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ABSTRACT
Immigration and population diversity are hot topics in Canadian society. Canadian
immigration discourses include widespread debates over the value of immigration to
Canada, the structure of the immigration program, and the impact of immigrants with
‘non-Canadian’ traditions and practices on Canadian society. Representations deployed
in these discourses operate to socially construct the Canadian nation, and symbolically
define immigrants’ place in Canada’s national imagined community. The present thesis
elaborates on theoretical understandings of the social construction of the Canadian
national community in the contemporary era of international migration by providing a
qualitative critical discourse analysis of three types of Canadian immigration
discourses: (1) media discourse (focusing on news media coverage of marriage
immigrants); (2) policy discourse (addressing materials produced by Citizenship and
Immigration Canada); and (3) official measurement of immigrants (in the form of the
Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada and its accompanying analytical reports).
The thesis reveals that these dominant immigration discourses serve to co-construct
immigrants, Canadians, and the Canadian state in the imagining of the Canadian
national community. These representations reveal that contemporary immigration to
Canada is a major source of tension and uncertainty. This ambivalence manifests as
inconsistent representations of immigrants (in general, and different groups of
immigrants, in particular), involving co-existing, contradictory discourses of inclusion,
marginalization, and exclusion. These representations inconsistently gender and
racialize immigrants, often in the context of immigration categories of admission. These
varied representations are interpreted in the thesis in terms of the convergence of
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historical patterns of discrimination, the growth in immigration from non-European
source countries, contemporary national and international concerns (e.g., economic
stability; terrorism), and rhetorical pride in Canada as a multicultural nation. Overall,
the present study contributes to theoretical work on Canadian immigration and
imagined communities by furthering understandings of the various ways in which
immigration discourses operate as conceptual spaces wherein what it means to be
Canadian is articulated, and the place of immigrants in the Canadian nation is defined
and contested.

Keywords: Canada, immigration, imagined community, imagined futures, critical
discourse analysis, qualitative, media discourse, policy discourse, Longitudinal Survey
of Immigrants to Canada.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
“Immigrants are actual people born outside the country who
have been admitted to Canada, as well as symbolic
representations of those who, in the eyes of the resident
population, should be given or denied entry to Canada” (Li,
2003c:2).
1.0 Introduction
On April 23, 2009, clad in a white wedding dress and holding a bridal bouquet, Lainie
Towell was surrounded by on-lookers and flashing cameras as she scaled the steps of
Parliament Hill. Towell, an attractive artist and dancer from Ottawa, was accompanied
up the steps not by her future husband, but by a full-sized red door that she had strapped
to her back: “‘The door was red, my dress was white – the colours echoed the Canadian
flag,’ says Ms. Towell” (Bielski, 2009, April 30). Towell was climbing Parliament Hill
on her hands and knees as a symbolic portrayal of the burden she claimed to have
suffered at the hands of her estranged husband, Fodé Mohamed Soumah. Soumah, an
immigrant from West Africa, was granted entry to Canada in 2007 on the basis of his
marriage to Towell, a Canadian citizen. According to Towell, Soumah had tricked her
into marrying him just to gain entry to Canada and receive status as a permanent
resident, only to abandon her within four weeks of landing on Canadian soil. Appearing
alongside the jilted bride on CTV’s Canada AM the day of her Parliament Hill trek,
Jason Kenney, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, noted with regret
that Towell’s experience was all too common, and that her case was evidence of “one of
the most frequent forms of immigration fraud.” 1 Kenney commented that “migration
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See http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/TopStories/20090423/marriage_protest_090423/ to watch a clip of
Towell and Kenney’s appearance on CTV’s Canada AM.
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integrity officers” closely screen potential immigrants, and do their best to prevent
fraud. Kenney further emphasized to viewers that it is of central importance to Canadian
society that incidents of immigration fraud be prevented.
In August of 2009, Naema Ahmed, a 29-year old pharmacist from Egypt, joined
a government-sponsored French language class in Montréal. While attending class,
Ahmed, a Muslim, insisted on wearing a niqab – a face-covering veil that exposes only
the wearer’s eyes. She also requested that certain accommodations be made in the
classroom out of respect for her religious beliefs:
“The teacher allowed her to give an oral presentation at the back of the
classroom, facing away from other students. However, [Ahmed]
complained that some male students could see her face and asked that
they be moved to a different part of the classroom” (Scott, 2010, March
2).
During the next three months, the school accommodated Ahmed’s requests to wear the
niqab, have female instructors, and be segregated from male students. Yet, in November
of 2009, Ahmed was expelled from the school on the grounds that her niqab was
interfering with language instruction and that her demands were creating a tense
classroom atmosphere. In response, Ahmed lodged a human rights complaint, reigniting
the “never-far-from-the-surface debate over reasonable accommodation of minorities”
(Scott, 2010, March 2). The case made national headlines and sparked a major
controversy over the extent to which the Canadian nation-state should bend to meet
newcomers’ diverse needs:
“I think this is an illustration of when an accommodation becomes
unreasonable,” civil-rights lawyer Julius Grey said…Morton Weinfeld,
chair in Canadian ethnic studies at McGill University, said it will be up
to the courts to rule on the issue. “My personal view as a citizen is that
there are always going to be limits to the amount of reasonable
accommodation we can have. This may be a reasonable limit,” he said
(Scott, 2010, March 2).
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As these two cases poignantly illustrate, immigration and the ethnic, religious,
and cultural diversity it brings about are controversial issues in contemporary Canadian
society, despite Canada’s widely cited legacy as a ‘nation of immigrants.’ Indeed, these
examples are only two of innumerable instances of public and political debate
surrounding immigration in Canada. These cases also capture the essence of the various
issues being addressed in this thesis. They demonstrate tensions surrounding
immigration policy and common concerns pertaining to the admission of newcomers,
such as who should be granted entry and, once they have been granted entry, how they
should be dealt with by Canadians and the Canadian state. The examples illustrate
concerns over granting admission to ‘undeserving’ immigrants, and trepidation
surrounding how to deal with immigrants who have ‘non-Canadian’ traditions and
practices. These examples also demonstrate that the Canadian nation has both literal and
symbolic boundaries, and illustrate that both types of boundaries are often perceived as
being threatened by newcomers from diverse backgrounds to the end of requiring
safeguarding by the Canadian state. These cases also reveal the fact that immigrants
occupy a contested place in Canadian society, and that their admission as permanent
residents does not automatically render them uncontested members of the Canadian
national community in the eyes of Canadian citizens or the Canadian state. Moreover,
the two examples document how discourses on immigrants, such as those put forth by
the media, politicians, and academics, communicate ideological messages pertaining to
gender, ‘race’/ethnicity, and national belonging in the context of immigration. Together,
these issues echo the overarching research question at hand in the present thesis –
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namely, in a global era of international migration, how is the Canadian national
community imagined and discursively constructed in relation to immigration?
As Benedict Anderson (2006) notes, “nation, nationality, nationalism – all have
proven notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyze” (p.3). In an effort to do just
that, Anderson examined the ways in which political and economic elites in postcolonial nations brought together fragmented population groups to formulate relatively
cohesive societies. Across different settings, he noted that elites sought to create a
shared sense of belonging among all citizens of a nation-state. This sense of belonging,
however, was necessarily ‘imagined’ in light of the impossibility of personal
connections among all members of the nation. It follows that nations, for Anderson, are
cultural artifacts that are upheld through elite-led nation-building processes.
Importantly, according to Anderson, nation-building was historically facilitated through
the development of print and mass media.
Anderson’s notion of ‘national communities’ as constructed imaginings and his
views of nation-building bear directly on questions of immigration and constructions of
national belonging. In a settler society such as Canada, there is an inherent link between
immigration and nation-building. As Smith (1993) notes, Canada emerged as a nationstate through “the gradual accretion of the right kinds of people, who acquire their
national identity by living in Canada and contributing to a Canadian way of life” (p.52).
Yet, with the emergence and acceleration of processes of globalization in recent
decades, the theoretical integrity of the ‘nation’ has come into question, in part due to
the widespread international movement of people, involving increasing temporary
migration, mobile refugee populations, and growth in transnational networks
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(Appadurai, 1996, 1993; Basch et al., 1994; Glick Schiller, 1999; Glick Schiller et al.,
1995, 1992; Kearney, 1995; Papastergiadis, 2000; Smith, 1995). Global and
transnational processes have led some theorists to prompt the need for ‘post-national’
understandings that move beyond viewing the ‘nation’ as a territorially bounded
imagined community that is governed by a sovereign state (Appadurai, 1996, 1993;
Glick Schiller, 1999; Glick Schiller et al., 1995, 1992; Steger, 2009a, 2009b; see also
Nieguth, 1999).
The present thesis was inspired by these theoretical tensions surrounding the
configuration of imagined communities in an era of globalization and international
migration. As previously noted, immigration has historically been a central component
of Canadian nation-building (Simmons, 2010), yet remains a source of considerable
controversy that speaks to the gap between literal and symbolic national borders. The
present thesis contends that the configuration of the Canadian imagined community in
contemporary contexts can be most fruitfully understood through an examination of
immigration discourses. This contention also draws on Anderson’s (2006) emphasis on
modes of communication, particularly print documentation and media, in historical
nation-building efforts. To this end, the present thesis examines dominant discourses on
Canadian immigration, focusing on media discourse, policy discourse, and
‘measurement’ discourse (i.e., official surveys), in order to assess the manner in which
the Canadian imagined community is imagined and constructed in an era of
globalization and widespread international migration.
Discourse can be broadly understood as an extensive, ongoing dialogue
articulated in a wide variety of written, spoken, and symbolic forms. Existing research
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on Canada’s immigration discourse has contended that immigrants are symbolically
constructed as outsiders to the Canadian imagined community (see Abu-Laban, 1998a,
1998b; Bannerji, 2000; Creese et al., 2008; Creese & Peterson, 1996; Henry & Tator,
2002; Henry et al., 2000; Jiwani, 1998; Li, 2007, 2003a, 2003c, 2001; Mahtani, 2008;
Thobani, 2007, 2000a, 2000b, 1999, 1998). This work commonly argues that
immigrants are socially constructed as symbolic or literal threats to the Canadian nation.
More specifically, much of the literature contends that Canada’s immigration discourse
constructs a racialized insider/outsider dichotomy between Canadian nationals and
immigrants that leads to the symbolic exclusion of immigrants and citizens of colour
from Canadian society. Gender has also been considered in this context, most often
addressed with a view to the marginalization of women immigrants of colour (see AbuLaban, 1998a, 1998b; Jiwani, 1998; Thobani, 2007, 2000a, 2000b, 1999, 1998). It is my
contention, however, that the immigration discourse accomplishes much more than this.
To this end, the present thesis builds on the strengths of the existing literature and
simultaneously helps fill the literature’s gaps by departing from it in important ways.
The thesis provides a more comprehensive and systematic examination of Canada’s
immigration discourse than previous work. This contribution involves both a theoretical
and empirical expansion upon the existing literature, the latter of which focuses most
directly on race and, importantly, on constructions of immigrants. Although the existing
literature recognizes that the construction of immigrants as ‘outsiders’ to the Canadian
nation implicitly constructs the nation’s ‘insiders,’ the present thesis contends that the
focus on the ‘immigrant’ side of this equation, and, in particular, the racialized
immigrant, has left considerable room for a further theoretical exploration of the
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‘imagined communities’ framework in reference to contemporary Canadian
immigration. Moreover, the literature typically makes reference to an expansive
‘immigration discourse’ to draw broad conclusions about underlying discriminatory
biases without exploring in detail the contours of different ‘strands’ of discourse.
Indeed, Canada’s immigration discourse is not monolithic, but is, in fact, constituted by
a number of discourses originating from diverse sources and representing particular
points of view and agendas in immigration debates. It is thus insufficient to simply
consider the construction of immigrants without contextualizing the potential social and
political reasons underlying these constructions in different contexts. To this end, the
present thesis explores three different immigration discourses with an eye to the
conceptualization of Canada’s imagined community in an era of globalization and
international immigration. In order to address this overarching objective, the thesis
examines the following research questions:
(1) How do specific immigration discourses (media, policy, and measurement)
represent immigrants?
(2) How are different categories of immigrants (i.e., based on immigrant mode of
entry, with a focus on family-class and economic immigrants – defined in
section 1.3 below) differentially characterized and represented in discourse?
(3) How are immigrants racialized and gendered in these representations?
(4) How might these various representations be put in service of the Canadian state?
(5) How do these representations operate to discursively define the boundaries of
Canada’s national imagined community?

8
The thesis applies a social constructionist perspective to Canadian immigration
discourses in order to elucidate the manner in which Canada’s imagined community is
constructed in the contemporary era of international migration and globalization,
addressing the broader social, economic, and political contexts within which this
construction occurs. In doing so, the thesis expands on theoretical understandings of the
manner in which gender, ‘race’/ethnicity, and immigrant mode of entry are
independently and interactively involved in the construction of Canada’s imagined
community.
Based on a multi-faceted examination of Canadian immigration discourse, the
present thesis argues that the Canadian imagined community is directly constructed
around a particular vision of the Canadian nation that entails the co-construction of
immigrants, Canadians, and the Canadian state. These constructions embody distinct
social and political tensions surrounding the presence of immigrants from non-European
countries, and occur alongside a neo-liberal agenda and national self-interest involving
an understanding of Canada as an economically strong, multicultural nation-state that
selects ‘good’ immigrants and prevents ‘bad’ immigrants from entering the country. To
this end, the construction of the Canadian national community through immigration
bears various stamps, including Canada’s discriminatory nation-building history,
national and global trends and controversies surrounding immigration, ideological
struggles to define Canadian national identity, and the state’s pursuit of legitimacy.
The remainder of this chapter provides the background for the thesis. First, a
theoretical framework of the various ways in which immigrants are socially constructed
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is discussed, followed by a brief overview of Canada’s post-Confederation immigration
history and a description of the current immigration program.
It is important to briefly note here that this thesis does not specifically examine
the immigration situation in Québec. Immigrant settlement (in both historical and
contemporary contexts), immigration policies, ethnic relations, and national identity in
Québec differ significantly from the remainder of the country. A comprehensive
appreciation of Québec’s imagined community would require an analysis of Québecois
French-language discourses and an in-depth appreciation of the unique political and
cultural history and circumstances of that province – a study in and of itself. The thesis
thus focuses on English-language discourses associated with ‘Canadian’ immigration,
and does not address the unique immigration situation of Québec in either the
background chapters or the original analysis chapters of the thesis.

1.1 The Social Construction of Immigrants in Canada
According to Li (2003a), social assessments and understandings of immigrants and their
place in receiving societies are, in part, determined by the ideological preferences and
concerns of the assessor. In other words, the interests and subjectivities of the assessor
shape the manner in which immigrants, as well as their role in and their impact on
society, are viewed and interpreted; these interests and subjectivities ultimately affect
the outcome of the assessment and the manner in which immigrants are represented. To
this end, different social constructions of immigrants can be interpreted as different
vantage points from which immigrants are evaluated. Social constructions of
immigrants define who is considered an immigrant, in addition to the characteristics and
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social value of those placed within the boundaries of this group. A useful framework is
offered by Li (2003a), who specifically articulates three different ways in which
immigrants are socially constructed: (1) a ‘folk’ version of immigrants; (2) immigrants
as an analytical concept, and (3) immigrants as a bureaucratic definition. Each of these
three constructions is addressed in the present thesis and thus requires brief explanation.
In Li’s (2003a) first type of social construction, the ‘folk’ version, the notion of
an ‘immigrant’ is associated with ‘racial’/ethnic categorization and cultural difference.
In the Canadian context of this type of construction, immigrants are understood as
persons who appear ‘foreign’ compared to descendents of mainly ‘White,’ European
settlers. In this social construction of immigrants, ‘fact’ and ‘myth’ are often
confounded, with ‘non-Whites’ being defined as ‘immigrants,’ regardless of their
national origin, and ‘Whites’ being defined as Canadian nationals, regardless of whether
or not they were born in Canada. As articulated by Kobayashi and Peake (1997),
“White, middle-class professionals from Britain or the United States are not commonly
perceived as ‘immigrants’” (p.7), even if they are, in fact, legally newcomers. In
contrast, visible minorities, regardless of whether they were born in Canada, are
constructed as immigrants based on their phenotypical features. Both Ng (1990) and
Mahtani (2008) similarly point out that ‘common-sense’ discourse constructs
immigrants as people of colour, and constructs people of colour as immigrants (see also
Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002; Bannerji, 2000; Creese & Kambere, 2003; Gonick, 2000),
despite the possible inaccuracies of these understandings. In the folk construction of
immigrants, ‘non-Whites’ are commonly problematized based on the assumption that
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they are linguistically and culturally ‘different’ from ‘Canadians’ (Li, 2003a; see also
Creese, 2007 and Creese & Kambere, 2003).
According to Li (2003a), immigrants can also be constructed as an analytical
concept. In this sense, ‘immigrant’ is a conceptual label used to construct theoretical
and operational boundaries around a group of individuals for analytical purposes.
Researchers, for instance, may conceptualize immigrants as persons who have moved
from one country to settle in another. In research studies, immigrant status is often
assessed by comparing country of birth and country of permanent residence, the
assumption being that if an individual were born in a country other than the one in
which they are residing, then she/he can be considered an ‘immigrant.’ According to Li
(2003a), the term ‘immigrant’ in analytical contexts is often used inconsistently and
imprecisely, and can at times be misleading. For instance, children living in Canada
who were born to individuals themselves born outside of Canada are often referred to in
research contexts as ‘second-generation immigrants,’ even if the children were born in
Canada. Imprecision in analytical contexts might also arise from self-identification (or
non-identification) as an immigrant, or in the context of acquired citizenship. In other
words, in an analytical setting, it is not always clear when someone is, is not, or is no
longer an immigrant.
Li’s (2003a) third way in which immigrants can be socially constructed pertains
to the bureaucratic definition of immigrants; this form of social construction is of
central importance in the present thesis. In a bureaucratic context, individuals are
constructed as ‘immigrants’ based on their legislative status. Nationals from other
countries who are granted legal admission to Canada as permanent residents are

12
bureaucratically constructed as ‘immigrants’ until they become Canadian citizens, at
which point their designation as immigrants would cease from a bureaucratic
standpoint, as these individuals would legally enjoy the same privileges and rights as
native-born Canadians. At the same time, this bureaucratic shift from ‘immigrant’ to
‘Canadian’ precludes access to immigrant settlement services, despite the possibility
that these services may still be of value to newly defined citizens.
As this typology suggests, the notion of an ‘immigrant’ is surrounded by
ambiguities and imprecision, despite typically being used as if it were straightforward
and unambiguous. The present thesis reveals that, in the Canadian context, these
different constructions of immigrants are often intertwined in complex ways, and are
illustrative of broader tensions relating to the social imagining of Canada as a nation.
Moreover, the present thesis reveals that the social construction of immigrants is about
much more than just immigrants. Indeed, the thesis illustrates that focusing exclusively
on the social construction of immigrants ignores the broader effect of these
representations in constructing other constituent parts of the Canadian nation. The thesis
demonstrates that constructions of immigrants are not exclusively about immigrants but,
rather, serve as a key means for defining the Canadian national community and this
community’s identity. As background to the thesis’ analysis, it is necessary to briefly
review the history of Canadian immigration and the contemporary context of immigrant
admission and immigration debates. The remaining sections of this chapter offer this
background.

13
1.2 Building Canada’s Imagined Community: A History of Immigration
Canada’s post-Confederation immigration history is discussed in more detail in Chapter
Three, and an overview of Canadian immigration levels is located in Appendix A. For
now, however, it is relevant to briefly document the extent to which constructions of
immigrants have been a longstanding feature of Canadian nation-building.
Canada was founded as a settler society whose government actively sought to
build a ‘White’ nation through immigration by enacting policies to attract ‘desirable’
immigrants and to exclude or marginalize ‘undesirable’ immigrants (Stasiulis &
Jhappan, 1995). Indeed, as Canada was settled and built as a nation, the immigration
program was structured so as to promote the long-term settlement of persons and
families who were seen as ideal future citizens (that is, who could and would become
‘insiders’ to the Canadian national community) and to discourage or outright prohibit
the settlement of migrants who were viewed as inherently incompatible with the longterm vision of the nation (Abu-Laban, 1998a; Das Gupta, 1995; Satzewich, 1998a;
Simmons, 2010, 1999, 1998; Stasiulis, 1997). Public and political discourses, as
represented by immigration policies, published documents, public forums, politicians’
speeches, etc., reflected these ideological biases in both explicit and implicit ways.
The precise features of ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ immigrants, and the manner
in which these features were defined in discourse, have varied to some degree over
time, depending on social norms and the economic and demographic needs of the
Canadian nation at any given point in time. For the first century of Canada’s postConfederation immigration history, the distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’
was explicitly structured along lines of ‘race,’ ethnicity, and/or national origin (Abella
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& Trooper, 1982; Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Boyd & Vickers, 2000; Calliste, 1993;
Das Gupta, 1995; Green & Green, 2004; Hawkins, 1972; Li, 1998; Satzewich, 1989a,
1989b; Simmons, 2010, 1999, 1998; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Thompson & Weinfeld,
1995; Whitaker, 1991). The settlement of British, Western European, and American
immigrants was typically preferred, while the settlement of other immigrants was
discouraged or prohibited (Li, 2003a). Although some ‘non-preferred’ immigrants were
granted entry to the country throughout the nation’s early immigration history, often as
needed for immediate labour purposes, they remained marginalized ‘Others’ who were
excluded from the full privileges afforded to ‘White’ settlers (Stasiulis & Jhappan,
1995). Moreover, the intersection between the ideological construction of a ‘White
Canada’ and the economic needs of the growing nation interacted with gender and
social class in relation to norms of appropriate work and social roles. To this end,
immigrants, immigrant families, and the Canadian nation were constructed along
intersecting lines of race, gender, and social class (Abu-Laban, 1998a; Das Gupta, 1995;
Stasiulis, 1985; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Thobani, 2000; 1999, 1998). These points
are clarified in Chapter Three.
Since the late 1960s, the composition of the immigration population to Canada
has changed considerably compared to the first century of post-Confederation
immigration. During the 1960s, in the midst of growing social and political commitment
to principles of equality and non-discrimination, the Canadian government liberalized
the immigration system, abandoning the longstanding “nationality preference system”
(Simmons, 1990: 141) of immigrant selection. In the new system introduced in the
1960s, immigrants were selected according to ‘objective’ criteria pertaining to
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individual skills and family relationships. 2 As a result of these changes, the nation
witnessed a ‘new wave’ of immigrants from ‘non-traditional’ source countries,
including Asia, Africa, and Latin America (see Simmons, 1990). Moreover, increased
allowances for family reunification meant that a growing number of immigrants were
arriving in Canada on the basis of their relationship with a Canadian permanent resident
or citizen. Notably, this change in immigration patterns sparked a controversy regarding
‘family’ immigration that has persisted for the past 50 years, and has come to occupy a
prominent place in Canadian public and political discourses on immigration. This
debate is discussed in Section 1.4 of this chapter.
Over time, non-European source countries have come to provide an increasingly
substantial portion of Canada’s annual intake of immigrants. For instance, 87.1% of all
immigrants admitted to Canada between 1946 and 1955 arrived from Europe (including
Britain, which alone accounted for 29.3% of immigrants over this time period); in
contrast, between 1979 and 2000, only 22.5% of all immigrants to Canada arrived from
Europe (with a total of only 5.1% from Britain), while 53.8% arrived from Asia. In
2008, only 20.9% of immigrants arrived from the United States, Europe, and the United
Kingdom (CIC, 2009b). These changes have been associated with a transformation of
the cultural landscape of Canada; as Simmons (2010) notes, “immigrants from Africa,
Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America have brought and continue to bring new
2

The supposed deracialization of Canada’s immigration system in the 1960s has been challenged, often
by critical race scholars who point out that the manner in which the immigration program was structured
continued to racialize immigration, despite the overt removal of race as an organizing principle (see
Satzewich, 1989a; Simmons, 1999; Stasiulis, 1985; Thobani, 2007, 2000a, 2000b, 1999, 1998).
Moreover, it has been argued that the socio-economic criteria embedded in the selection system
introduced in the 1960s effectively served to create a ‘class-based’ system that continues to shape the
countries from which immigrants are selected (see Simmons, 2010). Chapter Three discusses these
matters in more detail.
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nationalities, languages, and cultures to Canada” (p.114). The growth in non-European
immigration source countries has also entailed a transformation of the ‘face’ of the
nation since the 1960s, with ever-increasing proportions of visible minorities
constituting the Canadian population. For instance, in 1981, 4.7% of Canada’s total
population was considered a visible minority (Statistics Canada, 1998). By 1991, this
proportion had increased to 7.7% (Statistics Canada, 1993). Fifteen years later, this
proportion had more than doubled, with the 2006 Census recording over 5 million
persons, or approximately 16.2% of Canada’s population, as visible minorities
(Statistics Canada, 2008).

1.3 A Brief Summary of Current Immigration in Canada
Broadly speaking, migrants to Canada are granted entry as either temporary residents or
permanent residents. Temporary residents are migrants who enter Canada for a defined
period of time. This group includes visitors, temporary workers, and students (see
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/index.asp). There are various streams of admission for
immigrants whose entry is premised on the expectation of permanent residence (and
possible citizenship). Under current immigration legislation (the 2002 Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act – IRPA), permanent residents fall under one of three categories:
(1) economic immigrants, whose admission is based on their human capital and is
geared toward national economic development; (2) family-class immigrants, whose
admission is associated with social goals – specifically, the reunification of families;
and (3) refugees, whose admission is based on humanitarian considerations involving
Canada’s international obligation to protect individuals affected by imminent danger or
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undue persecution (see Statutes of Canada, 2001). Importantly, although ‘immigrant’
and ‘refugee’ are legal categories, affecting individuals’ material reality in Canada (for
instance, in terms of access to settlement services), they can also be seen as discursive
constructions, in that they reflect ideological biases and constitute immigrants as objects
bearing institutionally defined characteristics.
In terms of these bureaucratic categories, the present thesis is most specifically
interested in family-class and economic immigrants (but also more broadly considers
‘immigrants’ insofar as this concept is articulated in discourse without being further
defined). In the current immigration legislation, the immigration program (associated
primarily with economic and social objectives) and the refugee program (associated
with humanitarian objectives) are guided by distinct regulations. Temporary labour
migration streams are also regulated by discrete policies and programs (see
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/work/index.asp). Moreover, permanent resident
immigrants, refugees and temporary workers are generally treated as distinct groups in
the sociological literature and in public discourse, and thus, to some extent, are seen as
occupying unique sociological spaces. Although the decision to focus on economic
immigrants and family-class immigrants in this thesis may reinforce the notion that
bureaucratic categorizations are a meaningful way of identifying and constructing
immigrants, it is not meant to reify these distinctions, nor is it intended to indicate
support for bureaucratic categorization as the best way of defining immigrants. Rather,
it is merely a decision based on the existing nature of Canadian immigration, and a
means of providing a manageable scope for the present research.
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1.31 Economic Immigrants
As described in the IRPA, economic immigrants are foreign nationals selected on the
basis of their ability to become economically established in Canada. This category
includes skilled workers, the self-employed, entrepreneurs, investors, and certain
provincial/territorial nominees (Statutes of Canada, 2001). Skilled workers are selected
through the point system, wherein they are evaluated according to a number of
‘objective’ criteria (specifically, education, language skills, experience, age, arranged
employment, and adaptability), each of which is associated with a defined number of
possible points. If an applicant’s total score exceeds the designated cut-off (currently,
67 points), they are eligible for entry as a permanent resident, providing that other
criteria for entry to Canada (such as health and security checks) are met (see
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/apply-factors.asp). Business class
immigrants (including entrepreneurs and the self-employed) are granted entry based on
their likelihood of success in a business, athletic, or cultural venture in Canada, as
defined by different criteria depending on the activities in which the immigrant intends
to be involved (see http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/business/index.asp).
‘Investor’ immigrants are required to have a net worth of at least $800,000 and are
required to invest a minimum of $400,000 in a business project in Canada. 3 Eligible
spouses and dependents who accompany principal applicants are also enumerated as
economic immigrants. Notably, however, as the upcoming chapters illustrate, this
3

As of June 26, 2010, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) temporarily stopped accepting
applications for the Immigrant Investor Program in order to revise eligibility requirements. The
Government of Canada is proposing that investors be required to have a net worth of at least $1.6 million
and invest at least $800,000 in the Canadian economy. This represents a proposed increase of 100% over
the existing requirements.
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bureaucratic classification does not mean that economic-class spouses and principal
applicants are socially constructed in comparable terms. This disjuncture is discussed
throughout the thesis.

1.32 Family-Class Immigrants
Family-class status is reserved for immigrants who join a family member already
residing in Canada as a permanent resident or a citizen. These immigrants are granted
entry on the basis of their relationship with a Canadian permanent resident/citizen, be it
a spouse, a child, a parent, etc. 4 (in addition to health and security criteria) (Statutes of
Canada, 2001). Family-class immigration occurs in contexts of family reunification and
family formation (Croes & Hooimeijer, 2010; Merali, 2009, 2008). In somewhat of a
simplification of often complex processes, the first instance involves reunification of
families that pre-existed the migration of one or more member of the family, and thus
pertains to families that were geographically split by the migration process. This type of
migration is a common arrangement wherein one family member migrates first, and is
later ‘followed’ by other family members, known as ‘chain migration’ (Boyle et al.,
1998; Croes & Hooimeijer, 2010; Massey et al., 1994). Conceptually, this process
implies an active leader (a pioneer migrant), and a passive, dependent, follower. The
second sub-category of family-class immigration involves establishing new families in
various ways, such as through transnational marriages (e.g., culturally arranged
marriages, mail-order brides, new partners encountered over the Internet or through

4

Exactly who has been eligible for entry under different categories has changed over time; this will be
discussed further in Chapter Three.
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travel, etc.) (Constable, 2003; Lauser, 2008, 2006; Merali, 2009, 2008; Piper & Roces,
2003).
Importantly, both family reunification and family formation are gendered
processes that materially and ideologically construct the secondary immigrant (most
often a woman) within relations of dependence (Boyd, 1997; Das Gupta, 1995; Merali,
2009, 2008; Thobani, 2000a, 2000b). In the Canadian context, this construction of
dependence is tied into the legislative requirements associated with family-class
immigration. Under existing legislation, family-class immigrants are eligible for entry
into Canada only if a Canadian citizen or permanent resident signs a ‘sponsorship
agreement.’ With this agreement, sponsors commit to being financially responsible for
their sponsored family member for a minimum of three to ten years after the immigrant
acquires permanent resident status (with the specific length of time depending on the
type of family relationship between the sponsor and the sponsored immigrant). With
this commitment, the sponsor agrees to pay for any sponsored immigrant’s “food,
shelter, clothing, necessary goods or services, and health and dental care not already
covered” (CIC, 2010a: 47). For spouses or partners sponsored into the country under the
family class, the sponsor’s financial obligation is set at three years after the sponsored
immigrant becomes a permanent resident; this time period was set in 2002, at which
time it was lowered from the previous commitment of ten years. This change was
brought about in part by political activism relating to the potential dangers that
legislated dependence could entail for sponsored immigrants (for instance, in cases of
domestic violence; see Côté et al., 2001; Narayan, 1995; Thobani, 1999; Vukov, 2003;
Walton-Roberts, 2004a).
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As previously noted, family-class immigration, including the sponsorship
program, has long stood as a topic of notable debate in the Canadian immigration
discourse, commonly addressed by both women’s advocates and immigration critics.
Immigrant advocates commonly emphasize the gendered nature of spousal sponsorship;
in this regard, some argue the need to abandon sponsorship requirements altogether,
pointing out that women who migrate through marriage are highly vulnerable in light of
their precarious status in society and the unequal power relations entailed in the
sponsorship process (Côté et al., 2001). Others maintain that the sponsorship process is
needed in order to ensure financial security for incoming spouses 5 (Walton-Roberts,
2004a). For their part, immigration critics problematize family-class immigration and
the sponsorship program based on claims that immigrants entering the country through
this route impose a financial burden on the Canadian system, emphasizing that the
financial responsibility of sponsors is insufficiently enforced (see, for example, Francis,
2002a, 2002b, 1993). As illustrated in this thesis, the contention that family-class
immigration is a national burden represents a central theme around which this group of
immigrants is constructed in immigration discourses. The present thesis uncovers in
detail the contours of these social constructions of family-class immigrants, interpreted
in terms of the impact of these representations in symbolically positioning family-class
immigrants to the Canadian national community.

5

See Walton-Roberts (2004a) for a discussion of the arguments presented to CIC by two advocacy
groups taking these different stances leading up to the regulation changes implemented in the IRPA.
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1.4 Canadian Immigration Discourse
At the heart of the present study is the contention that immigration discourse is a central
site for constructing the Canadian national imagined community, including the social
groups that inhabit this community, those that stand on its margins, and those that stand
outside its borders. In the Canadian context, the ‘immigration question’ speaks directly
to the imagining of the Canadian national community. This ‘question’ commonly
revolves around the theme of balance: balance between admitting ‘too many’ or ‘too
few’ immigrants into the country with respect to economic and demographic needs;
balance between the economic and the social goals of the immigration program; and
balance between the costs and the benefits associated with being a country of largescale immigration (Puttagunta, 1998). Much of this debate over ‘balance’ translates into
a debate over the type of immigrants (and the respective volume of these groups) being
admitted into the country.
Broadly speaking, the ‘balance’ discourse is indicative of a widespread
utilitarian mentality and a widely held belief “[…] that the worth of immigrants is
contingent on the ability of newcomers to benefit the existing population in Canada” (Li
2003a: 164). Indeed, although immigration has long been justified on grounds of
national economic benefit, public and political discourses on immigration have
increasingly emphasized the value of immigrant ‘self-sufficiency,’ particularly since the
1990s, at which time Canada underwent a widespread process of neo-liberal
restructuring (Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Arat-Koc, 1999). In this context, ‘ideal’
immigrants are those who will enrich the Canadian labour market with their skills and
who will not ‘drain’ public resources by relying on welfare and other social programs.
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As it commonly plays out in the public and political discourse on immigration, this
ideology translates into a clear and unquestioned preference for economic immigrants
(and skilled worker principal applicants in particular), and a widespread
problematization of family-class immigration (Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Creese et al.,
2008; Deshaw, 2006; Li, 2003c; Satzewich, 1993; Thobani, 2000a, 2000b, 1998).
Indeed, family-class immigration represents a common target for vocal critics of the
country’s immigration program (see Campbell, 2000, 1989; Collacott, 2002; Francis,
2002b; Gwyn, 1995; Stoffman, 2002, 1993 6 ). These critics most commonly espouse
two major classes of arguments: first, that admission of family-class immigrants results
in the exclusion of skilled and talented immigrants; and second, that family-class
immigrants place a burden on the public purse because they are not self-sufficient and
commonly rely on government assistance. In the public and political discourse
surrounding immigration, family-class immigrants are thus constructed as being “less
able [than economic immigrants] to integrate, more likely to go on welfare, and in
general more of a burden to Canadian society” (Abu-Laban 1998b: 201). Anti-familyclass immigration arguments also imply this form of immigration represents a detriment
to the Canadian nation because it allows entry to those who will detract from the
country’s well-being at the expense of those who would be able to contribute to
Canadian prosperity (Puttagunta, 1998).

6

All of these authors are well-known critics of Canada’s immigration program whose views receive
widespread media attention (as discussed by Bauder, 2008; Henry & Tator, 2002; Li, 2003c). Stoffman’s
book (entitled “Who gets in: What’s wrong with Canada’s immigration program – and how to fix it,”
2002) was runner-up for the Donner Prize for best book on Canadian public policy and the Shaughnessy
Cohen Prize for best book on Canadian politics. Other of these authors (particularly Diane Francis and
Martin Collacott) are regular contributors to the National Post, widely known for its anti-immigrant
stance. A case study of Francis’ reporting on Canadian immigration can be found in Henry and Tator
(2002, Chapter 7).
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The remainder of this thesis elaborates on portrayals of immigrants in various
discourses, with a focus, whenever possible, on distinctions between economic and
family-class immigrants, and on the ‘racial’/ethnic and gendered nature of
representations. The thesis documents the subtleties, continuities, and contradictions of
these representations within and across different discourses, and demonstrates that the
social construction of immigrants serves distinct purposes and is revealing of broader
social concerns that are uncovered by linking representations of immigrants to the social
context within which they are articulated. The thesis links these representations to the
social construction of the Canadian ‘imagined community,’ demonstrating the central
role that the social construction of immigrants plays in defining ‘Canadians,’ the
Canadian state, and the Canadian nation.

1.5 Thesis Outline
Chapter Two describes the theoretical and methodological background for this thesis,
including an explanation of the overarching theoretical framework, definitions of key
concepts, and an explanation of critical discourse analysis as a methodology. Chapter
Three provides a critical examination of post-Confederation immigration history with a
focus on the intersections between economic and family-class immigration streams.
Chapters Four to Six constitute the thesis’ original data analysis. Each of these chapters
uses a different data set (to be described in each individual chapter), and focuses on a
different ‘type’ of discourse. More specifically, Chapter Four offers an analysis of print
news media, focusing on the social construction of a particular sub-group of familyclass immigrants in Canada (namely, “marriage” immigrants); Chapter Five considers
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immigration policy discourse; Chapter Six addresses analytical discourse (represented
by official measurement of immigrants, in the form of the Longitudinal Survey of
Immigrants to Canada). A focused literature review and a description of the specific
methods used for selecting and analyzing data are provided in these individual chapters.
Chapter Seven brings together the findings from the three analysis chapters to offer an
overarching conclusion regarding discourse and the construction of Canada’s imagined
community.
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CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
“One of the key tenets of contemporary social theory is to
question the ideological construction of social categories and to
seek to uncover the material interests that such categorizations
inevitably serve” (White & Jackson, 1995: 15).
“We are surrounded by and immersed in discourses. They
inhabit all written and spoken material and are embedded in all
systems of signification” (Burr, 1995: 141).

2.0 Introduction
Overarching the individual theoretical frameworks guiding Chapters Four, Five, and Six
is a larger framework that informs this thesis as a whole. The thesis draws on a wide
range of perspectives that share an inherent epistemological affinity and that are highly
amenable to the methodology of critical discourse analysis. The present chapter outlines
these perspectives, and defines key concepts that surface throughout the thesis. First, the
overarching ideas of social constructionism, discourse, and the concepts of power and
ideology are described. Next, two main theoretical frameworks used in the thesis,
Imagined Communities and Imagined Futures, are discussed. From here, additional key
concepts (namely, race, racism, racialization, ethnicity, and gender) are defined in terms
of how they are employed in the present thesis. Having laid this conceptual
groundwork, the chapter concludes by summarizing the methodological principles of
critical discourse analysis that underlie the thesis’ analytical approach.

2.1 Social Constructionism
At the heart of theories of social constructionism is the understanding that categories are
used to structure experience and to understand the social world (Jackson & Penrose,
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1993). Proponents of social constructionism contend that knowledge and reality are
produced and sustained by social processes whereby information about the world is
constructed in such a way as to provide a framework of understanding. From this
perspective, characteristics of individuals or groups, as well as social relationships
between people and groups (including unequal relationships), are often accepted as
natural or legitimate, when, in fact, they have been socially constructed. For instance,
using Hacking’s (2000) example, a ‘woman refugee’ can be understood as a social
construction:
What is socially constructed is not, in the first instance, the individual
people, the women refugees. It is the classification, woman refugee. […]
This way of classifying people is the product of social events, of
legislation, of social workers, of immigrant groups, of activists, of
lawyers, and of the activities of the women involved. This kind of
person, as a specific kind of person, is socially constructed. Or simply:
the idea of the woman refugee is constructed (p.10).
To this end, social constructionism questions essentialist views of the social world, and
problematizes taken-for-granted knowledge that is traditionally viewed as ‘natural,’
unbiased, or objective (Burr, 1995; Jackson & Penrose, 1993). Social constructionist
theories are critical of the status quo, and demand that a range of ‘givens’ be questioned
and re-evaluated (Burr, 1995; Hacking, 2000). A social constructionist perspective
involves identifying the components and processes of category construction. In this
context, the objective is not to demonstrate that categories are ‘false,’ but, rather, to
illustrate that they are not ‘natural’ and, as such, serve a social purpose. Insofar as
existing categories are exposed as constructs, they can be deconstructed so as to
“disempower them or appropriate their intrinsic power, to achieve more equitable ends”
(Jackson & Penrose, 1993:2).
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2.2 Dominant Discourses: Elites, Orthodoxy, Ideology, and Power
The notion of discourse as a scientific construct was popularized by 20th century
philosophers and post-structuralists, and is commonly associated in the social sciences
with philosopher Michel Foucault and cultural theorist Stuart Hall. Broadly speaking, a
discourse is a body of representations (including written and spoken words, images,
ideas, etc.) that create meaning regarding a particular topic (Lilja, 2009). As defined
more specifically by Hall (1997):
Discourses are ways of referring to or constructing knowledge about a
particular topic of practice: a cluster (or formation) of ideas, images and
practices, which provide ways of talking about, forms of knowledge and
conduct associated with, a particular topic, social activity or institutional
site in society. These discursive formations, as they are known, define
what is and is not appropriate in our formulation of, and our practices in
relation to, a particular subject or site of social activity; what knowledge
is considered useful, relevant and ‘true’ in that context; and what sorts of
persons or ‘subjects’ embody its characteristics (p. 6).
Discourses are a central site of social construction, and inform social practices by
providing meanings and by defining the social world (Lilja, 2009).
The present thesis focuses on dominant discourses pertaining to immigration
(namely, discourses originating from various components of the Canadian state and
from the Canadian news media). A discourse is distinguished as ‘dominant’ on the basis
of its connection to elite groups and structures in society, its power to be ‘heard’ and
‘seen’ in society, and its ubiquity as a framework for interpreting social life (relative to
other possible frameworks). As van Dijk (1989) explains:
It is the symbolic elite and its discourses that control the types of
discourses, the topics, the types and the amount of information, the
selection or censoring of arguments, and the nature of rhetorical
operations. These conditions essentially determine the contents and the
organization of public knowledge, the hierarchies of beliefs, and the
pervasiveness of the consensus, which in turn are potent factors in the
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formation and the reproduction of opinions, attitudes, and ideologies
(van Dijk, 1989: 25-6).
The concept of ‘symbolic elites’ underlies the notion of dominant discourse employed
in this thesis. This term refers to groups (such as state actors and journalists) who are
implicated in the construction of dominant discourses through their privileged access to
powerful institutions and instruments in society (such as the mass media) (see van Dijk,
2006, 1996). Although the boundaries surrounding such a definition may not be precise,
symbolic elites can be broadly understood as “those who control the means of
communication and who are engaged in the manufacturing of public opinion” (van
Dijk, 1993b: x).
Importantly, scholars often argue that dominant discourses are characterized by
considerable ideological and linguistic coherence, and share a normative framework
rooted in the (conscious or unconscious) desire of elites to maintain the status quo.
Often, these discourses are interpreted in terms of hegemony (see Karim, 1993; Li,
2003c; Lilja, 2009; Williams, 1977). In contrast, from the perspective employed in this
thesis, dominant discourses on immigration are better understood in reference to Pierre
Bourdieu’s (1977) notion of orthodoxy. In Bourdieu’s formulation, social knowledge
consists of two fields, or ‘universes’: the universe of the undisputed (doxa), and the
universe of the disputed (consisting of heterodox and orthodox discourses). Doxa
consists of social knowledge that, at a given point in time in a given society, is taken for
granted and unquestioned. Doxa can thus be understood as that which “goes without
saying because it comes without saying” (Bourdieu, 1977: 167). Embedded in doxa is
the implication that the existing nature of the social (and natural) world is not only
legitimate, but entirely natural and incapable of human modification. Dominant groups
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hold interest in protecting doxa, while dominated groups hold interest in advancing
discourses that push back the boundaries of doxa. The universe of discourse offers this
possibility in the form of heterodoxy. Heterodoxy consists of the radical arguments,
experiences, and suggestions that protest the order of the world laid out in doxa. In
other words, although doxa is upheld by dominant groups as being beyond question, it
can be brought into crisis and transformed through heterodox discourses that identify
alternative possibilities to the existing social order (that is, the constructed systems of
classification associated with the status quo).
In the presence of heterodoxy, another field of discourse – orthodoxy – emerges.
Orthodoxy represents the realm of dominant discourses, which offer manifestly
legitimate ways of thinking about the social and natural world. These discourses are
advanced to protect the integrity of doxa, and operate (albeit imperfectly) to protect the
interests of the dominant classes and preserve the status quo. Orthodoxy thus represents
the “imperfect substitute” (Bourdieu, 1977: 169) of doxa, geared toward rendering
heterodox discourses illegitimate opinions rather than viable alternatives to doxa.
Depending on the effectiveness of orthodoxy, heterodox discourses will be silenced to
greater or lesser degrees, which in turn affects the extent to which doxa is preserved or
altered.
Underlying this framework is the understanding that dominant discourses (the
universe of orthodoxy) act as vehicles of ideology. Ideology, as a theoretical construct,
has been understood and employed in different ways throughout the history of the
sociology, and remains variably defined across different approaches (see Mannheim,
1997; Minar, 1961; van Dijk, 2000). Although the notion of ideology can be traced back
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at least as far as the French Revolution (see Hunt, 2004), the concept is commonly
associated with Marxism and its various theoretical offshoots (Hunt, 2004; Mannheim,
1997). In the work of George Lukacs and Antonio Gramsci, for instance, ideology is
understood in relation to false consciousness. Lukacs argues that false consciousness
emerges out of the practices of life in capitalist society, wherein impersonal economic
exchanges constitute the basis of most social relations, such that the socially constructed
nature of class inequality is obscured by the structure of capitalist production and
exchange. This leads to false consciousness regarding the reality of class oppression.
False consciousness benefits the bourgeoisie and is detrimental to the working class in
light of the fact that it preserves the status quo. In this context, ideologies serve as
explanations and justifications for the visible contradictions between the circumstances
of the capitalists and the working poor in capitalist societies (see Lukacs, 1971). Also
addressing class inequality in capitalist societies, Antonio Gramsci (1971) contends that
ideologies are normative sets of ideas and beliefs that guide observations and
interpretations of the capitalist social world. In Gramsci’s understanding, by virtue of its
general and intellectual subordination to the capitalist class, the working class adopts
ideologies that legitimate its oppression. In this context, social change is theorized as
coming about when the working class adopts a revolutionary ideology. Drawing on
these various ideas but stepping outside of the link between capitalism, false
consciousness, and ideology, Henry and Tator (2002) offer a useful definition that
captures the manner in which ideology is understood in the present thesis. According to
the authors, an ideology is:
A complex set of ideas that attempts to explain, justify, legitimate, and
perpetuate the circumstances in which a collectivity finds itself. It
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provides the basis for guiding behaviour, making sense of the world,
imparting meaning to life, instilling a common bond among group
members, and explaining situations. Ideology provides a framework for
organizing, legitimizing, and maintaining relations of power and
decision-making at all levels in institutions and systems (Henry & Tator,
2002: 246).
Ideologies are propagated, in part, through discourses that represent and construct the
social world, including different groups of people, the relationships between them, and
their respective relationships with other entities and institutions in a given society at a
given point in time. In other words, ideologies operate in discourses that both reflect
existing ideologies and contribute to their stability (or their modification) (see van Dijk,
2002, 1989).
As the above discussion suggests, the notions of symbolic elites, orthodoxy and
ideology are all linked to the idea of social power. Power, a widely used concept in
sociology, is the source of considerable debate in terms of its meaning and analytical
usefulness (Grabb, 2007). This issue notwithstanding, the notion of power is commonly
invoked in critical discourse analysis, and is intimately intertwined with the notion of
dominant discourses, elites, and orthodoxy. Power is understood in the present thesis in
social (rather that personal/individual) terms. Social power is a property of the
relationship between social groups, premised upon differential access to, and control
over, limited social resources (van Dijk, 1995, 1989). It can be broadly defined in the
context of structured inequality, wherein dominant social groups have the capacity and
resources to enact processes and strategies geared toward the legitimation of inequality
and the preservation of the status quo (Grabb, 2007). In this regard, “the exercise and
maintenance of social power presupposes an ideological framework [which] is mainly
acquired, confirmed, or changed through communication and discourse” (van Dijk,
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1989: 21). As previously discussed, dominant groups utilize orthodox discourses to
support the status quo (including their positions of power) while oppressed groups
deploy heterodox discourses to protest unequal social conditions. Deconstructing
discourse thus affords the opportunity to identify manifestations of social power, as well
as strategies that aim to resist inequality.

2.3 Imagined Communities
Benedict Anderson’s treatise on nationalism, Imagined Communities, offers an
important starting point for the present thesis, and can be tied to social constructionism,
orthodox discourses, and the other associated concepts discussed thus far in this chapter.
Based on an examination of the historical development of nation-states around the
world, Anderson argues that nation-building efforts on behalf of economic and political
elites revolve around creating a shared sense of belonging among all constituents of the
nation-state. In this understanding, a nation is a geographical, cultural, and ideological
entity with four defining features. First, it is “imagined because the members of even
the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even
hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson,
2006: 6). Second, it is “sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which the
Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained,
hierarchical dynastic realm” (Anderson, 2006: 7). Third, it is “limited because even the
largest [nation], encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if
elastic boundaries” (Anderson, 2006: 7). Finally, a nation can be conceptualized as “a
community because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail
in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson,
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2006: 7). As part of nation-building strategies employed by national elites, the creation
of imagined communities was an intentional process that was historically facilitated by
the spread of literacy and the development of mass media and improved modes of
communication. State actors and other elites, through access to various tools and
discourses (such as media and school curricula), are able to create a shared sense of
nationhood that legitimates particular sets of values, beliefs, and practices, and that
obscures internal fragmentation and diverse (non-national) forms of identification (such
as those based on ethnicity or religion).
Viewing a nation as an imagined, sovereign, limited community entails a series
of assumptions and implications that are highly pertinent to immigration discourse and,
thus, to the present thesis. First, insofar as a community is imagined, its reality lies in its
social construction. In this context, a nation is a cultural artifact that brings with it an
ideology of national belonging around which inclusion in the nation is premised. Yet,
given that a nation is limited, it is necessarily characterized by exclusion. To this end,
the construction of ‘us,’ as members of a shared imagined community, involves a
counter-construction of ‘them,’ consisting of ‘Others’ who do not fall within the
boundaries of the nation. Finally, Anderson’s articulation of the importance of modes of
communication and the role of elites in the construction of imagined communities
suggests the relevance of dominant discourses in symbolic nation-building strategies.
Indeed, as Creese (2007) explains, “imagined communities operate through discourses
[…] that tend to homogenize and erase differences internal to the nation, and separate
citizens from (both internally and externally located) ‘Others’” (Creese, 2007: 354). The
historical centrality of dominant discourses in nation-building highlights the relevance
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of studying prevailing discourses with an eye to how they contribute to the social
construction of national imagined communities in contemporary contexts.

2.4 Imagined Futures
Alan Simmons offers a particularly useful expansion on Anderson’s notion of imagined
communities by directly addressing immigration policy (which, notably, was not
explicitly addressed by Anderson). For Simmons, each phase of a nation’s history can
be understood in terms of a prevailing vision of the nation’s future (that is, an ‘imagined
future’) around which nation-building efforts are constructed. Nation-building, in this
context, is “a historical process guided by political leaders through their implementation
of relatively coherent policy packages covering economic growth, trade, immigration,
and cultural goals and strategies, as well as other related matters” (Simmons, 2010: 14)
(see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1 Imagined Futures and Immigration Policy

CONTEXT
Nation’s position in the international system

POLICY PROCESS
Trade options
and preferences

Immigration options
and preferences

IMAGINED FUTURE

OUTCOMES
Immigrant integration?
Transformation of society?

Source: Reproduced from Simmons (1999: 35)

Cultural identity
options and
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In developing policies, political leaders and policy advisors consider the various
combinations of policy options, and decide upon the most appropriate strategy for
achieving the desired ‘imagined future.’ Imagined futures are thus ‘conceptual spaces’
wherein nation-building is negotiated and planned (Simmons, 1999).
Depending on the historical circumstances and the nation-building goals being
pursued at any given point in time, there will varying degrees of tension involved in
determining the most complementary set of policies. In an over-simplified example,
political leaders may struggle to determine the best policy package for a nation in
instances where the nation’s imagined future requires a high level of immigration to
meet labour demands, the prevailing vision of the population is monocultural in nature,
and immigrants are only available from ‘non-preferred’ cultural sources. Alternatively,
if a pluralistic vision of the nation exists under the same circumstances, developing a
coherent policy package would be (in principle) less challenging.
As this description suggests, immigration policy does not emerge as an
independent and isolated decision, but is integrated into state leaders’ broader vision for
the nation within an international system. It follows that, depending on broader goals
and policy directions, immigration flows will wax and wane, and different immigrants
will be considered more or less ‘ideal’ with respect to their ‘fit’ with a nation’s
imagined future. On a related point, it is important to note that the formulation of a
policy package is based on assumptions about the ‘fit’ between various policies and, in
the case of immigration, the success of newcomers with respect to their ‘imagined’ role
in building the nation. At any given point in time, immigration policies (and the other
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policies with which they are intertwined) will continue to make sense only insofar as
they enable the nation’s goals (as defined by political leaders) to be realized:
For example, if Canada’s hopes for future exports are not realized, the
logic of a policy favouring the immigration of skilled foreign labour and
entrepreneurs will be called into question. The skilled workers will be
without jobs and the entrepreneurs will seek greener pastures elsewhere
(Simmons, 1999: 46).
Given that immigration is an arena where economic and cultural values intersect
(Simmons, 1999), any imagined future will be based on the assumption that the cultural
identity of the nation will not be threatened by immigration, and that newcomers will be
accepted into the nation. Thus, if immigration policies are constructed around a multicultural national vision, the assumption is that immigrants from diverse countries and
backgrounds will integrate into their receiving society, and that immigration will not
stimulate social conflict (Simmons, 1999).
The present thesis draws on Simmons’ useful framework, but approaches it from
a slightly different angle by focusing on discourse. More specifically, insofar as
Canadian immigration policies are based on a particular vision of the nation, then the
discourse advanced by the state can be expected to reflect and reconstruct that vision,
and to reiterate its underlying ideologies. Other dominant discourses can be expected to
echo the ideological underpinnings of state discourses based on their shared status as
orthodox discourses and their common role in protecting the status quo. To this end, the
concrete policies associated with any given imagined future are seen here as reflecting
and supporting particular ideologies; the present thesis thus explores how these
ideologies manifest in dominant discourse on immigration. 7

7

See Sutherland (2005) for a useful discussion of the value of taking a discourse approach when studying
the ideological dimensions of nation-building and nationalism.
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2.5 Additional Concepts
The present section outlines additional concepts that surface at various points in this
thesis and that are embedded to greater or lesser degrees in the construction of Canada’s
imagined community. The section specifically defines the manner in which the terms
nation, country, state, race, racialization, racism, ethnicity, and gender are understood
and used in the remainder of the thesis.

2.51 Nation, Country, and State
Throughout the thesis, the terms nation, country, and state are used to refer to related
concepts that are highly relevant to immigration. In this thesis, ‘Canada’ as a country, is
understood as a sovereign territorial entity that is separated from the remainder of the
world by its geopolitical boundaries. The Canadian nation is understood in the thesis as
a social construction; it is the community that is imagined (here, in media, policy, and
official measurement discourse) as corresponding to Canada (the country). This
understanding adheres to Anderson’s (2006) view of nations (see section 2.3 of the
present chapter). It is, however, critical to acknowledge that using the term ‘Canadian
nation’ is not meant to imply the existence of a monolithic, uniform nation. The use of
this term is not intended to suggest that all individuals contained within the geopolitical
boundaries of Canada share a sense of belonging to a unified ‘Canadian nation.’ For
instance, First Nations communities and Québec are widely regarded as distinct nations
residing within the geopolitical boundaries of Canada (the country). Yet, it is the
contention of the present thesis that, in media, policy, and official measurement
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discourse, an ambiguously defined ‘Canadian nation’ is imagined, in neglect of the fact
that internal ‘national’ divisions exist within the country (i.e., the fact that there are
multiple communities within Canada that imagine themselves as being nations). Finally,
the term ‘state’ is used throughout this thesis to refer to the set of institutions that are
manned by a heterogeneous group of actors who, as a collectivity, are charged with
carrying out the regulatory and administrative capacities associated with overseeing the
constituent population (including citizens, permanent residents, and temporary
residents). Although the government (at the federal level) is the component of the state
most relevant to the present thesis, the term ‘state’ is also frequently used in light of the
fact that the government is not seen as an independent entity but, rather, is understood
as being part of an overarching social structure (the state) that, as a whole, operates on
the basis of a shared organizational and bureaucratic logic, despite internal divisions
and conflicts.

2.52 Race, Racialization, and Racism
The term ‘race’ has had a long history of widespread usage in public, political, and
scholarly discourses. In biological terms, ‘race’ refers to genetic or biological
differences (such as skin colour) that have often served as the basis of scientific and
popular efforts to categorize individuals into ‘racial’ groups. Historically, efforts to
delineate biological ‘races’ coincided with attempts to attribute individual and cultural
competencies to racial difference (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007; Miles & Brown, 2003;
Satzewich, 1998b). Scientific evidence indicates, however, that phenotypical variation
across human population groups is not indicative of inherent ‘racial’ differences; as
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such, the scientific validity of race has largely been rejected in contemporary scholarly
contexts. As Satzewich (1998b) explains:
Things like skin pigmentation certainly vary, and there may very well be
differences in the geographical frequency distribution of certain genes. In
other words, physical and genetic differences between individuals exist,
but these are not race differences. Race is simply the label that has been
used to describe certain kinds of human difference (p.29).
Despite the scientific rejection of the validity of biologically categorizing population
groups on the basis of ‘race,’ the concept of race persists in public, political, and
academic discourses. For instance, race is reified in the legislative definition of visible
minorities in Canada; according to the Employment Equity Act of 1995, visible
minorities are “persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race
or non-white in colour” (http://www12.statcan.ca/censusrecensement/2006/ref/dict/pop127-eng.cfm). It is in contexts such as this that the notion
of ‘racialization’ emerges as a useful framework.
Although there are various definitions of racialization, a useful definition is
offered by Miles and Brown (2003), who use the term “to denote those instances where
social relations between people have been structured by the signification of human
biological characteristics in such a way as to define and construct differentiated social
collectivities” (Miles & Brown, 2003: 101). Racialization can thus be understood as
processes that mark physical bodies with symbolic meaning, to the end of assigning
people to different social locations and organizing social interactions accordingly
(Cornell & Hartmann, 2007; Kobayashi & Johnson, 2007). In this understanding,
groups that are ‘marked’ as a certain race are constructed as having specific nonphysical qualities, such as intellectual capacity, work ethic, beliefs and values, etc. That
is, physical and cultural traits become associated with social attributes, regardless of
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whether these associations legitimately exist. These social attributes are constructed as
being the inherent result of ‘racial’ group membership (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007).
The traits that are considered salient vary across time and place and are a matter of
contestation and renegotiation, yet are largely contingent on power differentials, with
dominant groups in society holding the power and resources to dictate the
characteristics that define other groups as subordinate (Li, 1988; see also Omi &
Winant, 1994).
Racism and racialization are conceptually interrelated, albeit not coterminous.
Racism can broadly be understood as an ideology, doctrine, or dogma involving a
negative or prejudicial evaluation of a ‘racial’ collectivity (see Back & Solomon, 2000;
Fleras & Elliot, 2003; Henry et al., 2000; Miles & Brown, 2003; Satzewich, 1998b;
Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007). In this context, racism presupposes a process of
racialization; groups must first be racialized before they can be evaluated on the basis of
their assigned characteristics. Insofar as these evaluations are prejudicial or negative,
and are rooted in the assumption of shared, inherent, group characteristics, they can be
considered ‘racist.’ Importantly, racism can be explicit or implicit and can operate as
both individual prejudices or as institutional forms of discrimination (of which social
actors may or may not be aware). Moreover, racism can take a variety of forms,
depending on the historical, social, and economic context (Miles & Brown, 2003). As
such, as Satzewich (1998b) explains: “what exists is not so much racism, but rather a
range of racisms […] Part of the task of sociology, then, is to analyze the varied
meanings, expressions, and significance of racism” (p.39). A critical examination of
dominant discourses of immigration in Canada allows for such an analysis, given the
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‘racial’ diversity commonly associated with contemporary Canadian immigration
(discussed in Chapter One) and the ideological connection between ‘race’ and the
‘immigration question’ (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007).

2.53 Ethnicity
Closely linked to the issue of ‘race’ is the concept of ethnicity. In popular discourses,
the terms race and ethnicity are often used interchangeably (Cornell & Hartmann,
2007). This tendency reflects widespread confusion and conflation surrounding the two
concepts in a variety of contexts, including scholarly settings. As was the case for
‘race,’ the term ‘ethnicity’ is not straightforward to define, despite its widespread usage.
The word ‘ethnic’ has its origin in the Greek word ‘ethnos’ (translated as
‘nation’); in this context, it refers to group membership based on shared descent or
blood ties (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007). In the term’s first English usage in the 15th
century, it carried with it the meaning of ‘others’ (in reference to religion) to refer to
persons who were neither Christian nor Jewish (Tonkin et al., 1989). Under these
conditions, ‘ethnicity’ served as a means of drawing boundaries around a religious
imagined community. In sociological contexts, one of the first theorists to offer an
explicit definition of ethnicity was Max Weber, who defined ethnic groups as “those
human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of
similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of
colonization” (Weber, 1968: 389). This definition acknowledges the subjective element
of ethnicity, wherein ethnicity is contingent on a belief in common descent or shared
ties, regardless of whether biological ties exist.
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More recently, sociological definitions have addressed ethnicity in terms of
shared cultural characteristics or, in some cases, national origin. Feagin and Feagin
(2003), for instance, define an ethnic group as “a group socially distinguished or set
apart, by others or by itself, primarily on the basis of cultural or national-origin
characteristics” (p.8). Cornell and Hartmann (2007) elaborate on this idea, offering a
useful framework for the concept of ethnicity that reflects the manner in which it is
understood in the present thesis. First, Cornell and Hartmann (2007) note that ethnicity
can be linked to three (real or imagined) features: shared kinship or ancestry (which is
broadly defined, often involving descent from a common homeland); a common
historical trajectory; and symbolic means of group identification. Second, ethnicity is a
matter of contrast, and is thus inherently relational. In other words, “to claim an ethnic
identity (or to attempt to assign one to someone else) is to distinguish ourselves from
others; it is to draw a boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ on the basis of the claim we
make that ‘we’ share something that ‘they’ do not” (Cornell & Hartmann, 2007: 20-21).
Finally, as this latter quote suggests, ethnicity can be a matter of self-identification,
involving self-conscious membership in an ethnic group. Alternatively, ethnicity can be
identified and assigned by external parties, in which case it can be understood as an
ethnic category that may or may not represent the manner in which individuals selfidentify. In the present thesis, ethnicity is addressed in terms of how it is socially
constructed in discourse; to this end, it is interpreted primarily in relation to ethnic
categorization, based upon relational notions of cultural or national belonging.
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2.54 Gender
In the present thesis, gender is understood as a social construction that operates at a
number of levels, ranging from the relations between individual men and women all the
way up to the structural organization of societies. In the social construction of ‘women’
and ‘men,’ the biological distinction between females and males is transformed into
socially significant differences in terms of roles and societal arrangements (Agnew,
2003; Rubin, 1975). In this understanding, the meanings associated with femininity and
masculinity and the differential roles that women and men occupy in society (for
instance, in terms of the family and the household, the economy, the education system,
the state, etc.) are not inevitable outcomes of being female or male but arise through
ongoing processes of social construction (see Ferree, Lorber & Hess, 1999). Gender,
then, is not fixed, but is constructed and reconstructed in given historical and social
contexts (Agnew, 2003). Gender, however, is not seen here as merely a characteristic of
individuals. Rather, it is a constitutive feature of social life that extends beyond socially
constructed meanings pertaining to individual women and men. It is an “organizing
principle of collectivities, social institutions, historical processes, and social practices”
(Nakano Glenn, 1999: 5). As a constitutive feature and central organizing principle of
social life, gender is linked to the allocation of power, privilege, and resources.
In the context of international immigration, gender operates at all stages of the
migration process and experience (Boyd, 2006; Boyd & Grieco, 2003). In the premigration stage, for instance, cultural norms define the opportunity that women and
men have to migrate, as well as the context within which such migration might occur
(i.e., independently as a labour migrant; as part of a family as a dependent, etc.) (Boyd
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& Greico, 2003). Critical scholars have argued that contemporary determination
processes involved in the selection of immigrants often appears gender neutral, yet
actually occur within gendered frameworks, thus embedding gender in immigrant
access to receiving countries (see, for example, Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Boyd, 1997;
Boyd & Grieco, 2003; Mascini & van Bochove, 2009; Ng, 1990; Palriwala & Uberoi,
2008; Sweetman, 1998; Thobani, 1999). Gender is also implicated in the post-migration
stage in terms of the impact of gendered entry status on social rights and entitlements,
and cultural norms in the receiving country (see Boyd, 2006; Boyd & Grieco, 2003;
Boyd & Pikkov, 2005; McKay, 2003; Oxman-Martinez et al., 2001; Sweetman, 1998).
Much like race and racialization, gender is often obscured in ‘neutral’ discourses that do
not acknowledge pre-existing gendered norms and structures. Indeed, insofar as social
practices and processes are organized in gendered ways, then gender neutrality
facilitates the persistence of gender inequality. To this end, the gendered reality
underlying gender neutrality is a necessary consideration of all immigration studies, as
well as all studies of discourse.

2.6 Critical Discourse Analysis
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is highly attuned to the various frameworks and
concepts discussed thus far in the present chapter. CDA involves examining a
discourse’s construction of particular ‘objects’ with an eye to the ideological work it
performs (van Dijk, 1993c). In other words, CDA addresses “how discourse is shaped
by relations of power and ideologies, and the constructive effects discourse has on
social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief, neither of which
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are normally apparent to discourse participants” (Fairclough, 1993: 12). From this
perspective, discourse is implicated in the social construction of reality, acting to
constitute identities and structure the social world (Fairclough, 2001).
Although CDA is theoretically and analytically diverse, what is consistent
across all critical approaches to discourse analysis is the contention that there is a de
facto relationship between discourse, power, and social inequality (van Dijk, 1993c).
Most forms of CDA thus focus on the manner in which discursive structures serve to
reproduce dominance and inequality, regardless of the genre or context of discourse
under examination (van Dijk, 2001). As Luke (2002) describes, “critical discourse
analysis […] is an explicitly normative analysis of how texts and discourses work in
ideological interests with powerful political consequences” (p.96).
According to Fairclough and Wodak (1997), there are eight main tenets of CDA.
These tenets are briefly described here as general principles, as well as in terms of how
they relate to Canadian immigration and the present thesis.
(1) CDA addresses social problems. In CDA, discourse is examined in the
context of a social concern, pertaining to how discourse is implicated in the
(re)production of systematic inequalities. Thus, for instance, many analyses based on
the principles of CDA have been conducted on racism (see, for example, Goldberg,
1992, 1990; Li, 2007, 2001; Puttagunta, 1998; van Dijk, 1997, 1994, 1987; Wetherell &
Potter, 1992; Wodak, 1996b; Wodak & Matouschek, 1993) as well as on gender
inequality (e.g., Baden & Goetz, 1997; Ehrlich, 2007; Elliott et al., 1995; Kobayashi,
1994; Kondo, 1990; Marling, 2010; Wetherell, Stiven & Potter, 1987). With respect to
Canadian immigration, inequalities along dimensions of ‘race’ and gender represent
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important issues that have been addressed by numerous scholars (e.g., Abu-Laban,
1998a, 1998b; Agnew, 2007; Jiwani, 2006; Simmons, 1998; Thobani, 2000). Building
on this work, the present thesis examines dominant discourses more closely to ascertain
the manner in which discourse symbolically includes, marginalizes, or excludes
different groups of immigrants in the construction of Canada’s imagined community.
(2) Power relations are discursive. Dominant forms of discourse (e.g., in arenas
of politics, media, and science) play central roles in sustaining unequal social relations
and supporting discriminatory social structures. One the one hand, accessing these
discourses is a matter of power (van Dijk, 2001). Power is enacted through discourse by
placing certain individuals and groups in the position to constitute the content of talk
and text; this content subsequently plays a role in influencing the knowledge and
opinions of receiving audiences. In other words, groups who control the most influential
discourses have the power to socially construct people, things, and relationships, to the
end of positioning individuals and groups in particular social roles and establishing,
sustaining, and legitimizing unequal social relationships (van Dijk, 2001). With respect
to Canadian immigration, the construction of immigrants in orthodox discourses
positions immigrants with respect to Canadian state and society, and provides the means
by which these relationships are to be understood and rationalized. Dominant discourses
also inform broader audiences about immigrants and immigration, to the end of
influencing knowledge and opinions about newcomers, and providing symbolic
resources for naturalizing discrimination against immigrants.
(3) Discourse constitutes society and culture, as well as being constituted by
them. Discourse has a role in reproducing or transforming society and culture, and must
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be understood as having a dialectical relationship with the society and culture in which
it occurs. A discourse both informs social practice and is created, upheld, and/or
transformed through practice. In other words, discourse provides meanings that underlie
social practices, while social practices themselves become represented as discursive
formations. Take, for instance, an example offered by Lilja (2009):
Every hijab-wearing woman constitutes a representation within a
religious, sometimes nationalistic discourse, a discourse that she is
upholding by wearing the hijab. She is one representation among many
forming an Islamic discourse. She, acting from her identity, becomes a
‘living representation’ and a powerful means to strengthen a discourse
(p.8).
In the context of Canadian immigration, relationships between immigrants and
Canadian society, as well as the positioning of different groups of immigrants relative to
one another, are constantly created and reproduced through discourses that socially
construct these groups in particular ways. The manner in which immigrants are
constructed in dominant discourses stands to affect public opinion, political agendas,
and the treatment of immigrants within society. Discourses thus reflect existing
conditions, yet also stand to configure the social life of immigrants (and nonimmigrants) in symbolic and material ways. Social practices also have the ability to
alter dominant discourses by constituting and strengthening counter-discourses (i.e.,
heterodoxy).
(4) Discourse does ideological work. As discussed earlier in this chapter,
ideology is a means by which dominant groups exercise control over society – namely,
by legitimating the status quo and thus supporting prevailing power structures and
existing inequalities. In this regard, discourse serves as a conceptual space wherein
ideologies are expressed, often in coded ways, to the end of naturalizing a particular
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social order. As Fairclough and Wodak note, “discursive practices may have major
ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power
relations through the ways in which they represent things and position people” (cited in
Wodak, 1996a: 15). With respect to immigration, the social construction of Canada’s
imagined community in discourse is based on ideological underpinnings that can go
unnoticed as ideological formulations in light of their seemingly ‘common sense’
nature.
(5) Discourse is historical. From a sociological perspective, any given discourse
must be considered within its broader context, and is only meaningful if it is understood
in terms of the events and discourses that have preceded it and that surround it. It
follows that uncovering the discursive meaning of given texts and talk necessarily
requires historical and social contextualization. As such, in order to deconstruct
contemporary discourses on Canadian immigration, it is necessary to examine the long
history surrounding immigration in Canada, particularly with respect to immigrants’
place in the Canadian nation and Canadian nation-building efforts; Chapter Three
provides this contextualization.
(6) The link between text and society is mediated. There is necessarily a
mediated relationship between discourse and social practice, involving intervening
socio-cognitive processes through which intentions, beliefs, and ideologies are realized
in discourse, and, likewise, through which interpretations of discourse produce beliefs,
attitudes, knowledge, and behaviours. In terms of discourse analysis, these sociocognitive processes are most commonly addressed in social psychological approaches;
this is a major topic of study in its own right (see, for instance, Fiske & Taylor, 1984;
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Giles & Peterson, 1990; Wyer & Srull, 1985). For the present thesis, it is necessary to
acknowledge that there is a ‘black box’ between the content of dominant immigration
discourses and the manner in which their content does or does not affect identity
formation, discriminatory behaviour, and policy formation. The emphasis is this thesis
is on uncovering the ideologies and constructions in particular immigration discourses,
not on determining how these constructions are or are not translated into attributions or
actions. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind throughout the thesis that a mediating
socio-cognitive relationship, albeit undefined here, exists between discourse and social
practice.
(7) Discourse analysis is interpretive and explanatory. There are likely to be
various readings of any given discourse. In other words, in the context of CDA,
“interpretations are never finished and authoritative, they are dynamic and open”
(Wodak, 1996a: 20). The manner in which dominant immigration discourses are read,
interpreted, and understood in the present thesis is inevitably shaped by the theoretical
and methodological perspective and social location of the analyst – myself. In this
regard, the reading of the immigration discourse offered here is simply one reading that
could be contested by other readings. Rather than being a caveat, this point is seen as
reflective of the complex nature of any social science. Moreover, a critical reading of
discourse, involving systematic efforts to deconstruct a discourse and embed it within
its social conditions, may help to narrow down the range of possible readings and help
to link a particular discourse to ideologies and power relationships. To this end, efforts
were taken throughout the thesis to be transparent, and to provide as much as possible
the textual evidence contributing to the conclusions being drawn. In this way, the reader
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is afforded the opportunity to configure an alternative reading of the immigration
discourse.
(8) Discourse is a form of social action. As discussed in point number four
above, CDA is rooted in the contention that analyses of discourse can reveal ideologies
that operate to uphold and legitimize the existing social order. It follows that the
ultimate goal of CDA is to uncover the hidden operation of power and oppression in
discourse, thereby contributing to changes in consciousness and leading to social action.
In this regard, CDA is a “socially committed scientific paradigm” (Young & Fitzgerald,
2006: 24) that encourages both reflective and reflexive thinking. Clearly, expecting
social change to come about from any single analysis, or even multiple analyses, is a
lofty goal. Nevertheless, CDA has had some notable successes in this regard. For
instance, van Dijk’s (1993b) analysis of Dutch school books raised awareness of their
racist undertones, ultimately leading to the production of new school materials (see
Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). In terms of the present thesis, although it is not expected
that this work alone will alter orthodox discourses on immigration, it nevertheless
stands to contribute to a literature that contests inequality pertaining to immigration in
Canada.
Overall, these eight principles are implicit in CDA, and will be evident to
greater or lesser degrees throughout the present thesis. As discussed above, some of the
tenets are beyond the scope of the thesis (for instance, the socio-cognitive mediation
between ‘text’ and society), and thus will be not explicitly discussed in the remainder of
the thesis. Nevertheless, these principles provide background for understanding the
methodological usefulness of CDA in the context of this thesis and beyond.
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The other frameworks and concepts outlined in the present chapter also inform
the upcoming chapters. Benedict Anderson’s notion of imagined communities
represents the core framework for the thesis, which also draws inspiration from Alan
Simmons’ ‘imagined futures’ approach to immigration policy. The upcoming analysis
chapters elaborate on the manner in which immigration is tied into the social
construction of the contemporary Canadian imagined community, thereby extending
both of these frameworks into the realm of discourse. First, however, it is necessary to
address the history of Canadian immigration in more detail. This history lends insight
into current immigration patterns and controversies. It also sheds light on the relevance
of addressing the notion of imagined communities in reference to immigration, and in
considering the intersection of ‘race,’ gender, and immigrant mode of entry in such an
examination. Chapter Three provides this historical contextualization.
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CHAPTER THREE: CANADIAN IMMIGRATION FROM CONFEDERATION
TO THE IRPA
“The exercise of examining the past reminds us that change is
constant and that the present is only the latest installment in an
unfolding story” (Simmons, 2010: 48).

3.0 Introduction
There have been several comprehensive examinations of Canadian immigration history
(see Hawkins, 1991, 1988; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Knowles, 2007), and nearly
every textbook and scholarly publication on Canadian immigration includes an
abbreviated version of this history. This work has documented the evolution of
immigration policies over time in accordance with economic and nation-building goals,
and has also articulated the widespread discrimination that characterized the first
century of Canadian post-Confederation immigration. Indeed, the manner in which
‘race’/ethnicity, national origin, gender, and social class were implicated in early
Canadian immigration have been well-documented in the existing literature (see, for
example, Abella & Trooper, 1982; Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Bolaria & Li, 1988;
Boyd & Vickers, 2000; Buchignani & Indra, 1985; Calliste, 1993; Das Gupta, 1995;
Elliot & Fleras, 1992; Hawkins, 1991, 1988; Li, 1988; Ng, 1992; Satzewich, 1989a,
1989b; Simmons, 1998; Stasiulis, 1997; Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995; Thobani, 1998).
Although the present chapter also addresses these issues, it adds to the existing literature
by looking more directly at how and why the ‘family’ entered into immigration policies
and flows, in combination with, and as distinct from, ‘economic’ immigration. Family-
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based 8 and economic immigration have both always been a part of Canadian
immigration; however, the relationship between these two types of immigration has
evolved considerably since Canada’s first Immigration Act in 1869. By examining these
changes over time, it becomes possible to see that the conceptualization of the family,
and its relation to economic immigration, has been directly implicated in racialized and
gendered constructions of Canada’s imagined community over time. More specifically,
the chapter demonstrates that the family has been a central site for defining three types
of relationships to Canada’s national community. The first of these three relationships
involves immigrants who most closely resemble the ‘ideal future citizen,’ be it based on
skin colour, national origin, gender, or skill; these immigrants have historically been
most readily granted entry into the country and permitted access to their family (either
through migration of the family unit or allowances for family reunification). The second
positioning of immigrants to the Canadian nation involves persons who are constructed
as less than ‘ideal’ future citizens, yet are nevertheless granted access to the nation; this
group has typically been marginalized through limited or no access to family
reunification, and thus constructed as ‘outsiders’ within the nation. Finally, those most
strongly contradicting the image of an ‘ideal’ immigrant have typically been excluded
from entry, and thus most explicitly and literally constructed as ‘outsiders.’ Each of
these three relationships has been visible throughout Canadian post-Confederation
immigration history.

8

For the sake of ease of discussion, this term is used loosely in this chapter to capture various forms of
immigration that share in common a connection to the institution of the family. In particular, it is used as
an umbrella term for the immigration of entire families as the migratory unit and for family reunification.
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The present chapter defines sub-periods of post-Confederation immigration that
delineate the changing relationship between family-based and economic immigration.
The discussion is organized according to these periods, and addresses the manner in
which the relationship between family-based and economic immigration has manifested
in terms of gender, ‘race’/ethnicity, and social class.

3.1 White Settler Families: 1869 to 1910
Prior to Confederation, Canada was conceptualized as a British colony within the
Americas. With Confederation in 1867, an official vision of ‘White Canada’ as its own
nation became firmly established (Simmons, 2010, 1998). Accordingly, despite a
variety of changes in immigration volumes and policies, immigration during the first
hundred years following Confederation in 1867 was guided by an overarching goal of
building a well-populated, economically successful, independent nation that replicated
the desirable features of Canada’s mother country (Simmons, 2010, 1998). These
economic and demographic goals were articulated within exclusionary immigration
principles based on gendered and class-based ‘racial’ preferences (Kelley & Trebilcock,
1998; Knowles, 2007; Stasiulis, 1997). Importantly, as the upcoming discussion
illustrates, these goals clearly manifested in the manner in which economic and familybased immigrants were positioned in the context of nation-building and the construction
of the nation’s imagined community.
In the early post-Confederation years, the National Policy of Prime Minister
John A. Macdonald’s administration represented the package of strategies through
which the Canadian Dominion was to be solidified. Efforts were to revolve around
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agricultural development, the completion of a transnational railway, tariffs to incite
industrial growth, and the promotion of immigration in order to protect the nation
(particularly in the West) from U.S. expansionism and to compensate for the loss of
population through emigration to the U.S. (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Puttagunta,
1998; Simmons, 2010; Thompson & Weinfeld, 1995). As part of this set of national
policies, Canada’s first Immigration Act was implemented in 1869. This earliest
immigration program focused on excluding immigrants who were most immediately
constructed as a threat to the well-being of the emerging nation; this was expressed in
medical terms, geared towards avoiding the introduction of communicable diseases into
the nation (Whitaker, 1991). Efforts were also taken to safeguard the nation against the
possible burden imposed by less than desirable immigrants (defined in the Act in terms
of idiocy, lunacy, deafness, infirmity, etc.) through the imposition of a $300 bond, to be
collected for each individual deemed likely to become a public charge in the absence of
a family to care for them (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Knowles, 2007; Whitaker, 1991).
The expectation that immigrant families were responsible for ‘burdensome’ immigrants,
currently embedded in the sponsorship agreement (discussed in Chapter One), was thus
evident in the earliest immigration policies.
At this point in time, official restrictions on immigrants were not explicitly
articulated in terms of ethnic or national origin of immigrants. Nevertheless, the
prevailing vision of the nation’s imagined future entailed an ideological preference for
‘White’ settler (i.e., agricultural) families (Simmons, 2010, 1999, 1998; Stasiulis, 1997;
Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995). In this context, economic and family-based immigration
were largely synonymous – the family was conceptualized as the unit of both economic

57
production and demographic/social reproduction. The assumption that women were
dependents of male heads of households was implicit in the patriarchal structures and
norms of the time (Côté et al, 2001). Consistent with these norms, women were only
indirectly addressed in the 1869 Immigration Act as dependents of males. To this end, in
the earliest years of Canadian immigration policy, ideal future citizens were
bureaucratically and normatively constructed as male heads of agricultural households.
Female immigrants were located within the family unit, and thus were constructed as
dependents of permanent settlers rather than as future citizens in their own right.
Although ‘White’ British and American women were recruited to come to Canada as
domestic workers at the time (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998), the presence of women as
workers was not articulated in the first Immigration Act. In this way, women’s
economic contributions to Canadian nation-building were obscured by the fact that they
were subsumed within families.
Through 1867 into the 1890s, emigration from Canada (primarily to the U.S.)
remained ahead of immigration; this heightened the demand for “large-scale British
immigration to retain the ‘British’ character of Canada” (Whitaker, 1991: 4). Yet,
despite the ideological goal of populating the nation with British agricultural families,
the labour needs required for the expansion of the nation meant that a larger influx of
immigrants was needed than was being provided by British settlers (Kelley &
Trebilcock, 1998; Whitaker, 1991). As a result, immigration in the early postConfederation decades commonly involved admission of immigrants outside of the
ideal ‘White settler’ model (Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995), albeit under circumstances that
clearly demonstrated the distinction between ideal future citizens and ‘undesirables.’ In
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this regard, family-based immigration was particularly telling; when ‘non-White’
immigrants were admitted to Canada (typically for labour purposes), their spouses were
largely prohibited from entry. For instance, between 1880 and 1885, large numbers of
Chinese male labourers were recruited to work dangerous posts during the construction
of the Canadian Pacific Railway (Abu-Laban, 1998a; Satzewich, 1993). Only single
male migrants or married men willing to leave their families behind were recruited; the
wives and children of married Chinese workers were not eligible for entry to Canada
(Satzewich, 1993). Access to family-based immigration thus existed very early on as a
feature that distinguished between those intended for permanent inclusion in the
Canadian nation and those intended for temporary residence. Moreover, specifically
excluding women of ‘undesirable’ races was not only a means of restricting the
permanent settlement of immigrants who were not ‘ideal’ future citizens themselves, it
also served to preclude the reproduction of ‘undesirables’ on Canadian soil (Satzewich,
1993; Stasiulis, 1997). In this way, the labour of Asian men contributed to building the
Canadian nation, while their marginalization in the Canadian nation was solidified
through the exclusion of their family members.
As suggested by the above discussion, immigrants of Chinese origin were
singled out for particularly restrictive treatment in the early decades of postConfederation immigration. Indeed, once railway construction was completed in 1885,
the government introduced the Chinese Immigration Act, which implemented an
immigration tax (‘head tax’) on newcomers of Chinese origin. This legislation
institutionalized efforts to exclude these ‘undesirables’ from the Canadian nation
(Bolaria & Li, 1988; Li, 1998; see Chapleau & Gray, 1885). Later amendments to this
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Act illustrated the extent to which women immigrants were entrenched within the
family unit, as well as the extent to which Chinese families, rather than individual
migrants, were perceived as the most salient threat to the developing nation:
No duty shall be payable under “The Chinese Immigration Act,” in
respect of any woman of Chinese origin who is the wife of a person who
is not of Chinese origin; but, for the purposes of the said Act, such a
woman shall be deemed to be of the same nationality as her husband
(Canada, 1887, ch.35, section 1).
In other words, in cases where Chinese women were granted entry as wives of nonChinese males, their national origin was erased in official documentation, subsuming
them under their husband’s origin.
At the turn of the 20th century, large influxes of immigrants continued to be
central to the growth of the Canadian nation and official efforts to populate the
Canadian west (Green & Green, 2004; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Puttagunta, 1998). In
1896, Clifford Sifton was appointed Minister of Interior (the portfolio responsible for
immigration at the time). Sifton immediately initiated an aggressive recruitment
campaign with a focus on attracting farmers from Central and Eastern Europe (as well
as from the U.S.). Although small numbers of non-British immigrants had arrived in the
first three decades after Confederation, it was during Sifton’s post that immigration of
non-British immigrants was first actively encouraged. This immigration, however, was
not unrestrained, but involved clear limits geared towards encouraging agricultural
settlement (Whitaker, 1991). In this way, economic and demographic nation-building
goals were, to some degree, prioritized over the cultural boundaries previously
constructed around the Canadian imagined community.
Importantly, however, immigrant recruitment retained racial assumptions,
structured around racialized views of different groups’ abilities in ways that defined
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which types of families were economically desirable. At this point in time, the
immigration of farming families was central to Canadian nation-building, relating to
official efforts to encourage the growth of western Canada. To this end, the Canadian
government entered into an agreement with the North Atlantic Trading Company
(NATC) in 1899 geared toward the recruitment of peasant families. The NATC was
mandated to recruit continental European peasant families who possessed at least $100
(Satzewich, 1993). In this context, the family, rather than the individual, was clearly still
the unit of immigration, corresponding to the Canadian state’s view of the nation’s
needs at that point in time. Moreover, the recruitment of continental European families
for settlement in the west “was based on a Social Darwinist belief that certain types of
families, conditioned by many years of oppression and arduous labour, were ‘racially’
suited for the labour intensive tasks essential to homesteading” (Satzewich, 1993: 320).
In this way, families of particular origins were racialized as a unit; their merit to the
Canadian nation was only realized in the context of family labour power. Additionally,
the racialization of continental European peasant families entailed gendered and classbased implications: many of these families were granted land that was of inferior
quality, undermining their ability to meet a subsistence level of existence. The males
were thus forced to engage in seasonal labour (for instance, for logging companies or as
section hands on railroads); women, along with children, engaged in reproductive
labour on the homestead, while some women also performed domestic labour in the
homes of more established farmers in the area (Satzewich, 1993). These immigrants
were thus marginalized in the Canadian nation; they were included in literal terms
insofar as they served nation-building needs, but were simultaneously entrenched (as
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both individuals and as families) in unequal relationships with settlers who more closely
approximated the model of ideal citizens.
Overall, the policy discourse of the early post-Confederation decades illustrates
the central role of family-based immigration in the construction of the Canadian nation
at the time. Indeed, the earliest immigration policies in Canadian history constructed the
nation’s imagined community around a vision of a nation composed of largely British
family units consisting of a male head who was responsible for his wife and dependents.
Accordingly, British male heads of households, as ideal future citizens, were granted
the most generous allowances in terms of family-based immigration; their wives were
allowed entry to Canada, guided by these women’s status as dependents and their role
in bearing the next generation of ideal citizens. Other European families were granted
entry on the basis of racialized views of their farming ability, yet were still symbolically
and materially marginalized with respect to the Canadian national community. Chinese
men during this time were not constructed as future citizens, but were more restrictively
viewed as labourers whose only purpose was to fill production needs that could not be
met by the existing population. In turn, their wives and families were largely excluded
from Canada. More generally, women of the most ‘inferior races’ were excluded from
entering Canada and constructed as a veritable threat to the nation’s (‘White’) imagined
future due to their risk of reproducing ‘undesirables.’

3.2 White Permanent Settlers and Domestic Labourers: 1906 to 1920s
Sifton’s recruitment of non-British immigrants generated considerable controversy,
illustrating the tension surrounding the intersection of economic and demographic
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interests, on the one hand, and national cultural identity, on the other. Prompted by a
growing backlash against his approach to immigration, Sifton was replaced by Frank
Oliver in 1905. With his succession, Oliver reasserted the boundaries of the nation:
It is not merely a question of filling the country with people …It is a
question of the ultimate results of the efforts put forward for the building
of a Canadian nationality…This can never be accomplished if the
preponderance of the population should be of such a class and character
that will deteriorate rather than elevate the condition of our people and
our country at large (cited in Whitaker, 1991: 8).
The immigration program, under Oliver’s direction, continued to aggressively recruit
immigrants, but no longer welcomed immigrants of non-British origin.
During this time, the intersection between ‘family’ and ‘economic’ immigration
surfaced in two main ways that were clearly articulated in new immigration regulations
implemented in 1906 and in 1910. First, as in the previous sub-period, British
agricultural families remained the ideal immigration unit from both an economic,
demographic, and cultural perspective. These families would populate the nation with
culturally suitable citizens, and would also reproduce the next generation of ideal
citizens. What was unique in this sub-period was the heightened articulation of
gendered norms of dependence, which further documented the extent to which the
family was viewed as the integral unit of settlement at the time:
In any case where deportation of the head of a family is ordered, all
dependent members of the family may be deported at the same time. And
in any case where deportation of a dependent member of a family is
ordered on account of having become a public charge, and in the opinion
of the Minister such circumstance is due to willful neglect or nonsupport by the head or other members of the family morally bound to
support such a dependent member, then all members of the family may
be deported at the same time. Such deportation shall be at the cost of the
persons so deported (Statutes of Canada, 1910, ch. 27, s. 42.5).
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The second unique feature of this time period was the active recruitment of female
domestic workers. This meant that the immigration of women for labour purposes
(albeit, notably, still within a ‘family’ setting) was officially articulated for the first time
in Canada’s post-Confederation history. At the time, the demand for British domestic
servants typically outstripped the supply, in part because wages and work conditions for
this class of worker were not substantially better than in Britain. As such,
encouragement of female domestic workers from other areas of Europe at the beginning
of the 20th century became part of the state’s broader recruitment efforts, otherwise
primarily focused on agriculturalists:
The policy of the Department at the present time is to encourage the
immigration of farmers, farm labourers, and female domestic servants
from the United States, the British Isles, and certain Northern European
countries, namely, France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Germany,
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Iceland. On the other hand, it is the
policy of the Department to do all in its power to keep out of the country
undesirables [i.e.,] those belonging to nationalities unlikely to assimilate
and who consequently prevent the building up of a united nation of
people of similar customs and ideals (Statutes of Canada, 1910, cited in
Department of Manpower and Immigration Canada, 1974: 9-10).
Overall, whether women arrived in Canada as dependents within a family unit or as
domestic workers, their place in the Canadian nation was constructed solely in terms of
the domestic sphere, and thus in the context of the institution of the family. Consistent
with social norms and ideologies at the time, the location of women within the private
sphere was embedded in the Immigration Act, which explicitly defined women in
positions of subservience and dependence within the home, either as domestic workers
or as dependents within a male-headed household.
In this context, social class was also central to immigration policy and the
construction of the Canadian national community, and again manifested in the realm of
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the family. Women from higher social classes were expected to immigrate as
dependents of the male head of their household (either as wives or children), while
women from lower social classes were to immigrate as individual workers, in the form
of domestic servants who would contribute to the growth and well-being of the ‘ideal
settler’ families they serviced. The intersection of gender and ‘race’ was also evident
here; as the above excerpt from the 1910 Immigration Act shows, the Canadian
government sought single, European women to serve as domestic workers (Abu-Laban,
1998a), while women of colour were still excluded from entry through such
immigration programs (Côté et al., 2001).
Overall, during this period, the intersection between economic immigration and
family-based immigration (either for permanent settlement or domestic labour) clearly
served as a site for defining the three relationships of immigrants to Canada’s imagined
community (i.e., inclusion, marginalization, and exclusion). ‘Black,’ working-class,
Caribbean women, for instance, were commonly singled out for exclusion (or
deportation) from positions as domestic workers, despite the aforementioned high
demand for workers to fill these positions. These women were assumed to be
‘immoral,’ likely to become public charges through pregnancy and single parenthood
(Calliste, 1993). Stasiulis (1997) notes that “the exclusion of prospective female
Caribbean domestic workers was … informed by invidious myths of the promiscuous
nature and proneness to single parenthood of Black women” (p.148). In this instance,
the racialized sexualization of Black women constructed this group as self-evidently
undesirable for membership in the Canadian nation, in direct opposition to ‘ideal’
British women in settler families.
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More generally, the circumstances surrounding prospective Black Caribbean
immigrants, including domestic workers, demonstrates the tension between ideological
and economic needs that defined much of Canadian immigration history, wherein a
clear dialectic existed between ideological preferences for ‘ideal’ immigrants
(historically understood in gendered, class-specific, racial terms), and
economic/employer needs. Among Black prospective immigrants (as with Chinese
immigrants, as previously discussed), the end result typically involved selective entry
under restrictive conditions, most often when there was an urgent need for cheap labour;
relegation to specific posts within a racialized split labour market; and vulnerability to
mistreatment and expulsion. In this fashion, immigration to Canada and the construction
of the nation’s imagined community up until WWI was clearly structured in intersecting
terms of ‘race,’ gender, and social class, with respect to both individual immigrants and
immigrant families.

3.3 British Family Recruitment: 1920s
During WWI, immigration to Canada had declined considerably, due to British and
European needs for workers in war-related industries and army recruits, and the expense
and hazard of transportation at times of war. As a result, the majority of immigrants
arriving in Canada during WWI originated in the U.S. (approximately 50,000 annually)
(Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Li, 2003a). Following the war, national economic and
political concerns visibly shaped both immigration policy over the next decade and
views of ‘foreigners’ within the nation. On the economic side, the return of hundreds of
thousands of soldiers to a post-war depressed economy and increasing demands on
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federal funds brought about by various payments to veterans led to a rapid increase in
both unemployment and the cost of living (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). Growing labour
unrest within the country manifested as a wave of radicalism towards the end of WWI,
culminating in the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 (Green & Green, 2004; Whitaker,
1991). In the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and growing concern over
‘foreign agitators’ and ‘enemy aliens’ within the nation, this strike was constructed in
political, public, and legal arenas as evidence of a Bolshevik conspiracy (Horrall, 1980).
As Horall (1980) explains:
During the early morning of 17 June 1919 eight leaders of the Winnipeg
General Strike were arrested by members of the RNWMP [Royal North
West Mounted Police] and charged that as officials of the One Big
Union 9 they had conspired together to replace constituted authority with
a soviet form of government. Although a royal commission which
investigated the causes of the strike found no evidence of any seditious
conspiracy, nor any connection between the strike and the [One Big
Union], seven of the eight accused were eventually convicted by the
courts of trying to ‘overthrow’ the state (p.169).
Such suspicions meant that the borders of the Canadian imagined community tightened
in the immediate post-WWI years (both literally and symbolically), involving
marginalization and exclusion based on national origin, political anarchism, and labour
radicalism. For instance, concerns over ‘foreign agitators’ within the nation prompted
expulsions of persons suspected of conspiring against the Canadian government
(Whitaker, 1991).
These prevailing conditions also prompted revisions to the existing Immigration
Act in 1919. Although not explicitly expressed in the context of concerns over the soviet
threat, the new provisions created additional latitude for excluding immigrants by: (1)

9

The One Big Union was a syndicalist trade union, formed in 1919 and dissolved in 1956, when it
merged with the Canadian Labour Congress (see Bercuson, 1990).
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establishing a literacy test for prospective immigrants; (2) expanding on how
prospective immigrants’ origins were defined by adding the term ‘nationality’ to the
word ‘race’; and (3) requiring prospective immigrants from anywhere other than the
U.S. or Britain to have a valid passport and/or visa prior to leaving their country of
origin for Canada (Green & Green, 2004). Kelley and Trebilcock (1998) argue that
these changes were intended to allow the government to screen out immigrants that
would place an added burden on an already depressed Canadian economy and
potentially contribute to even more unemployment. However, the policy restructuring
also served to expand the government’s power to strictly regulate the composition of
newcomers; this served to structure the Canadian imagined community through
inclusion, marginalization, and exclusion on ‘racial’ and ethnic ground. Thus, couched
within concern for the domestic economy persisted the belief that certain immigrants
were a threat to the Canadian nation, and the assumption that these threats could be
screened out on the basis of applicants’ ‘race’ and national origin. Overall, British
immigrant families remained the most ‘preferred’ settlers, followed by North
Europeans, then Central Europeans. Southern and Eastern Europeans were much lower
on the list of suitable immigrants, while Asian and ‘Black’ immigrants remained
explicitly unwelcome (Li, 2003a). Continued restricted access to family-based
immigration among marginalized groups remained in effect, thereby perpetuating the
distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ within the nation through family
settlement rights.
As the nation moved into the 1920s, British immigration to Canada lagged
behind Canadian official targets as a result of a lack of both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors.
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The lack of ‘push’ factors related to the relative prosperity of Britain at the time and the
expense of the overseas journey to Canada. In Canada, desirable tracts of land near
railways were no longer in abundant supply; land in more remote areas, although
available, was less appealing to potential settler families. At the same time, the
economy was reviving and growing in diversity. As such, although immigrant families
of British origin remained the ‘gold standard’ from an ideological perspective, business
interests resulted in a moderate level of continued immigration of ‘non-preferred’
groups (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). In an attempt to continue building the Canadian
population along ‘desired’ cultural lines, the Canadian government took strides to
guarantee the exclusion of the most undesirable immigrants and the inclusion of the
most preferred. For instance, efforts to exclude Asian immigrants became even more
rigid. In the revised Chinese Immigration Act, passed in 1923, the head tax system on
Chinese newcomers was eliminated in favour of broad provisions that were designed to
effectively exclude most prospective Chinese immigrants (see Statutes of Canada,
1923). By the mid-1920s, immigration from China had virtually halted (Li, 1988). In
contrast, in order to encourage British immigrant families and thus to promote the
immigration of families that best suited Canada’s ideal ‘imagined future,’ the Canadian
government entered into several agreements with the British government involving
efforts to recruit families for agricultural settlement. In this context, economic and
family-based immigration remained synonymous, albeit only for the most desirable
(i.e., British) future citizens.
For instance, under the Farm Family Settlement Schemes, the Canadian
government provided assistance (including aid with travel, agricultural training, and the
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provision of land on credit) to British families willing to settle on farms in Canada
(Green & Green, 2004), thereby further institutionalizing racialized preferences for
certain ‘types’ of families. The original goal of the Canadian government was for 3,000
British families to arrive through this program; in 1927, an additional 1,000 families
were expected to arrive under similar programs directed toward settlement in New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia. However, the Farm Family program was ultimately a
disappointment: by the time the program was terminated in 1929, it had attracted a total
of only 1,500 families (Green & Green, 2004). According to Whitaker (1991), relatively
few competent British farmers had been willing to immigrate, and many of those
recruited eventually abandoned farming for manual work in the cities, wound up on
public assistance, or returned to Britain. By 1941, over 50% of those families had
abandoned their farms, and a mere seventeen families had repaid their land credit loans
(Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998).
With the relative failure of efforts to recruit British farming families, the
powerful transportation corporations Canadian Pacific Railway and Canadian National
Railway began placing pressure on the government to open the doors to central and
eastern Europeans. The companies’ interest in a more open-door immigration policy
was rooted in the fact that larger numbers of immigrants meant more passenger and
commercial railway traffic (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Whitaker, 1991). In 1925, the
government ceded, and signed a Railway Agreement with the two companies. This
agreement permitted the companies to recruit agriculturalists and farm workers from
countries in continental Europe that had previously been discriminated against.
Immigrants who had not settled in farm work after one year were to be deported at the
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cost of the transportation companies. Approximately 185,000 immigrants from central
Europe entered Canada under the Railway Agreement between 1925 and 1929
(Whitaker, 1991). Among the largest of these groups were Mennonites from Russia,
Ukrainians, Poles, and Hungarians (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). Despite their entry, the
ideological preference for British settler families remained intact, prompting growing
anti-immigrant nativist sentiment (Whitaker, 1991). To this end, in 1928, a House of
Commons committee recommended that that the Railway Agreement be amended to
reinstate greater governmental control over the selection of newcomers.

3.4 Non-Asian Family Reunification: 1930 to 1944
With the door on certain immigrants already beginning to close again due to persisting
ideological preferences for British settler families, it was effectively shut on the
majority of immigrants with the collapse of the New York stock market in 1929 and the
further worsening of the Canadian economy. Indeed, the 1930s marked one of the most
exclusionary periods in Canadian immigration history, and also represented a time of
high levels of expulsion of ‘undesirable’ immigrants. R.B. Bennett, elected as prime
minister in 1930, rapidly implemented highly restrictive immigration regulations,
particularly against potential immigrants from outside Britain and the U.S. (Whitaker,
1991). In March of 1931, the Order in Council PC 695 effectively closed the doors to
immigrants of all classes and occupations; however, immigration officers could permit
the landing of a select few exceptions. These exceptions were clearly drawn along
racialized lines, embedded within economic interests, and included: British subjects (by
birth or naturalization) entering Canada directly or indirectly from “predominantly
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white dominions” (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998: 216) (such as Britain, Ireland,
Newfoundland, New Zealand, Australia etc.) who had the proven means to sustain
themselves until employment was secured; agriculturalists with the proven means to
farm in Canada; United States citizens entering Canada from the U.S. having sufficient
means to provide for themselves until employment was secured; and wives and
unmarried children under the age of 18 of Canadian citizens with the means to provide
for them (Green & Green, 2004; Hawkins, 1991). This Order in Council specifically
stated that these provisions did not apply to any individuals of ‘Asiatic race’ (Hawkins,
1991). Again, Asian immigrants who had previously been granted entry for economic
purposes were thus marginalized from within the Canadian nation through non-access
to family reunification.
Family reunification among certain groups was further constrained through
restricted access to citizenship. At the time, British immigrants received naturalization
status automatically after five years of residence. Immigrants of all other national
origins had to apply for naturalization through the court system; these applications were
reviewed and decided upon by the secretary of state, whose decision required no
explanation and could not be reviewed or reversed. According to Kelly & Trebilcock
(1998), historical records clearly indicate that applications were commonly denied for
no explicit reason; however, “the pattern of rejections make it clear that such refusals
often were made on racial grounds” (Kelly & Trebilcock, 1998). Given that access to
family-based immigration depended on citizenship status, discriminatory access to
naturalization thus represented another means by which immigration was racialized and
the ideological model of ‘White settler’ families was preserved.
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Overall, at a time of economic depression, the discriminatory nature of Canadian
immigration policy became increasingly visible, with immigration being rooted in
racialized nation-building efforts and the desire to guarantee a future nation of suitable
immigrant families. Indeed, throughout the 1930s, most immigrants granted entry to
Canada were of British or northern European origin, and were wives and minor children
of Canadian male citizens having the means to support them (Kelly & Trebilcock,
1998). Thus, even in conditions of economic devastation, certain ‘types’ of families
were allowed to reunite in Canada while others were not afforded the same right; in this
way, the Canadian imagined community was being continually constructed along the
lines of ‘ideal’ future citizens located within ‘preferred’ types of families. As evidenced
in the above discussion, these preferences entailed the intersection of ‘cultural’ goals
(i.e., for immigrants to be as ‘White’ as possible) and economic goals (with agricultural
families representing the ideal economic unit of immigration).
The restrictive immigration regulations surrounding family-based immigration
implemented at the onset of the Depression persisted throughout much of the 1930s,
easing only slightly in 1938 with a new allowance for fiancées of male citizens able to
support their intended wives. In 1944, regulations were again widened, this time to
permit immigration of non-British European wives and dependent children of members
of the Canadian armed forces. Reflecting gendered social norms, women residents in
Canada were not permitted to sponsor family members into the country, even if they
had adequate means to support these individuals. Other than these modifications,
immigration policy changed very little during the 1930s and 1940s (Kelley &
Trebilcock, 1998). As such, the construction of the Canadian imagined community
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remained based around the ideal of British (and, to a lesser extent, Northern European)
families consisting of a male head of household and his dependent wife and children.

3.5 Humanitarian Pressures and ‘Family’ Controversies: Post-WWII to 1976
In general, two major factors had a powerful influence over Canadian immigration
policy in the post-WWII years that led to a distinct change in the intersection between
economic and family-based immigration. First, government investment in infrastructure
and large-scale private investments in manufacturing and natural-resource industries,
low unemployment, and high post-depression/post-war consumer demand created an
economic environment that favoured elevated immigration for labour and consumption
purposes. Yet, the decline in agriculture as the predominant industry meant that the
family (as an economic unit) was no longer at the heart of economic development;
accordingly, family-based immigration and economic immigration began to formally
diverge into two distinct streams. The second major factor affecting Canadian
immigration policy was the changing international environment in the context of WWII
atrocities and Canada’s place in this environment. Such changes involved, for instance,
the creation of the United Nations in 1945, Canadian involvement in peacekeeping
efforts and post-war rebuilding in Europe, and Canada’s development of a nondiscriminatory international trading regime (the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade) in 1947 (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). The post-WWII rise in humanitarianism
also brought about the official repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1947, at which
time Chinese Canadians were also afforded full citizenship rights. More broadly, the
devastation of atrocities during WWII stimulated growing opinion among some
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politicians and interest groups that a more open immigration policy was needed. In
terms of family-based immigration, migrants’ rights emerged as an issue in the global
humanitarian discourse, bringing about pressures to increase allowances for family
reunification. To this end, it was during the post-WWII period that the notion of family
sponsorship, in its current form, first surfaced. Correspondingly, reunification emerged
as an increasingly important means for immigrants to enter the country during the
1950s 10 (Côté et al., 2001; Green & Green, 2004; Hawkins, 1991; Kelley & Trebilcock,
1998; Parai, 1975; Whitaker, 1991).
In 1956, an Order in Council (1956-785) specified that citizens by birth or
naturalization of any country of Europe or the Americas, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, or
Turkey could be sponsored by a relative in Canada who was a Canadian citizen or a
permanent resident, and who was able to provide for them financially. Eligible relatives
in this category included spouses, children and their spouses and children (under the age
of 21), siblings and their spouses and children (under the age of 21), fathers (over age
sixty-five), mothers (over age sixty), grandparents, and unmarried orphaned nieces and
nephews. The Order in Council also stipulated that citizens from countries other than
those listed above could be eligible for admission as a family member if they were a
spouse, unmarried child (under the age of 21), father (over age sixty-five), or mother
(over age sixty) of a Canadian citizen who applied to receive them and was in a
financial position to be able to provide for any ‘sponsored’ family member (Kelley &
Trebilcock, 1998). These differential allowances for family-based immigration meant
that the immigration of Asian and African populations remained considerably more

10

It is interesting that the timing of the increased allowances for family reunification coincided with the
rise in the ideology of domesticity in Western countries.
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restricted than European immigration. Overall, in the two decades between 1946 and
1966, out of 2,500,000 newcomers to Canada, 900,000 arrived through family
reunification (Côté et al., 2001).
In light of the large numbers of immigrants entering the country on the basis of
family relationships, this form of immigration became an issue of considerable debate
during the late 1950s (Côté et al., 2001; Green & Green, 2004). As Green and Green
(2004) note, different understandings of ‘family’ among immigrants who had been
granted new rights to family-based immigration (most notably those from southern
Europe) brought about changes in the composition of newcomers to Canada. 11
Immigrants from southern Europe in particular commonly made use of family-based
immigration rights, much more so than immigrants from ‘traditional’ source countries
(Green & Green, 2004). By 1958, while British immigration had fallen substantially
(specifically, to 5,000, compared to 23,000 at the same time in 1957), immigration from
southern and central Europe, and from Italy in particular, was steadily increasing. The
majority of immigrants arriving from southern Europe, Central America, and South
America entered through family-based immigration, given existing restrictions on their
independent immigration (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). On average, sponsored
immigrants represented about 37% of all immigrants entering Canada during the 1950s

11

It is interesting that these authors attribute the use of family-class immigration to inherent familialism
among certain groups rather than structural discrimination. For a critical examination of this issue, see
Satzewich’s (1993) excellent discussion on ethnic families. Based on historical evidence, Satzewich
argues that ‘ethnic families’ in Canada were in part shaped by structural constraints, namely, immigration
policy, the labour market, and racism. In this context, Satzewich claims that the extended familialism of
certain groups was a reaction to existing conditions and constraints rather than a natural consequence of
their ethnicity.
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and 1960s; at its peak in 1959, 55% per cent of all immigrants entered through family
reunification (Whitaker, 1991).
One of the specific points of contention that emerged in the face of the expanded
allowances for family members at the time (and which remains prominent in
contemporary immigration discourse) was where the line should be drawn in defining,
from a policy perspective, what constitutes ‘close relatives.’ A distinction was also
clearly emerging that would continue to structure the social construction of immigrants
up to the present, involving the assumed intersection of ‘skill’ with different types of
immigration, as discussed in Chapter One. Specifically, the large numbers of
immigrants arriving through family reunification during the 1950s prompted growing
concern over the influx of ‘unskilled’ immigrants (Côté et al., 2001; Green & Green,
2004; Whitaker, 1991). In this regard, the predominant concern was that broad criteria
for family-based immigration would produce a ‘lower quality’ immigrant pool, and
would result in the country being flooded by ethnic groups that could potentially
develop undue influence in Canadian society. The following lengthy but important
quote from Whitaker (1991) both captures the controversy of the time and highlights the
manner in which family-based immigration continues to be viewed by many
contemporary immigration critics:
A policy of sponsored immigration had certain results: it encouraged the
entry of many more low or unskilled people; it led to uncontrolled
growth in numbers, skewed toward the expansion of ethnic groups
already established in Canada with strong kinship ties; and it helped
foster, especially in major cities, strong ethnic pressure groups with
political leverage, which seek to maintain and expand the system. Thus
the state in effect diminished the control and selectivity which it
apparently sought in other aspects of immigration policy (Whitaker,
1991: 16).
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By the end of the 1950s, family reunification was being problematized in reference to
three main concerns. The first of these concerns was the impact of uneven family-based
immigration from different regions of the world (i.e., the changing ethnic composition
of the Canadian population). Second, concern was mounting among municipalities that
‘sponsored’ relatives would become public charges. Finally, the federal government
was concerned that family reunification lowered the skill level of the incoming
immigrant population and undercut efforts to align immigration with the country’s
labour needs (Côté et al., 2001; Green & Green, 2004; Whitaker, 1991).
As a result of these concerns, an Order in Council was enacted on March 19,
1959 that added restrictions to family reunification from regions most commonly using
this form of entry (specifically, southern Europe, Central America and South America)
by excluding married children and siblings (including their spouses and children) from
eligibility (Hawkins, 1991; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). However, this measure was not
well received, as evidenced by political and media discourse at the time. The
Opposition’s immigration critic J.W. Pickersgill, for instance, viewed the Order as an
unjust and cruel legislation that directly targeted Italian immigrants, as indicated in his
speech to the House of Commons on April 15, 1959:
We are told by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, or by
some so-called spokesman for the department, that the reason they made
this unnecessary, cruel and inhuman order was to give preference for
skilled workers. Of course, that is the most unadulterated camouflage;
there is not the slightest intention on the part of the government of doing
anything about that at all. This order was just a restriction. It was an
unnecessary and inhuman restriction […]. The reason it was done, sir,
was that when the government realized that more people of Italian origin
than people from the United Kingdom came in last year, they got in a
panic. They were afraid of many of their political supporters, and they
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felt they had to do something about it. Then they did this stupid, cruel,
silly and inhuman thing (cited in Hawkins, 1972: 121-122). 12
In this context, the Conservative government rescinded the Order in Council in
question. Despite this action, Canada’s immigration system at the end of the 1950s
remained highly discriminatory, with the persistence of a hierarchical organization of
immigrant preferences, defined largely in terms of national (and ethnic) origin. Thus,
although family-based immigration widened during the post-WWII era, it was
racialized through restrictions on families of specific ethnic and national origins.
Foreshadowing the decades to come, family reunification in the post-WWII period
remained a topic of active debate regarding its implications for the nation’s future.
With the passage of the first Bill of Rights in Canada in 1960, stipulating nondiscrimination on the basis of “race, national origin, colour, religion, or sex” (Justice
Canada, 1960, part 1: 1), the discriminatory features of Canada’s immigration program
became increasingly incompatible with the broader principles of Canadian law.
Accordingly, the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker announced its intention
to overhaul the existing Immigration Act. The next major amendment to Canada’s
immigration system, undertaken by Diefenbaker’s government in 1962, would mark a
significant milestone in Canadian immigration history, involving a new vision of the
nation’s ‘imagined future.’ In this imagined future, the Canadian nation was envisioned
as a growing power in the international scene. The pursuit of this vision entailed efforts
to expand Canadian trade, and to remain engaged in peace-keeping, international
12

It is interesting that Pickersgill’s speech, given over 50 years ago, expresses many of the same claims
as contemporary critical scholars (e.g., Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Thobani, 2000a) regarding the state’s
use of the ‘skills’ discourse to obscure discriminatory policies and attitudes against certain groups of
immigrants.
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development and anti-racism activities. The 1960s thus marked an important
transformative period in Canadian immigration history, involving official abandonment
of the ‘White Canada’ policy and the beginning of Canada’s contemporary ‘nondiscriminatory’ immigration system (Simmons, 2010, 1999).
Importantly, 1962 was a landmark year for formalizing the distinction between
‘economic’ and ‘family’ immigration; from 1962 to the present day, immigrant families
were officially no longer at the heart of Canadian immigration. Moreover, the official
move toward ‘non-discrimination’ in 1962 was not uniform across the immigration
program, but, rather, further delineated between economic and family-class
immigration. More specifically, in 1962, new regulations to the Immigration Act were
developed in which explicit ‘race’ and ethnicity-based restrictions on immigration were
removed (Hawkins, 1972). These regulations firmly established ‘skill’ as the main
criterion for independent (that is, economic) immigration. Under the 1962 regulations,
persons from all national origins and ethnic backgrounds were eligible for entry into
Canada if, “by reason of his education, training, skills, or other special qualifications is
likely to be able to establish himself successfully in Canada” (An Act Respecting
Immigration, cited in Hawkins, 1972: 125; italics added to highlight the gendered
construction of independent immigrants at the time). The definition of ‘skill’ was, at
this point, still highly discretionary, with immigration officers having the power to
determine which skills were likely to ensure an immigrants’ ‘success.’ This discretion
meant that, although discriminatory stipulations had been removed from the official
regulations, the possibility for discriminatory biases in immigrant selection remained
intact. Indeed, numerous authors (e.g., Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Satzewich, 1989a,
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Simmons, 1999, 1998) have argued that, informal control over the entry of economic
immigrants was constructed around racial definitions and assumptions long after the
supposed deracialization of the system in 1962.
Also relevant to the present chapter is the fact that family immigration policy
retained a discriminatory character, despite the purported rejection of discriminatory
biases. Under the 1962 immigration regulations, all Canadian citizens or permanent
residents were able to sponsor their spouse, unmarried children under twenty-one years
old, parents, and grandparents (Hawkins, 1972). However, the sponsorship of children
over the age of twenty-one, married children, siblings and their spouses/children, and
unmarried orphaned nieces and nephews under the age of twenty-one (s.31[d]; see
Hawkins, 1972) was restricted to citizens of the ‘preferred’ nations outlined in the 1956
Immigration Regulations (Parai, 1975). In this way, family-based immigration persisted
as a means of racializing immigration, with family reunification policy echoing earlier
patterns of excluding families of ‘undesirable’ groups more so than individual economic
immigrants. Given the gendered nature of immigration, with family-based immigration
being a more prominent means of entry for women (Stasiulis & Jhappan, 1995;
Thobani, 1998), differential allowances for family sponsorship additionally amounted to
gendered, racialized immigration flows.
The Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the Department of Labour
were amalgamated into the Department of Manpower and Immigration in 1966. 13 In the
same year, the Liberal government commissioned a policy paper as part of the ongoing
efforts to reassess and revamp Canada’s immigration program. This paper (the White

13

This amalgamation arguably reflects the extent to which immigration was first and foremost perceived
as a strategy for national economic development.
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Paper 14 of 1966) provides a striking illustration of the official discourse on family-class
immigration at the time. The paper advocated changing Canada’s immigration program
to be more closely aligned with the country’s labour needs, and recommended
restricting the family-class sponsorship program in order to ensure immigrant ‘quality.’
In this context, ideal immigrants were educated, skilled, and trained (which familybased immigrants were assumed not to be). It was recommended that the number of
immigrants entering through family sponsorship be restricted to prevent the influx of
large numbers of ‘unskilled’ foreign nationals. As Kelley and Trebilcock (1998: 359)
note, “the sponsorship issue was a continuing source of concern to immigration officials
because, allegedly, too many unskilled workers were being sponsored by relatives, a
process which was largely beyond the department’s control.” The White Paper
specifically recommended that family sponsorship be limited to spouses, unmarried
offspring under the age of twenty-one, orphaned relatives under the age of sixteen, and
parents and grandparents (who would not be eligible to work in Canada). It was further
recommended that while both Canadian citizens and landed immigrants be granted
these sponsorship rights, additional sponsorship privileges were to be afforded to
Canadian citizens, subject to literacy and/or employment requirements (including, for
instance, siblings, unmarried nieces and nephews under the age of twenty-one, and
parents and grandparents, who would be allowed to work in Canada) (Kelley &
Trebilcock, 1998). The White Paper’s recommendations elicited considerable criticism
from community organizations and ethnic groups, yet were welcomed by the business
community. Political players stood on both sides of the debate, some problematizing
14

A White Paper is a document issued by the government that outlines policy directions or proposed
actions on a specific policy topic of imminent concern.
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and others praising the recommendations. In the end, new regulations were introduced
in 1967 that seemed designed to provide a middle ground, supposedly rendering both
economic and family-based immigration ‘fair,’ ‘objective’ and ‘reasonable’ by creating
three categories of immigrants (namely, independent, family, and nominated relatives),
each with defined criteria for eligibility.

3.6 Further Divergence Between Economic and Family Immigrants: 1967 to 1976
Beginning in 1967, defined criteria according to which newcomers were to be selected
became an institutionalized dimension of Canadian immigration. The selection of
‘independent’ immigrants was to be governed by the ‘point system,’ which formalized
and systematized the 1962 regulations by creating a grid of criteria (e.g. education,
work experience, age, ‘personal suitability) each quantified by a defined number of
points (Green & Green, 2004; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998; Parai, 1975) (see Table 3.1
for the point system grid of 1967). Based on their qualifications and circumstances,
applicants were assigned a score for each criterion and, if their total score exceeded the
predefined ‘pass mark’ (set at 50 points in the original system), they were eligible for
admission as an independent immigrant (Parai, 1975). To this day, the point system is
cited as the step that finally limited the discretionary powers of immigration officials,
thereby eliminating “all traces of racial discrimination from Canada’s immigration
laws” (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998: 351).
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Table 3.1 Canada's Point System in 1967

Short-term
factors

Long-term
factors

Factors for Evaluation of Independent
Applicants

Range of Points

Arranged employment or designated occupation

0 or 10

Knowledge of English and/or French

0-10

Relative in Canada

0-5

Area of destination

0-5

Education and training

0-20

Personal qualities

0-15

Occupational demand

0-15

Occupational skill

1-10

Age

0-10

Total

1-100

Source: Department of Manpower and Immigration Canada (1974)

With respect to family sponsorship, official European privilege was eliminated
with the development of one set of rules that applied equally to immigrants from all
regions of the world (Parai, 1975). However, to deal with concerns over the widespread
sponsorship of ‘unskilled’ relatives, family-based immigration was separated into two
types: ‘sponsored dependents’ and ‘nominated relatives’ (Côté et al., 2001; Kelley &
Trebilcock, 1998). The ‘nominated’ category was created for distant relatives, who were
evaluated according to a select portion of the points system – specifically, education,
occupational skill, occupational demand, ‘personal suitability,’ and age. These
applicants could receive a specified number of ‘bonus points’ if their family members
already in Canada acknowledged a willingness to assist them in their settlement.
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Immediate relatives, defined as ‘sponsored dependents,’ would continue to be processed
exclusively on the basis of their relationship with a Canadian citizen or permanent
resident (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). At this point in time, aside from the general
statement about a sponsor’s ability to support their family members, no explicit
contractual obligation was built into family-based immigration, reflecting prevailing
ideologies about the nature of family relationships:
The assumption was that the term ‘sponsored dependents’ designated a
‘natural’ relationship of dependence or moral obligation that did not
require definition under contractual provisions. The subtext here leads us
to believe that the family model based on the patriarchal structure of a
[male] spouse who support the household and meets the needs of his
wife, children and aged parents was still very prevalent (Côté et al.,
2001: 23).
The assumption of dependence, however, would soon become explicit, codified in
immigration policy.

3.7 The Growing Rationality of Canadian Immigration: 1976 to Early 1990s
In 1976, a new Immigration Act was passed (although it did not come into effect until
new Immigration Regulations were introduced in 1978). With this Act came increasing
systematization of the immigration program, reflecting increasing rationality and
bureaucratic logic. Indeed, this Act was the first in Canadian immigration history to
specify objectives for the immigration program, as opposed to just the criteria for
immigrant eligibility. These objectives aligned with specific groups of immigrants as
follows: (1) family reunification (represented by both the family class and assisted
relatives); (2) humanitarian considerations (represented by refugees); and (3) national
economic development (represented by independent/economic immigrants) (Côté et al.,
2001; Green & Green, 2004; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998). In the 1976 Immigration Act,
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the point system remained in effect for the selection of independent immigrants;
however, it was adapted from its original (1967) form to place greater emphasis on
practical training and occupational experience. Preference was also to be given to
immigrants whose occupations were in high demand in Canada. (See Table 3.2 for an
overview of the point system over time). The ‘independent’ stream of immigration
would grow in subsequent years, with the additions of business-class immigrants
(including entrepreneurs and the self-employed) in 1978, and the ‘investor’ class of
business immigrants in 1986. 15
Table 3.2 Maximum Points and Selection Factors in Canada’s Point System
(Selected Years)
Selection Factor
1978
1986
1993
1996
2004
2010
Education
12
12
14
21
25
25
Proficiency in English and/or French
10
15
14
21
24
24
Specific vocational preparation
15
15
16
Work experience
8
8
8
9
21
21
Occupational demand
15
10
10
Labour market balance
10
Age
10
10
10
13
10
10
Pre-arranged employment in Canada
10
10
10
4
10
10
Personal suitability
10
10
10
17
Adaptability (levels control)
10
8
10
10
Relative in Canada
5
5
Destination
5
Total Possible Points
100
100
100
100
100
100
Pass Mark
50
70
67
*
67
67
*Pass mark varies by skill group: 52 for Professionals and Skilled Administrators; 47 for Technical;
45 for Trades
Sources: CIC, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/apply-factors.asp; Simmons (2010)
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Persons granted entry in the business class were required to submit a business plan and were evaluated
according to a variety of criteria pertaining to their likelihood of success in a business venture in Canada
(in which they would be involved on a day-to-day basis and which would employ a designated number of
Canadians). Investor immigrants were required to have a net worth of at least $500,000 and had to invest
a minimum of $250,000 in a business project in Canada for at least three years (Kelley & Trebilcock,
1998; Whitaker, 1991).
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Under the 1976 Act, family members eligible for entry under the family class included
spouses and fiancé(e)s, unmarried children under the age of twenty-one, and parents (of
any age), as well as orphaned sisters, brothers, nieces, nephews, and grandchildren who
were under the age of eighteen and unmarried. Eligible members of the ‘assisted
relative’ class (previously referred to as the ‘nominated’ class), included brothers,
sisters, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and grandparents (Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998).
This group was evaluated according to a modified form of the point system, as
previously discussed.
Several changes pertaining to family-class immigration are important here, and
speak to changing conceptualizations of the ‘immigrant family.’ First, for the first time
in Canadian immigration history, the 1976 Immigration Act included a formal
stipulation of a contractual sponsorship obligation, wherein sponsors had to take
financial responsibility for their relatives for up to ten years after immigration (up to
five years for the assisted relative class) (Côté et al., 2001; Kelley & Trebilcock, 1998).
In previous Acts, it was merely specified that the sponsor was to ensure that their family
member did not become a ‘public charge’; however, in practice, there was very little
monitoring or enforcement of this matter. Although the expectation that the Canadian
citizen or permanent resident (the sponsor) was responsible for supporting sponsored
family members had always been inherent in immigration regulations, the formalization
of this commitment officially constructed this group as dependents.
A second relevant point pertaining to family-class immigration under the 1976
Act was the allowance for parents of any age to be sponsored. This change opened up
family-class immigration to heightened criticism in the face of growing pressures to
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match Canadian immigration to the economic needs of the country. Described by one of
the most vocal critics of family-class immigration, Daniel Stoffman, as a “monumental
blunder” (Stoffman, 1993:13), the 1978 change in legislation has been widely criticized
for allowing entry to an elderly population. The concern here was that this group could,
in turn, sponsor additional relatives, thereby amplifying the influx of ‘unskilled’
relatives that, presumably, would not qualify to come to Canada as skilled workers.
Concern over the burden on the health care system imposed by sponsored relatives was
also prominent in the anti-family-class immigration discourse at the time (and, notably,
remains a feature of contemporary discourse).
It is also important to note that, while the 1976 Act removed overt
discrimination from Canadian immigration policy, in practice, the immigration system
retained ethnic, gender, and class biases (see, for instance, Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b;
Das Gupta, 1995; Thobani, 2007, 2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999, 1998; Stasiulis, 1997;
Simmons, 1998). As Côté et al. (2001) note, although the immigration program put
forth in 1976 is widely touted as marking the official end to Canada’s discriminatory
immigration policies, gendered access to education and training in many countries
prohibits equal access to immigrant admission. This contention bears directly upon the
distinction between family-class and economic immigration. According to Das Gupta
(1995), the point system of immigration:
…perpetuates systemic barriers for women and people of colour since it
emphasizes such things as education, skills, training, employability in
‘open occupations,’ and knowledge of English and/or French. Most
women from the working classes and from racial minority groups would
never qualify to immigrate on the basis of such criteria as they lack
access to the required training (p.166).
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In other words, via the inherently discriminatory nature of economic immigrant
selection, the 1976 Act streamlined immigrants of particular national and ethnic origins,
particularly persons from lower social classes and women, into family sponsorship (in
addition to, for instance, domestic worker or temporary labour migration streams). In
light of the new contractual obligations of the sponsorship program, family-class
immigrants were additionally legislated into relations of dependence, and thus were
constructed as subordinates both within households and within society more broadly
(Abu-Laban, 1998a; Côté et al., 2001).
Moreover, biases in all immigration streams were still effectively instituted
through differential access to immigration posts abroad, with disproportionately more
posts in Europe and the U.S. than in other regions of the world and longer processing
times in non-Western countries (Abu-Laban, 1998a). In this way, the explicitly overt
discrimination of the first century of post-Confederation immigration became translated
into sanctioned practices and structures that rendered discrimination opaque and
implicit. Thus, more than a century after Canada’s first Immigration Act, the 1976 Act
continued to structure access to Canada along gender, ethnic, and class lines, with the
distinction between ‘independent’ versus ‘family class’ immigrants representing a
primary means of differentially positioning these immigrants (both literally and
symbolically) with respect to Canada’s national community.
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3.8 Reconceptualizing and Dichotomizing Family and Economic Immigrants: 1993
to Present
According to Simmons (2010, 1999), a key shift in Canadian immigration policy
occurred in the late 1980s. This shift entailed a reimagining of the nation’s ‘imagined
future,’ involving a new vision of Canada as a competitive, multicultural nation that
holds a distinct economic and political presence in an international world. This vision of
Canada as a global player demands immigrants with skills that will boost Canada’s
economic development and trade-competitiveness. Immigrant selection thus became
centred around the ‘post-industrial’ requirements of a globalized, knowledge-based
economy, with ‘ideal’ immigrants constructed as self-sufficient innovators who “are
custom designed to meet the specific criteria of a neo-liberal nation intent on
productivity, cost recovery, and immigrant self-settlement” (Simmons, 2010: 85).
Key changes pertaining to family-class immigration associated with this
‘imagined future’ occurred in the early 1990s. These changes were intertwined with
economic immigration, involving a further dichotomization of family and economic
immigration. The polarization of the two groups of immigrants was directly associated
with an interest in admitting a more flexible, skilled labour force through revisions to
the point system (Abu-Laban, 1998a; Green & Green, 2004) (see Table 3.2). For
instance, the original pass mark for independent immigrants was 50 out of 100 points; it
was raised to 70 points in 1993 (Abu-Laban, 1998a). Further evidence of the push
toward prioritizing highly-skilled immigrants and marginalizing family-class
immigration came in 1993, at which time the ‘assisted relative’ class was eliminated
(Abu-Laban, 1998a). Moreover, with the stated intention to “capture more effectively
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the concept of family” (Employment and Immigration Canada, 1992: 3), a cap on the
age of children eligible for sponsorship was established in 1993, such that children over
the age of 19 became ineligible for sponsorship unless they were demonstrably
dependent on their parents (i.e., not capable of self-support due to disability or full-time
studies). Overall, economic immigrants became increasingly conceptualized as a highly
skilled and valuable group of newcomers, while the value family-class immigration
increasingly came into question. The chasm between ‘economic’ versus ‘family’
immigrants thus continued to grow, again shifting the boundaries of Canada’s imagined
community.
In the mid-1990s, the Chrétien Liberals initiated the Immigration Policy Review
(IPR) as part of a broader agenda of neo-liberal restructuring. The IPR resulted in the
repeal of the 1976 Immigration Act, which was replaced by the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). The IRPA, which came into effect on June 28, 2002,
was tabled as nearly 300 pages of legislation. Yet, as Dauvergne (2003) notes, despite
some modifications from previous legislation, “one of the most surprising things about
the new IRPA is how little it [changed]” (p.726). As with the 1976 Immigration Act, the
three main categories of immigrant admission in the IRPA were the economic class, the
family class, and the refugee class (Statutes of Canada, 2001). 16 The institutionalized
dependence of family-class immigrants on their sponsor, introduced in the previous
Immigration Act of 1976, remained in effect in the IRPA in the form of the sponsorship
agreement (see Chapter One). Spousal sponsorship, however, changed considerably,
16

It is relevant, however, that, for the first time in Canadian immigration history, objectives for
immigration were elaborated upon, and separate objectives were defined for immigration and refugee
protection. (The specific objectives for the immigration program are listed in Appendix B).
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and entailed two of the most notable modifications introduced in the IRPA. First, prior
to the IRPA, the required period of financial obligation toward a sponsored spouse was
10 years. This period of dependence was criticized by immigrant advocates and
women’s rights groups for the potential problems it could create for women immigrants
in violent relationships (see Walton-Roberts, 2004a). To this end, the sponsorship
period for spouses was reduced in the IRPA to 3 years. Second, with the IRPA, samesex partners were, for the first time, made eligible for family-class sponsorship. These
modifications suggest, at least in part, the growing advocacy power of minority rights’
groups in the immigration policy process.
Despite the important move toward equality pertaining to sexual orientation in
the IRPA, the non-discriminatory nature of the immigration program remained (and
remains) in question in ways that pertain to both economic and family-class
immigration. For instance, it has been argued (see, for example, Arat-Koc, 1992; Boyd,
1992, 1997; Das Gupta, 1995; Li, 2003c, 2001; Simmons, 2010, 1999, 1998; Stasiulis,
1997; Thobani, 2007, 2000a, 2000b, 1999, 1998) that the country’s current immigration
program maintains class-based racialization and gendering of Canadian immigrants
through policies that privilege certain immigrants over others. As Simmons (2010)
notes, “while Canada does not officially select immigrants on the basis of country of
origin, Canadian policy nevertheless uses socio-economic criteria that play an important
role in determining the countries from which immigrants come” (p.114). As in previous
policy eras, family-based immigration persists as an important way of structuring
differential access to the Canadian nation and for constructing Canada’s imagined
community. For instance, under current legislation, there is no minimum income
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requirement for sponsors of spouses, common-law or conjugal partners and dependents;
however, those sponsoring any other family members must meet a low-income cut-off
to be eligible for family-class sponsorship. Specifically, “the sponsor’s income must
meet the minimum necessary income requirement […] to support all members of a
sponsor’s own family and all sponsored persons and their family members, including
family members listed as non-accompanying” (CIC, 2010a: 23-4). In this way, despite
official discourse promulgating Canada’s acceptance of ‘non-traditional’ families and
respect for a broad range of traditions and customs (see CIC, 1994a), reunification of
extended families is constrained by financial requirements, to the end of indirectly
promoting the reunification of nuclear families, or of families of higher socio-economic
status. As such, biases remain rooted in Canadian immigration policy in ways that most
strongly (albeit indirectly) discriminate against ethnic minority women from lower-class
backgrounds originating in disadvantaged regions of the world (Abu-Laban, 1998b; Das
Gupta, 1995; Thobani, 2007).To this end, family-based immigration remains a site for
differentially prescribing access to the nation and, by extension, membership in the
Canadian national community.

3.9 Conclusion
Since Canada’s first Immigration Act in 1869, the admission of immigrants has
revolved around defining the nation’s ‘ideal’ citizens within the context of the nation’s
‘imagined future’; this has involved the intersection of economic interests and ‘cultural’
preferences in direct relation to economic and family-based immigration. Over time, the
boundaries for inclusion in the Canadian nation have evolved in reference to the
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demographic and economic needs of the country, alongside social norms and
international pressures pertaining to human rights and humanitarian interests.
Intertwined with these factors has been an overarching vision of the nation’s identity,
which can be clearly discerned from the structure of the immigration program at any
given point in time. As demonstrated by the present chapter, the relationship between
economic and family-based immigration, and the role of these types of immigration in
defining membership to the nation’s imagined community over time, provides useful
insight into the contemporary construction of the Canadian national community.
Clearly, the role of ‘economic’ and ‘family’ immigration in Canada has shifted
over time in meaningful and telling ways. In the early post-Confederation decades,
family-based and economic immigration were inextricably intertwined, with the ideal
migratory unit being (largely British) agricultural families, Moreover, racialized access
to both immigration as a family unit and family reunification served as a central site for
defining inclusion in, marginalization to, and exclusion from Canada’s national
community. Over time, changing national needs and social pressures resulted in an
increasing polarization of ‘family’ and ‘economic’ immigration. At present, the two
streams of immigration are clearly divided in policy and discursive contexts.
Despite this shift, the positioning of immigrants to the Canadian nation through
access to family-based immigration remains, in large part, intact. For instance,
permanent resident economic principal applicants (i.e., skilled workers, business and
investor immigrants) are currently granted the most generous allowances to family, both
in terms of being allowed to bring their family with them at the time of immigration,
and in terms of reunification (i.e., family-class sponsorship). Access to family

94
reunification, however, depends on the ability of the sponsor to accept financial
responsibility for sponsored newcomers. In this way, in the contemporary context,
access to family reunification requires socio-economic success. In the face of
discrimination and challenges experienced by racialized immigrants in the Canadian
labour market, it follows that visible minority immigrants (particularly those for whom
language is an added barrier to economic success) remain hindered in their access to
family. For other groups of migrants, the historical use of foreign labour without access
to family and permanent settlement is echoed in temporary migration programs (e.g.,
relating to agricultural work). For the majority of current temporary worker programs,
future citizenship is not a legal option, and permanent settlement is discouraged through
non-access to family reunification rights. These migrants are thus highly marginalized
in the Canadian nation through their severely restricted rights. Somewhat less
marginalized are live-in-caregivers, who enter as temporary workers as part of the Livein-Caregiver Program under the stipulation that, after two years of work in home care,
they are eligible to apply for permanent residence (and, if successful, will have access
family sponsorship rights). 17 Given that the majority of agricultural workers are male
and live-in-caregivers are female, the distinctive allowances between these two
programs clearly genders future membership in the Canadian nation. These brief
examples demonstrate continuity with Canadian immigration history, involving
gendered and racialized distinctions between family and economic immigration in ways
that are directly implicated in the positioning of immigrants to Canada’s national
community.
17

See http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/work/caregiver/index.asp
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The remainder of this thesis builds on the background offered by the present
chapter pertaining to the symbolic positioning of different groups of immigrants to the
Canadian nation. The upcoming three chapters examine in more detail the subtleties of
immigrants’ national belonging by examining the social construction of Canada’s
contemporary imagined community in a variety of discourses. Chapter Four begins this
examination with an analysis of media discourse surrounding one particular group of
family-class immigrants – marriage immigrants.
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CHAPTER FOUR: NEWS MEDIA AS DISCOURSE – FOCUSING ON
MARRIAGE IMMIGRANTS
“In effect, journalists join with other agents of control as a
kind of ‘deviance-defining elite,’ using the news to provide an
ongoing articulation of the proper bounds of behaviour in all
organized spheres of life” (Ericson et al., 1987:3).
4.0 Introduction
As discussed in Chapters One and Three, family-class immigration is a source of
considerable debate in contemporary Canadian society. The value of this type of
immigration to the Canadian nation is generally questioned, to the end of symbolically
positioning family-class immigrants on the margins of Canada’s imagined community.
The present chapter offers a focused consideration of the social construction of a
particular group of family-class immigrants by examining media discourse surrounding
marriage immigration. 18 This analysis focuses on media coverage of immigration
relating to the sponsorship of spouses or intimate partners. The chapter is based on a
content analysis of articles relating to marriage immigration in Canada published in four
newspapers (the Globe and Mail, the National Post, the Toronto Sun, and the Toronto
Star) over a ten year period. The chapter argues that marriage immigration serves as a
site for articulating anxieties pertaining to the presence of newcomers from nontraditional immigration source countries. More specifically, it argues that media
discourse on marriage immigrants, which is characterized by ambiguity, conceptual
vagueness, and contradictory constructions, reflects underlying tensions pertaining to

18

Although the term ‘marriage’ is used throughout the chapter for the sake of being concise, it is not
meant to imply that only legal marriages are being considered. The term is meant to capture intimate
partner relationships that can be considered ‘spousal’ in nature, including conjugal and common-law
relationships.
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ethnic and cultural diversity associated with contemporary international immigration to
Canada. The media discourse also demonstrates broader ambivalence surrounding
international marriages, and, more generally, upholds and reproduces dominant
discourses that devalue and problematize family-class immigration. To this end, the
media discourse largely marginalizes marriage immigrants with respect to Canada’s
imagined community.
The chapter begins by defining the recent Canadian context of the marriage
immigration ‘problematic,’ and proceeds to discuss the importance of studying media
discourse. The chapter then briefly reviews the two bodies of literature within which the
present analysis is grounded. First, research on the marriage-migration connection is
discussed, including a consideration of existing work on media coverage of marriage
migrants. Second, research on Canadian news media coverage of immigrants is
reviewed.

4.1 The Canadian Marriage-Migration Context
In Canada, 75% of all family-class immigration involves the sponsorship and migration
of a spouse/partner of a Canadian citizen or permanent resident (CIC, 2010a). As much
as 60% of male-initiated sponsorship applications involve efforts to sponsor wives from
a foreign country (Merali, 2008). According to Merali (2008), these statistics “reflect
the increasing number of immigrant men who are choosing to marry women from other
countries of origin, as well as the increasing number of non-immigrant males who are
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choosing to marry women from other countries and cultures” (p.281). 19 In recent years,
spousal sponsorship has entailed visible concern on the part of the Canadian
government, pertaining to the possibility that marriage could represent a route for
immigrants to enter the country under false pretenses. Indeed, the “abuse of the
immigration system through marriages of convenience” 20 was first identified as a
concern on the main page of Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s (CIC) website in
2006 as follows:
When someone gets married for the sole reason of immigrating to
Canada, this is known as a marriage of convenience. Under Canada’s
immigration law, marriages of convenience are not allowed. Citizenship
and Immigration Canada’s officers are specially trained to recognize
genuine immigration applications, and they know how to detect
marriages of convenience [...] Canada’s immigration system is also set
up in a way that discourages marriages of convenience. Anyone who
wants to sponsor their spouse or partner to immigrate to Canada makes a
serious legal commitment. As part of this commitment, sponsors must
support their spouse or partner for three years, even if the relationship
fails. If the couple breaks up and the sponsored person gets social
assistance, the sponsor must pay back the amount of social assistance the
former spouse received. Given the legal obligations, sponsorship should
not be taken lightly, and everyone is responsible for ensuring that their
marriage is genuine.
More recently, CIC initiated an online survey in which visitors to the website were
invited to provide input on the problem of marriages of convenience. The survey,
available on CIC’s website between September 27 2010 and October 27 2010, asked
respondents about their experiences with marriages of convenience, and their opinions
on what the government should do to protect Canadians and the Canadian nation against

19

Note that, despite Merali’s statement, the 60% of male-initiated spousal sponsorships cited above does
not distinguish between family reunification and family formation; indeed, there are no valid or reliable
statistics on this issue in Canada.
20
An archived version of these statements can be viewed at:
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20061025235652/http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/index.ht
ml
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this type of immigration fraud. The survey was launched by CIC Minister Jason Kenney
in advance of upcoming amendments to the IRPA regulations, and represented “part of
a wider government consultation that will likely lead to a crackdown on marriages of
convenience and tighter rules on immigration sponsorship.” 21 CIC’s survey and
Kenney’s articulation of concern over inauthentic marriage immigration thrust this
matter into the national spotlight, with stories of the longstanding ‘problem’ of
fraudulent immigrants abounding in national television reports, print media, and radio
programs. 22
Importantly, little is known about marriage immigrants in Canada (VanderPlaat
et al., 2009). This knowledge gap is arguably due, at least in part, to the neo-liberal
orientation of current immigration policies and the associated lack of official empirical
data on non-economic immigrants. In the absence of detailed information about
marriage immigrants and in light of the current controversies and official concern
surrounding this group, news media coverage of marriage immigrants becomes
particularly important to study. Indeed, news media is likely to represent one of the
most prominent sources of public ‘knowledge’ on marriage immigrants, and stands to
have a salient role in shaping social views about this group in their receiving society
(Hsia, 2007). Widespread research has demonstrated that the news media play a role in
influencing public opinion and policy agendas by identifying and/or reiterating issues
that are, or that ‘should’ be, of public and political concern (Creese & Peterson, 1996;
21

See http://www.cbc.ca/consumer/story/2010/09/28/immigration-marriages-sponsorshipsurvey.html#ixzz14Qtgv1TI
22
See, for example, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/toronto/story/2010/05/03/arranged-marriages.html. A CBC
radio broadcast on marriage fraud can be heard at http://www.cbc.ca/thecurrent/2010/07/july-192010.html. A documentary on marriage fraud also recently appeared on the CBC program “The
Passionate Eye”: see http://www.cbc.ca/documentaries/passionateeyeshowcase/2010/truelove/.
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Hay, 1996; Ungerleider 1991; van Dijk, 1995). Importantly, despite the ideal of neutral
and value-free media, a large body of critical literature suggests that the news media do
not provide objective coverage of people and events but, rather, provide particular
versions of a story, filtered through professional and personal ideologies and values, as
well as social, cultural, and organizational norms and corporate interests (Hay, 1996;
Henry & Tator, 2002; Jiwani, 1998; Karim, 1993; Mahtani, 2008, 2001; Ungerleider,
1991; van Dijk, 1989, 1983). As van Dijk (1983) comments, “news is not simply an
(incomplete) description of the facts, but a specific kind of (re)construction of reality
according to the norms and values of some society” (p.28). In other words, by reporting
selected stories in certain ways, news media contribute to the social construction and
reconstruction of reality. It follows that news media discourse acts to construct the
social groups it addresses, and contributes to an ideological climate replete with
assumptions about how the world ought to be, including who and what belongs and
does not belong in that world (Henry & Tator, 2002; Jiwani, 1998; Vukov, 2003).
Marriage immigration also represents a site of theoretical interest. In a time of
unprecedented ease in travel and communication across vast geographic distances,
marriages between nationals of different countries are becoming increasingly common
(Cottrell, 1990; Merali, 2008; Piper, 2003). These cross-border (or international)
marriages and their complex interconnections with migration have stimulated
heightened interest in scholarly circles in recent years. Indeed, the marriage-migration
link is a multi-faceted phenomenon involving implicit and explicit articulations of
gender, ‘race,’ and social class, embedded in historical and contemporary economic,
political, and social relations on the local, national, and international stage. To this end,
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a rapidly growing body of literature has stressed the need for closer attention to the
manner in which the marriage-migration phenomenon is experienced, constructed in,
and influenced by local, national, and global social and political contexts (Aguilar &
Lacsamana, 2004; Constable, 2005, 2003; Ehrenreich & Hochschild, 2003; Merali,
2008; Palriwala & Uberoi, 2008; Piper, 2003; Piper & Roces, 2003; Waldis & Byron,
2006).
Overall, marriage migration is a theoretical source of interest that is also
currently on the Canadian government’s policy radar and in the Canadian public eye. To
this end, an examination of how marriage immigration is understood and presented in
media discourse is both sociologically and socially relevant. Yet, an analysis of
Canadian media coverage of marriage immigration has not previously been conducted.
Existing research has addressed the complexity of the marriage-migration link and, in
other national contexts, media analyses of marriage immigrants have been conducted. In
the Canadian context, media analyses have focused primarily on negative, racialized
portrayals of immigrants. These bodies of literature are briefly reviewed here in turn.

4.2 The Marriage-Migration Link
The connection between marriage and migration is complex, entailing a wide variety of
relationships relating to both permanent and temporary migration (Kofman, 2003). In
Canada, marriage and migration can intersect in the following ways: (1) the
immigration of one spouse as a principal applicant (e.g., as an economic immigrant),
involving the simultaneous immigration of the other spouse as an accompanying
dependent who is not evaluated independently for admission; (2) the immigration of one
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spouse as a principal applicant, who later sponsors the admission of their existing
spouse under family-class immigration policies; (3) the independent immigration of one
individual, who, as a permanent resident or Canadian citizen, subsequently marries or
becomes intimately involved with a foreign national and sponsors their immigration to
Canada; or (4) a Canadian-born citizen who enters into an relationship with a foreign
national and sponsors their immigration to Canada.
As this description suggests, marriage migration occurs in the context of both
family reunification and family formation. 23 Although family reunification is associated
with its own set of concerns and is not viewed unproblematically by receiving societies
(as discussed in Chapters One and Three), it is nevertheless viewed as less suspicious
than family formation, as suggested by CIC’s ongoing concern over marriages of
convenience. A logical explanation for these diverging views of family formation and
family reunification is that the latter, in principle, involves unions that preceded
migration, and thus are less open to having their veracity questioned. As such, literature
on marriage migration associated with family formation is most relevant to the present
analysis. This background offers insight into the phenomenon of marriage immigration
against which this chapter’s analysis of news media coverage can subsequently be
considered.
Existing literature has highlighted how uneven economic development,
demographic pressures, unprecedented ease of communication across vast differences,
and accelerated international migration in the context of globalization have intersected
in the arena of marriage in complex ways (see, for instance, Bélanger, 2010; Constable,
23

The difference between family reunification and family formation is explained in Chapter One of this
thesis.
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2005, 2003; Lauser, 2008; Lu, 2008; Palriwala & Uberoi, 2008; Piper, 2003, 1999;
Piper & Roces, 2003; Wang & Chang, 2002). For example, some international
marriages across Asian borders have been associated with increasing gaps between the
expectations of women and men pertaining to work and marriage. These social changes
surrounding gender roles are occurring in the midst of social pressures for men to find a
suitable wife in order to carry on the paternal lineage. Together, these factors lead men,
typically from more developed Asian countries, to seek out foreign brides, often from
less developed countries; these women are perceived as being more willing to occupy a
traditional ‘wife and mother’ role (Bélanger, 2010). Cross-border marriages and the
migrations associated with these marriages are often brokered by matchmaking or socalled introduction agencies in both sending and receiving countries (Bélanger, 2010;
Constable, 2005; Lu, 2008; Nakamatsu, 2003; Wang & Chang, 2002). 24
Other research has further demonstrated the importance of cultural pressures in
shaping marriage migration on a global stage. Research on second generation South
Asian immigrants, for instance, has documented the role of transnational social
networks in establishing marriages between children of South Asian immigrants
overseas and nationals of their parents’ country of origin. This work has documented
how ‘arranged introductions’ often lead to cross-border marriages, entailing the
migration and settlement abroad of the South Asian spouse (Ballard, 1990; Brown,
2006; Walton-Roberts, 2004b). Walton-Roberts (2004b), for instance, has illustrated
24

The role of marriage brokers in cross-border marriages has produced a growing dialogue surrounding
women’s status in these unions – namely, whether they are victims of human trafficking or agents
determining their own fate through voluntary migration (see Bélanger, 2010; Constable, 2005, 2003; Lu,
2008). Again, this reflects the complexity of marriage migration in the face of the convergence of
restrictive national immigration policies, structured inequality, and multi-dimensional attitudes and
motivations in an era of globalization.
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that marriage immigration to Canada represents a means of satisfying Sikh marital
requirements (i.e., caste endogamy and village exogamy) in the midst of broader
migratory pressures and desires.
A growing body of literature has documented the complex intersections between
cross-border marriages and labour migration (see Piper & Roces, 2003; Piper, 2003,
1999). McKay (2003), for instance, argues that the de-skilling experienced by single
female Filipino migrant workers arriving in Canada through the Live-in-Caregiver
program represents a possible motivating factor for entering into an international
marriage with a Canadian citizen. In contrast, Pe-Pua (2003) demonstrates that the
marriage migration patterns of Filipino domestic workers in Spain and Italy less
commonly involve marriage to local men in their destination countries. Rather, the
majority of these women are married at the time of their migration. Some women thus
utilize labour migration as a means to gain admission to a foreign country, and
subsequently proceed to sponsor their family to join them through family reunification
policies. Other women do not sponsor their family, but rather live as part of a
transnational family, with their husband and children remaining in the country of origin
(see Pe-Pua, 2003).
Overall, the intersections between marriage and migration are complex, with
individual migrants’ experiences and motivations in different roles not always clearly
aligning with the category under which they gain admission to their receiving country.
Given this context, as well as the above-described importance of media representations
in reconstructing social and political realities and reiterating social norms and dominant
ideologies, the ultimate question at hand in this chapter remains – how are marriage
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immigrants represented in the media? Although, as noted, this issue has not been
addressed in Canada, a small body of literature has documented media coverage of
marriage migration in other national contexts.

4.3 Media Research
Despite the complexity of marriage migration, existing media research has
demonstrated that portrayals of marriage migrants and cross-border marriages draw on
overly simplistic, highly gendered stereotypes. These stereotypes fail to capture the
multi-dimensional nature of immigrants’ lives and obscure the complex and diverse
motivations associated with both marriage and migration. The existing literature nearly
exclusively focuses on Asian ‘foreign brides’ involved in marriage migration. This
research has generally documented highly similar representations across national
contexts, involving long-standing and highly familiar popular images of Asian women:
“One is the sweet and innocent, sexual-romantic ‘oriental doll’ or ‘lotus blossom’; the
other is the conniving, devious, and shrewd ‘dragon lady’” (Constable, 2003: 13). These
representations involve dichotomous constructions of women as either passive victims
of controlling men, or as cunning and manipulative women who dupe innocent men in
order to get a free meal-ticket and immigration status (Constable, 2003; Hsia, 2007).
Importantly, these stereotypical representations are commonly invoked in the
construction of marriage migration as a social problem. For example, in a detailed
examination of Taiwanese news media, Hsia (2007) demonstrates that foreign brides are
discursively linked with prostitution and broken families; these women are constructed
as passive victims, materialist gold-diggers, or criminals. Taiwanese men who marry
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foreign brides are broadly constructed as being socially undesirable, typified as
physically or morally inferior. These marriages are portrayed as a serious threat to
Taiwanese society, given their potential to lead to the deterioration of population
‘quality.’ To this end, Hsia (2007) argues that the Taiwanese media discourse reflects
national fear that a ‘low quality’ generation of children will interfere with Taiwan’s
competitiveness on a global economic stage.
Other research similarly demonstrates how national interests and concerns
underlie media representations of marriage immigrants. In the Vietnamese mass media,
for instance, marriage immigrants (namely, Vietnamese women married to Taiwanese
or South Korean men) are depicted, on one hand, as ignorant, uneducated, and poor
victims in need of state education and protection. On the other hand, these immigrants
are portrayed as selfish, materialistic opportunists who evade their duties as good wives,
daughters, mothers, and citizens (Bélanger et al., 2007). For Bélanger et al. (2007),
these images represent concerns over Vietnamese women’s abandonment of their duties
within a socialist society, and thus articulate the supposed threat that marriage migration
poses to Vietnamese nationalism, patriarchy, and masculinity.
Research on media coverage in receiving countries outside of Asia has similarly
revealed dichotomous representations of marriage immigrants. In the Australia media,
Asian foreign brides are alternatively constructed as sensual sex slaves or as the
“salvation of traditional family values” (Robinson, 1996: 60). Robinson (1996)
interprets these representations as an intersection between historically-rooted Orientalist
discourses of Western dominance and contemporary patterns of gender and marriage
relations in Australia. More specifically, media depictions reflect reactions to the
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changing nature of family and marital relations in the face of feminist advances in
Australia, co-mingled with debates surrounding Australia’s relations with Asia. In this
context, patriarchal and Orientalist discourses intertwine in the struggle to define
contemporary Australian identity (Robinson, 1996).
As previously noted, Canadian media coverage of marriage immigration has not
been analyzed. Nevertheless, there exists a large body of work on Canadian media
coverage of immigrants and ethnic minorities 25 (see Mahtani, 2008, for a review of this
literature) that deserves brief consideration. This research highlights the role of media
discourses in exclusionary nation-building, wherein immigrants and ethnic minorities
are symbolically located on the margins of the Canadian nation. Generally speaking,
immigrants and ethnic minorities are consistently portrayed in the Canadian media in
negative and stereotypical ways (Henry & Tator, 2002; Mahtani, 2008). Extensive
research on Canadian news media has demonstrated that immigrants and ethnic
minorities are widely racialized and criminalized in media coverage (Fleras & Kunz,
2001; Greenberg, 2000; Greenberg & Hier 2001; Henry & Tator, 2002; Hier &
Greenburg, 2002a, 2002b; Jiwani, 2006, 1998; Ma & Hildebrandt, 1993; Mahtani, 2008,
2001; Mahtani & Mountz, 2002). For example, in an examination of three daily British
Columbia newspapers between 1995 and 2000, Mahtani and Mountz (2002) found that
articles associated with immigrant criminality rose in volume and intensity of negative
tone over time, accompanied by increasing anti-immigration rhetoric. Similarly, in an
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Note that much of the mainstream media discourse on immigration is characterized by the folk
construction of immigrants discussed by Li (2003a) (see Chapter One). In this understanding, there is an
epistemological conflation between immigrants and ethnic minorities, wherein the terms immigrants,
visible minorities, people of colour, racial minorities, etc. are often used interchangeably, despite the
inaccuracies this involves (Mahtani, 2008). This conflation means that, in the present review, some of the
literature discussed addresses media coverage of ethnic minorities, and not necessarily immigrants per se.
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analysis of the Toronto Star and the Vancouver Sun between 1970 and 1990, Ma and
Hildebrandt (1993) found that, over time, an increasing proportion of news stories about
ethnic Chinese in Canada (including but not restricted to immigrants) constructed this
group as criminals, and the balance of stories about the Chinese community generally
became more negative.
Hier and Greenberg have written cogently about media treatment of the 600
Fujian migrants, popularly and pejoratively termed the “Chinese boat people,” who
arrived on Canada’s west coast in 1999 (Greenberg 2000; Greenberg & Hier 2001; Hier
& Greenberg 2002a, 2002b). The authors argue that news media coverage of the
incident was part of a process of ‘collective problematization’ of immigration
(Greenberg & Hier 2001), touching on public concerns about the ability of the Canadian
state to secure the nation’s borders and protect the Canadian population. In this regard,
the arrival of undocumented migrants was constructed into a narrative crisis that was
factually disproportionate to the reality of the situation, yet appealed to the population’s
concern over national security. To this end, even a relatively small group of migrants
became ‘legitimately’ defined as a ‘crisis’ (Hier & Greenberg, 2002a). Moreover, these
migrants were racialized as foreign ‘Others’; as the authors explain, “repeated reference
to the fact that [the migrants] were of ‘Chinese’ or ‘Asian’ origin [created] an instant
epistemological distinction between ‘Chinese’ and ‘Canadian,’ ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident,’
‘Us’ and Them’” (p.498). In this way, insiders’ status in Canada’s imagined community
was solidified through the construction of the Fujian migrants as threats to the Canadian
nation.
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The present chapter extends and draws together the above two bodies of work
by examining Canadian news media discourse on marriage immigration. The chapter
contends that this discourse reflects national anxieties about contemporary immigration
relating to the increasing ethnic and cultural diversity of the Canadian nation, as well as
broader concerns associated with non-economic (i.e., family-class) immigration. The
media coverage is revealing of ambivalence and uncertainty surrounding the presence
of residents of non-European origins and about marriages between Canadians and
‘foreigners.’ The media discourse thus reflects and contributes to social tensions
surrounding marriage migrants, and contributes to this group’s symbolic
marginalization in Canada’s imagined community.

4.4 Methods
An initial keyword search of newspaper publications was conducted using the electronic
database LexisNexis. Broad search terms of “Canada,” “immigration,” and (“family” or
“spouse”) were used in order to ensure that as many relevant articles as possible would
be located. Given that marriage immigration has never been specifically examined in
existing analyses of Canadian media, there was no a priori expectation regarding the
volume of articles that might be published on this topic. However, given that Canadian
immigration is a very broad topic, and that specific coverage of any individual aspect of
this topic would not be likely to garner a particularly high volume of publications, a
relatively long time frame of ten years was selected for the present analysis. As such,
the search was conducted for articles published between December 1999 and December
2009.
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The LexisNexis keyword search returned 958 newspaper results. Of this total,
approximately 79% were published in three newspapers: the Globe and Mail (n=242),
the Toronto Star (n=382), and the Toronto Sun (n=131); all others newspapers included
in the results were primarily non-Canadian publications, and were thus excluded from
the analysis. In order to ensure that articles of interest from these three newspapers were
not missed, an additional search with slightly more narrow search terms (“Canada” and
“immigration” and “spouse or marriage”) was conducted in the electronic database
ProQuest for these three specific newspapers. These results were cross-referenced with
the LexisNexis results to identify any non-duplicate articles. An additional search for
articles published in the National Post between 1999 and 2009 was also conducted in
ProQuest, again using the search terms “Canada,” “immigration,” and “spouse or
marriage.” Notably, the National Post is not included in the LexisNexis database;
however, it was purposively sampled in order to provide as national a perspective as
possible. Based on this search, a total of 304 results from the National Post were
reviewed for relevance.
Results from both the LexisNexis and ProQuest databases were obtained in fulltext format and examined for possible inclusion in the current analysis. Publications that
contained the specified search terms but were not actually about marriage immigration,
articles that were only peripherally relevant (i.e., where marriage immigration was not
the substantive focus), and duplicate results were excluded from the data file. In
addition, articles that were not authored by journalists (e.g., letters to the editor) were
excluded from the analysis, on the basis that these types of pieces are not bound by the
journalistic standards and requirements of newspapers, and are viewed in critical
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analytical and theoretical terms as being distinct from the discourse produced by staff
journalists. 26
The final sample for the present analysis consisted of 190 articles on spousal
sponsorship. This included 47 articles from the Toronto Star, 44 from the Toronto Sun,
62 from the Globe and Mail, and 37 from the National Post. For all individual articles,
the following information was entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet: (1) overall
tone (positive/sympathetic, neutral, or negative/accusatory); (2) article focus (e.g.,
policy, personal/human interest story); (3) specific topic(s) covered in the article (e.g.,
sponsorship policy; immigrants as a burden on Canadian society; difficulties associated
with spousal sponsorship); (4) whether the article specifically addressed female or male
immigrants or both; and (5) whether a specific country of immigrant origin or the ethnic
origin of immigrants were discussed. From here, content analysis was conducted in
order to identify themes and codified context.
It should be noted that, given this chapter’s focus on marriage immigrants, the
tone of the newspaper articles was evaluated with respect to this group or this type of
immigration. There were instances where, for example, articles discussed both
economic immigration and family-class (including marriage) immigration; in some
cases, the tone of individual articles was positive towards economic immigrants and
their contribution to Canadian society or positive towards immigration as a general
phenomenon, yet simultaneously negative towards marriage immigrants. For the present
26

Letters to the editor are meaningful, in that they are part the public discourse on a given topic; they can
also reflect newspapers’ ideological inclinations, in the sense that the editors choose which letters to
publish. Nevertheless, these types of pieces are not seen as possessing the same degree of discursive
power as news stories. This distinction has been made in previous media analyses that have also excluded
letters to the editor for the same reason (see Hier & Greenberg, 2002b).
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analysis, articles as a whole were coded according to the dominant tone directed toward
marriage immigrants. In the small number of cases where both sympathetic and
negative elements were strongly present within individual articles, the articles were
coded as both ‘negative’ and ‘sympathetic.’ It is noted in the text when this type of
article is discussed.

4.5 Results
Overall, 56.2% of articles were categorized as having a negative tone, while 33.3% of
articles were categorized as sympathetic and 10.4% were categorized as neutral. The
breakdown of the number and percentage of each type of article in all newspapers is
provided in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Sympathetic, Neutral, and Negative Articles, by Newspaper
Newspaper
Sympathetic
Neutral
Globe and Mail
21
4
National Post
8
6
Toronto Star
23
8
Toronto Sun
15
3
Total
67
21
*5 articles coded as both negative and sympathetic
**6 articles coded as both negative and sympathetic

Negative
42*
23
22**
26
113

Total
67
37
53
44
201

Articles that were neutral in tone dealt mostly with immigration policy. The articles
primarily reported on changes relating to the spousal sponsorship program, most
commonly relating to regulations surrounding residency requirements during the
processing of sponsorship applications. Other articles in this category reported on the
change in immigration policy in 2002 that allowed spousal sponsorship among samesex partners. Overall, the neutral articles were typically short in length and were very
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straightforward, providing little to no evidence of ideological inclinations or political
leanings; as such, they offered very little content for meaningful and theoreticallyrelevant analysis of marriage immigration. Moreover, these articles represented a
relatively small proportion of all articles (6% for both Globe and Mail, 16% for the
National Post, 15% for the Toronto Star, and just under 7% for the Toronto Sun, for an
overall total of 10.4% across all newspapers). For these reasons, the remainder of the
chapter focuses on negative and sympathetic articles relating to marriage immigration.
These articles provide insight into the manner in which marriage immigrants were
socially constructed and symbolically positioned in the Canadian imagined community
through media discourse.

4.51 Negative Coverage: The Social Problem of Inauthentic Marriage Immigration
The analysis revealed that marriage immigration was presented in the media as a
distinct and growing social problem. In constructing marriage immigration as a social
problem, the media coverage emphasized immigrants’ growing use of marriages of
convenience and fraudulent marriages to undeservedly gain entry to Canada. As defined
in one article (Jimenez, 2006, July 29), marriages of convenience are unions entered
into with both parties’ knowledge that the primary purpose of the marriage is one
spouse’s immigration, with the migrating spouse commonly paying a fee to the resident
spouse for the marriage. In fraudulent marriages, on the other hand, the Canadian
counterpart is said to enter into a marriage not knowing that for the immigrant, the sole
purpose of the union is to come to Canada. Several sub-themes characterized articles
focusing on marriages of convenience and fraudulent marriages: first, that these types of
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unions are a significant and growing problem in Canada requiring state attention;
second, that culturally arranged marriages are a common route for introducing
inauthentic marriage immigrants 27 to Canada; and third, that marriage immigrants are
deviants or criminals who threaten the safety of the Canadian population, the integrity
of the Canadian immigration program, and the stability of Canadian values and norms.
Across these themes, marriage immigrants were commonly portrayed as evil-doers who
defraud Canadian citizens and the immigration system. Canadian partners, on the other
hand, were alternatively depicted as victims of marriage immigrants, or as victims of an
unduly harsh immigration system that imposes a financial burden on Canadian sponsors
via the sponsorship program.
Across articles from all newspapers, inauthentic marriage immigration was
portrayed as a widespread and growing problem, despite the absence of valid data to
support this claim. In the absence of such data, many articles attempted to quantify the
inauthentic marriage migration problem, often using quotes from immigration officials
or other elite voices (e.g., lawyers) to legitimize the claims being put forth: 28
Ms. Towell is one of a growing number of people going public with their
stories of marriage fraud in the immigration system. These are Canadians
who married a foreigner only to see their husband or wife leave them
within weeks or even days of landing on Canadian soil (Curry, 2009,
April 20).
The Canadian Marriage Fraud Victim Society has already documented
200 cases [of marriage fraud] and believes there are many, many more
(Mandel, 2006, July 9).

27

The term ‘inauthentic marriages’ is used in this chapter to capture both fraudulent marriages and
marriages of convenience.
28
These strategies (the use of questionable statistics and equivocal estimates, and reliance on authority
figures) were similarly found by Hsia (2007) as means used by the Taiwanese media to ‘prove’ that
marriage migration was a social problem.
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When a New Democratic Party MLA organized a meeting on [marriage
fraud] in Burnaby, B.C., in 2006, nearly 200 people filled a town hall.
An advocacy group called the Canadian Marriage Fraud Victims' Society
estimates the number of victims to be in the thousands (Curry, 2008,
May 21).
Ottawa immigration lawyer Julie Taub said thousands of Canadians have
fallen victim to marriage fraud and the 100 or so members of Canadians
Against Immigration Fraud ‘represent only the tip of the iceberg’
(Spencer, 2009, April 23).
Ms. Green is just one of 1,500 Canadians who fall victim to marriage
fraud each year, according to an advocacy group called Canadians
Against Immigration Fraud. Falling in love with foreigners, they are
jilted weeks – if not days – after the vows are exchanged. Commenting
on this issue last week, Immigration Minister Jason Kenney said: “I
would say it's one of the most frequent forms of immigration fraud”
(Bielski, 2009b, April 30).
When he first saw the front page of the Sunday [Toronto] Sun about a
woman abandoned shortly after sponsoring her Cuban groom here, Shah
nervously joked to his bride, “but you wouldn't leave me, right?” She
gave him a big hug. “What a stupid question,” she assured him. “Of
course not.” But the very next day the Cuban woman had vanished as
well, joining an epidemic of foreign brides and grooms who are ditching
their Canadian spouses soon after using them to get to this promise land
(Mandel, 2006, July 9).
The media discourse entailed constant assertion that inauthentic marriage immigration
is a widespread and growing problem that is nearing epidemic proportions, without
actually having data to this effect. The enumeration provided was based on
questionable, impressionist estimates or vague terminology (e.g., many; widespread),
yet served to lend a sense of ‘realness’ to the ‘problem’ under construction. In this way,
the media established a sense of prevalence and urgency, regardless of the extent to
which inauthentic marriage migration actually occurs.
Across the articles analyzed, the Canadian state’s concern over disingenuous
immigrants and active investigation of possible fraud was emphasized, further
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contributing to the construction of inauthentic marriage migration as a notable social
problem:
“The government is concerned about marriages of convenience and is
currently engaged in the investigation of these cases,” said department
spokesperson Danielle Norris (Keung, 2008, May 23).
After being flooded with fake wedding photos, false forms and forged
signatures, the Canadian government is sounding the alarm over
immigration fraud (“Feds look out for immigration fraud,” Toronto Sun,
2009, March 11).
The Harper government is deploying clandestine teams to fan out across
foreign countries and gather raw information about elaborately staged
phony weddings aimed at duping Canadian immigration officials. The
teams, which comprise up to five people, are part of a wider bid by the
Department of Citizenship and Immigration to crack down on marriages
of convenience as immigrant communities warn that thousands of
foreign fraudsters are leaving lonely Canadians broke and brokenhearted (Curry, 2008, May 21).
Officials from Citizenship and Immigration Canada are looking for input
from the Canadian Bar Association on possible changes to regulations
regarding ‘bad faith’ marriages, in which foreigners dupe Canadians into
marriage to gain a Canadian passport (Curry, 2008, July 10).
By defining inauthentic marriage immigration as an imminent problem affecting a
growing number of Canadians, marriage immigrants were cast under a shadow of
suspicion, while Canadians were directly represented as victims of immigration scams:
Palwinder Gill of Surrey, B.C., had an arranged marriage that quickly
fell apart two years ago. The 43-year-old said his wife left him one year
after he sponsored her entry into Canada from India. He is convinced she
used him purely for immigration purposes. Now he advocates for change
as part of a group called the Canadian Marriage Fraud Victims' Society.
The group says these marriages have devastating effects, leading to
depression, embarrassment and economic hardship (Curry, 2008, May
21).
Victims say such marriages of convenience stigmatize and humiliate
them before their family, friends and peers. Worse still is the depression
that follows the sudden marital abandonment. And there is a financial
burden: Sponsors are on the hook financially for any social assistance
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their spouses might receive for three years – 10 years if they've also
sponsored children (Bielski, 2009b, April 30).
There are no statistics measuring the scope of the problem [of marriage
fraud], but advocacy groups argue it is widespread, leaving Canadians
feeling ashamed and possibly on the hook financially should a fleeing
spouse go on social assistance (Curry, 2009, January 22).
Their unwitting Canadian sponsors invest not only their hearts but
thousands of dollars in paperwork, long-distance phone calls and airfare.
They also mortgage their future: To sponsor their immigrant spouses
here, they must agree to financially support them for three years. If the
newcomer draws on social assistance – even if they have run out on their
spouse – their Canadian sponsor is still on the hook to pay that money
back to the Canadian government (Mandel, 2006, July 9).
The media discourse thus constructed a clear dichotomy between marriage immigrants
and Canadians, with overseas marriages emerging as a site for marginalizing marriage
immigrants to Canada’s national community. Also important to note from the above
descriptions is the attribution of inauthentic marriage immigration to both women and
men immigrants; this stands in contrast to previous research focusing on foreign brides.
Indeed, the analysis revealed that inauthentic marriage migration was portrayed as a
scheme commonly used by both men and women immigrants to enter Canada. The
gendered contours of these portrayals are discussed further in section 4.53 of this
chapter.
The ‘social problem’ of inauthentic marriage immigration was also articulated in
reference to the necessity of the sponsorship program. In these cases, the potential
financial detriment that Canadians may face if they marry a fraudulent immigrant
further contributed to the image of marriage immigrants as a problematic group of
newcomers in Canadian society:
[Lawyer Julie] Taub argues that those who cynically say Canadians
marrying foreigners deserve their ordeals are missing the point. “When
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fraudsters become permanent residents, then they too have the right to
sponsor family members. They're entitled to health care, social
assistance, housing and all the benefits that Canadians are entitled to”
(Bielski, 2009b, April 30).
Ms. Finley is working with the B.C. government – which was asked to
co-operate with Ottawa on the issue – to warn and remind Canadians
they will be on the hook financially if their new husbands or wives
immediately leave them and apply for social assistance (Curry, 2008,
May 21).
The duped Canadian not only suffers emotional distress and
embarrassment as the victim of a marriage fraud, but they are also liable
for financial support if their ex then applies for social assistance. Some
immigrant advocates would have the federal government waive this
obligation, saying it punishes only the victim, but under existing rules
such an arrangement is a necessary protection for taxpayers and should
inspire greater vigilance among Canadians who enter into arranged
marriages (“A Simple Remedy,” Globe and Mail, 2008, May 22).
In this context, marriage immigrants were portrayed as a potential threat to not only
individual Canadian sponsors, but to Canadian taxpayers more generally. The potential
social burden associated with inauthentic marriage immigration not only depicted these
immigrants as a potential drain on the Canadian system, but also served as the basis for
articulating a warning to Canadians against entering an international marital union. It is
also evident from these latter examples that portrayals of Canadians within inauthentic
marriages were not always clear-cut. In some cases, Canadians were problematized for
marrying foreigners, and were portrayed as being at least partly responsible for their
own victimization. In other instances, as evidenced by the last article quoted above (“A
Simple Remedy,” Globe and Mail, 2008, May 22), marriage fraud was associated with
culturally arranged marriages. Importantly, as this example illustrates, articles referring
to culturally arranged marriages inconsistently and often simultaneously referred to
alleged victims of marriage fraud as ‘Canadians’ and as ‘immigrants.’ These articles
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thus served as a means of discouraging Canadians, in general, from entering marriages
with ‘foreigners,’ yet often also located the problem of inauthentic marriage migration
within certain ‘immigrant’ communities. This point will be discussed in detail in the
next section of this chapter (section 4.52).
Other articles linked marriages of convenience to foreign workers and students,
thereby expanding the reach of the ‘social problem’ of inauthentic marriage
immigration beyond newcomers who enter the country through marriage. Similar to
previously discussed articles, equivocal statistics were used in an attempt to establish
the extent to which temporary migrants remain in the country through inauthentic
marriages. For instance, an article in the Globe and Mail specifically stated that foreign
workers and foreign students can use marriage and spousal sponsorship as a way of
gaining permanent residence in Canada, then immediately noted that 90,668 workers
and 56,536 students were granted entry to Canada two years ago (Jimenez, 2006, May
11). Putting these two statements together suggested a direct connection, implying that
these large numbers of foreign workers and students are at risk of defrauding the
Canadian system through inauthentic marriages. The discursive effect of this connection
was to cast suspicion on a much broader population of migrants in Canada. In other
words, the media coverage suggested that family-class spousal immigrants as well as
temporary residents may abuse the system through marriage scams. By commenting
that fraudulent marriage is a common strategy used by temporary migrants to remain in
the country, the possibility that a migrant worker or student and a Canadian can actually
fall in love and be joined in a genuine union was dismissed, and marriages between
Canadians and temporary residents were inherently problematized. In this way,
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Canadians were implicitly warned against marrying a ‘foreigner’ residing overseas or
within Canada.
Indeed, unions between Canadians and foreign immigrants were directly
presented in the media discourse as highly problematic:
“In any overseas marriage,” says immigration spokesman Melanie
Carkner, "they [Canadian sponsors] are counselled that this [marriage
fraud] could happen. It's on their application" (Jimenez, 2006, June 1).
“It really is buyer beware when you marry overseas,” says Marina
Wilson, a spokeswoman for Citizenship and Immigration Canada
(Jimenez, 2006, July 29).
International marriage immigrants were characterized as a distinct threat to individual
Canadians entering unions with foreign nationals, and, by extension, cross-border
marriages were problematized. Moreover, concern about these types of union was
rendered legitimate by citing government officials. In this regard, the above-cited words
of state official Marina Wilson are particularly telling. Her statement portrayed foreign
marriage migrants as a ‘purchase’ that Canadians should be wary of ‘buying.’ This
statement explicitly conveyed doubt that international marriages can be based on
genuine love, and emerged as an official cautionary assertion against the sponsorship of
‘foreign’ marriage partners.
In other instances, the possibility that marriage immigration could escalate and
entail ongoing immigration scams was emphasized:
If marriages of convenience go undetected, the couple divorce once the
spouse receives permanent residency. Some then go on to marry for a
second time and sponsor someone from their homeland in a process
known as ‘chain sponsorships’ (Jimenez, 2006, May 11).
Someone divorces their real spouse, then enters a marriage of
convenience to get into Canada. Their “ex” husband or wife does the
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same. Although officially divorced, the couple end up living together
again in their new country (Blackwell, 2004, April 7).
The possible spiraling of inauthentic marriage immigration amplified the
problematization of marriage immigrants; it also undermined the validity of familyclass immigration as a component of Canada’s immigration system by suggesting that it
is inherently amenable to enabling the entry of inauthentic migrants. In this way,
marriage immigrants were presented as a source of ongoing threat to the Canadian
nation through their facilitation of additional disingenuous immigration. This further
contributed to the marginalization of marriage immigrants with respect to Canada’s
imagined community, constructing them as outsiders within the nation’s borders in light
of their tendency to continually take advantage of the Canadian immigration system.
In portraying inauthentic marriage immigration as a social problem, the media
coverage also delineated the differential value of economic versus family-class
immigrant types:
“The selection criteria [for economic-class immigrants] is set so high
that it’s increasingly difficult for someone who doesn’t have a relative
here to get into Canada,” said James Bissett, a retired Immigration and
Foreign Affairs official and critic of the system. “It’s a serious concern,
because the family class 29 is squeezing out the selected classes like
skilled workers” (Blackwell, 2004, April 7).
Once spousal sponsorships are granted, the partner immediately qualifies
for permanent resident status – avoiding skills requirements and queues
that for economic-class immigrants can involve waits of as long as six
years. Too often, the bureaucrats get it wrong. There are many cases
where the partner, once in Canada, then dumps his or her unsuspecting
spouse (“A Simple Remedy,” Globe and Mail, 2008, May 22).
“Marriages of convenience are increasing substantially…because it
takes so long to process immigration cases,” Tony Luk, president of the
29

Although this quotation is about the family class more generally, the article itself was about “sham
marriages.”
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Chinese Immigration Consultants’ Association, told the Toronto Star
yesterday. […] Luk said it takes about four to five years for a skilled
worker, for example, to get landed immigrant status, compared with six
to nine months for someone married to a Canadian. “Under the new
rules…you don’t even need to be (legally) married as long as you are
common-law,” Luk said (Brennan, 2006, May 10).
Marriage immigrants were thus presented as unskilled and undeserving of entry to
Canada. Moreover, they were depicted as inhibiting the admission of deserving
immigrants (i.e., economic immigrants). In this way, the media coverage discursively
located economic immigrants within the boundaries of the nation’s imagined
community by suggesting that they are necessarily preferable to family-class
immigrants, while simultaneously marginalizing marriage immigrants. Marriage
immigrants also served as a basis for articulating broader concerns about the current
state of the immigration system by indicating that qualified economic immigrants are
hampered from entering the country while marriage immigrants (and family-class
immigrants more generally) readily gain entry. It is also worth noting that, in portraying
economic and family-class immigrants in this fashion, the media coverage contributed
to an image of the Canadian state as an ineffective guardian of the nation’s borders. In
this way, marriage immigrants served as a means for highlighting ‘flaws’ in the
Canadian immigration system.

4.52 Negative Coverage: Inauthentic Marriages, Problematic Asians
Another characteristic of the media coverage of inauthentic marriages was the common
conflation of these unions with culturally arranged marriages. Alongside this conflation
was a tendency to largely attribute inauthentic unions to Asian communities. In this
context, ‘Asian’ partners in Canada were inconsistently presented as ‘immigrants,’
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without clear indication of whether they were, in fact, immigrants or Canadian-born. As
discussed in the preceding section, these types of articles commonly used ambiguous
quantifiers and appeals to authority to legitimize the claim that marriage immigration is
a major (Asian) problem.
The conflation of arranged marriages and inauthentic unions was, at times,
blatant. For instance, an article in the Globe and Mail entitled “Arranged marriages
becoming more common, officials say” (Jimenez, 2006, May 11, italics added) had as
its first line: “Marriages of convenience are more and more common, particularly in the
Chinese and South Asian communities, immigration lawyers say” (Jimenez, 2006, May
11, italics added). Other articles suggested that marriages involving immigrants and
Asian communities were highly likely to be inauthentic:
Marriages of convenience are common in the South Asian community,
and because of this, spousal sponsorships are scrutinized closely to
ensure people are not marrying for immigration purposes (Jimenez,
2006, June 1).
Mr. Parikh, according to his court filing, counts himself a victim of
marriage fraud, a new kind of immigration offence that is bringing
humiliation, financial ruin and distress to a growing number of
immigrants from India, China, the Philippines and other countries. […]
“I would tell Indo-Canadians, don't marry in India,” Parikh said in an
interview (Jimenez, 2006, July 29).
As this latter example also illustrates, the tendency to locate inauthentic marriage
immigration in Asian communities served as a means of obscuring whether sponsors
had previously immigrated to Canada or were born in the country. This contributed to a
broader depiction of Asian-Canadians as immigrants, thereby conflating ethnicity and
immigrant status.
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Numerous articles attempted to demonstrate the growing problem of inauthentic
marriage among Asian immigrants:
Chinese women wishing to come to Canada literally line up outside the
Canadian Embassy in Beijing proposing to men who’ve been issued
visas to travel here, according to immigration officers in Hong Kong.
The officers said single women try to marry visa-holding men so they
can be sponsored here as their wives (Godfrey, 2003, March 5).
Canadian immigration officials say migration from China will remain the
most problematic issue their department will have to deal with this year.
[…] Canadian diplomats said 21% of Chinese sponsorship cases are
rejected because they consist of misrepresentation and marriage of
conveniences (Godfrey, 2000, January 3).
To crack down on those using phony marriages to come to Canada,
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, according to news reports, is now
sending investigative teams around the world, especially to high-fraud
regions such as India, China and Vietnam, to gather intelligence on
staged marriages (Keung, 2008, May 23).
Canadian bureaucrats who staff visa desks at places such as Chandigarh
have the unenviable task of trying to determine whether a marriage is
fraudulent or not. They are required to immerse themselves in local and
religious customs that would seem mysterious to many Canadians, but
which provide insight into a marriage’s legitimacy, for example the
seven steps associated with Hindu ceremonies (“A Simple Remedy,”
Globe and Mail, 2008, May 22).
Marriage immigration involving Asian migrants was thus presented as a growing
problem for Canada and as a major source of concern among immigration officials.
Moreover, as the last example above illustrates, marriage immigration among Asians
served as the basis for highlighting the ‘foreignness’ of this group. The ‘mystery’ of
their cultural practices was presented as a challenge to Canadian immigration officials
in determining the veracity of marriage immigration. These portrayals dichotomized
Asians and Canadians, and defined Asians as ethnic Others with norms and customs
that are not easily understood by Canadians. The media coverage thereby served as a
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means of racialization, homogenizing both ‘Canadians’ and ‘Asians’ and positioning
them to each other in dichotomous terms.
Elsewhere, the previously noted link between inauthentic marriages and
temporary foreign residents (such as students, labour migrants, and visitors) was
reiterated in specific reference to Asian migrants:
A memo from an Immigration Canada intelligence analyst in Beijing
cites a Hong Kong newspaper article that told the story of a Hong Kong
woman willing to pay $30,000 for a Canadian spouse, and a Vancouver
dating service that routinely got calls, usually from Chinese people in
Canada on student or visitor visas, asking for marriage partners
(Blackwell, 2004, April 7).
It is often the cultural norm for Chinese Canadians and Indo-Canadians
to marry virtual strangers in arranged marriages overseas, making it
difficult for immigration officials here to assess the validity of these
unions. Foreign students and workers in Canada on temporary visas may
also persuade someone to marry them as a favour to be repaid in kind, or
for money, from as little as $1,000 to as much as $25,000, according to
immigration lawyers (Jimenez, 2006, May 11).
As previously discussed, this type of coverage cast a broader shadow of doubt over
marriages involving all types of migrants, suggesting that marriage immigrants, foreign
students, and foreign workers all stand the risk of defrauding the Canadian system
through inauthentic marriage. These examples also further demonstrate the manner in
which marriage served as a basis for articulating the ‘foreignness’ of the Asian
community, effectively Othering both Asian migrants and Asian-Canadians.
Other articles addressed a new, more sophisticated marriage migration scheme
that was purportedly being used by South Asians to skirt Canadian immigration
regulations:
Arranged marriages, where parents introduce young people to each other
and couples marry after a brief courtship, are common among South
Asians, but “barter” marriages seem to be becoming increasingly
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common, too. In other words: I'll get your son/daughter to Canada, you
help get my niece/nephew out of India. These ads have been around for
some time, but never as bold or pervasive as they are now, as people find
new ways of bringing relatives over after Citizenship and Immigration
Canada plugged legal loopholes and cracked down on marriage fraud in
recent years (Aulakh, 2009, June 29).
Once again, culturally arranged marriages were rendered comparable to inauthentic
marriages designed to fraudulently gain admission to Canada. This type of coverage
also cast suspicion on South Asians within Canada in light of their possible involvement
in marriage scams. Family-class immigrants in general were also problematized in
association with Asian marriage migration, with the implication that these inauthentic
marriage immigrants will sponsor additional relatives who are undeserving of entry.
It is relevant to note that the problem of inauthentic marriage immigration was
not exclusively attributed to Asian communities:
“This is a very huge problem in Canada,” Mr. Gill [a self-identified
victim of marriage fraud] said. “Marriage is the easiest and fastest way to
get Canadian immigration status, so people are using marriage as a route
to get into Canada. [...] There are thousands of cases in each and every
immigrant community” (Curry, 2008, May 21). 30
Vancouver immigration lawyer Andrew Wlodyka says he has seen it all
during his past 17 years in practice, and over the previous seven years in
various roles with the Immigration and Refugee Board. “In many
communities it's epidemic,” Mr. Wlodyka said. He mentioned India,
China and Vietnam as frequent sources of marriage fraud, but stressed
those countries are also a major source of overall immigration to B.C.
and that fraud is being committed by people of all backgrounds (Curry,
2008, May 21).
These runaway spouses come from every possible nation – from the
Dominican Republic and China to India and Pakistan, even Fiji – with
one common intent, to use a short-term Canadian marriage to escape
poverty back home and enjoy the good life here (Mandel, 2006, July 9).
30

Note in this example the previously mentioned articulation of marriage immigration as an easy route of
entry relative to economic immigration, thereby privileging economic immigrants as more valuable than
family-class immigrants.
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“Most of [the cases] that we have involve spouses from India because we
deal largely with the Indo-Canadian community but I think it's happening
in all immigrant communities,” says [Canadian Marriage Fraud Victim
Society] spokesman Navdeet Dhillon, an abandoned bride living in
Vancouver. “We believe there are thousands of cases but people are too
embarrassed to come forward.” In her case, Dhillon married her husband
in India in April 2004 and sponsored him here in October of that year.
He stayed just one day before telling her that he had used her to
immigrate and wanted a divorce (Mandel, 2006, July 9).
Marriage fraud was thus framed as an epidemic, and as a scam used by immigrants from
all regions (but especially Asian countries) to undeservedly gain entry to Canada.
Marriage immigrants were clearly portrayed as schemers seeking to escape poverty,
while their Canadian counterparts were depicted as embarrassed victims who are left to
pick up the pieces of their lives. The ongoing emphasis on Asian immigrants, despite
acknowledgement that inauthentic marriage immigration is a larger immigrant problem,
suggested that fraudulent marriage immigrants are most commonly Asian, and
simultaneously suggested that marriages between Asian nationals and (Asian-)
Canadians are suspicious and problematic.
Overall, ambiguity surrounding the distinction between culturally arranged
marriages and inauthentic marriages, and vagueness surrounding the immigrant status
of Canadian residents of Asian background are revealing of the tension surrounding
immigration from Asian source countries. Locating inauthentic marriage immigration
primarily within Asian communities inherently problematized the presence of
immigrants (and non-immigrants) of Asian origin, and defined ‘Asian’ cultural
practices (i.e., arranged marriages) as contravening Canadian norms. The identification
of Asian-Canadians as ‘immigrants’ that stand to defraud the Canadian immigration
system constructed this group as Others within the nation. In this way, Asians residing
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in Canada, regardless of their legal or citizenship status, were racialized and
marginalized with respect to Canada’s imagined community. These findings offer
discursive evidence of a struggle to come to terms with ethnic and cultural diversity in
the Canadian context, wherein the lines around membership in the Canadian national
community are blurred, and the identification of an individual as an ‘immigrant’ is not
clearly linked to their legal status. In this context, ‘non-Canadian’ practices are viewed
with suspicion, and the ‘Canadian’ status of persons from Asian ethnic communities is
rendered unstable.

4.53 Negative Coverage: Deviants and Criminals
The analysis of negative articles pertaining to marriage immigrants further revealed that
these immigrants were commonly represented in terms of deviance and criminality. In
this way, marriage immigrants were presented as highly undesirable members of the
Canadian nation. Consistent with research on foreign brides in other national contexts,
this component of the discourse employed simplistic gendered stereotypes; women
immigrants were constructed as sexualized deviants, while male marriage immigrants,
for their part, were constructed as criminals involved in terrorism and murder.
In terms of the media coverage of women marriage immigrants, numerous
articles (e.g., Clements, 2004, December 24; Fife, 2004, November 17; Fife, 2004,
November 15; Freeze & Jimenez, 2004, November 27; Friscolanti, 2004, December 4;
Girard, 2005, January 27; Jimenez, 2004, December 4; Jimenez, 2004, November 24;
Thompson, 2005, February 26; 2004, December 4) discussed the controversial case of
Alina Balaican, a female migrant from Romania attempting to remain in the country

129
through marriage. The articles recounted the fact that the Immigration Minister at the
time, Judy Sgro, had granted Balaican – a former stripper who had been residing in
Canada despite having an expired status, a permit to remain in the country while the
spousal sponsorship application submitted by Balaican’s Canadian husband was being
reviewed. The media coverage commonly implied that this marriage may be
inauthentic, intended only for Balaican to obtain immigration status. The coverage also
reiterated the fact that Balaican had previously volunteered on Sgro's election
campaign; to this end, the case came to be referred to in the media as ‘Strippergate.’ As
this label suggests, Balaican’s status as a former stripper became the dominant feature
of her identity as an immigrant, and served to cast her in a highly gendered, deviant
light:
This is where “Strippergate,” the controversy that threatens to derail the
career of Immigration Minister Judy Sgro, all began: on a stage like this
one, at the Diamonds Cabaret in Mississauga, Ont. The lights are dim.
The sound system blares Ludacris rapping about “all these women on the
prowl,” while a porn movie plays on the television. A customer lies on
the stage beneath a brass pole, as two blond Slavic women…wearing
nothing but leather boots stand over him and simulate lesbian sex. They
spank his backside with a belt, take the bills out of his mouth, and move
on to the next customer (Freeze & Jimenez, 2004, November 27).
Balaican’s case was use to paint all female foreign strippers as potential inauthentic
marriage immigrants:
Critics of the exotic-dancer program – and of Immigration Minister Judy
Sgro, who is accused of helping a Romanian stripper named Alina
Balaican prolong her stay here – say these foreign dancers are being
exploited by agents demanding kickbacks. But there is another side to
their Canadian journey. According to interviews with several people in
the industry, while some strippers are mistreated by corrupt agents,
others use the program as a back door into the country, and then marry
Canadian men in a bid for citizenship (Freeze & Jimenez, 2004,
November 27).
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Foreign exotic dancers were portrayed on the one hand as hapless victims of shady
businessmen, and on the other hand as scheming frauds who use marriage to remain in
Canada. In this way, ‘Strippergate’ served as a basis for painting both Balaican and
foreign exotic dancers more broadly as would-be marriage immigrant frauds. The
highly sexualized language used to describe these women cast them in an unfavourable
light, and relegated them to the ‘dark side’ of Canadian society. The implication that
foreign strippers who marry Canadians might simply be seeking citizenship served to
cast doubt on marriages involving these immigrants, and indirectly portrayed the men in
these marriages as victims of calculating women who use their sexuality to get what
they want – Canadian citizenship. In this way, foreign exotic dancers were portrayed as
undesirable members of the Canadian national community, at least in part due to their
risk of inauthentic marriage immigration.
The connection between marriage immigration and exotic dancing was also
articulated in passing in other articles. One article, for instance, stated that “the practice
[of inauthentic marriage] isn’t restricted to Chinese and South Asian communities; West
Indians, Americans, Filipinos, Fijians and exotic dancers from Eastern Europe have also
been known to marry for immigration purposes” (Jimenez, 2006, May 11, italics
added). By noting that inauthentic marriage immigrants are commonly exotic dancers,
most readily assumed to be women, this statement sexualized women marriage
immigrants and simultaneously depicted them as abusers of the Canadian immigration
system. This statement also reflects the previously discussed tendency to present
inauthentic marriage immigration as primarily an ‘Asian’ problem, but also as a larger
‘immigrant’ problem.
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With respect to male foreign spouses, these immigrants were more commonly
portrayed as organized criminals at risk of harming the Canadian nation. One example
of this theme concerns the case of Saïd Namouh. After immigrating to Canada through
marriage, Namouh was arrested on conspiracy charges pertaining to an alleged terrorist
act on Austrian soil:
Attempts to immigrate were unsuccessful until he married a Canadian
woman. A Moroccan-born man arrested in Québec in connection with a
bomb plot had tried several times to immigrate to Canada but wasn't
successful until he married a Canadian woman nearly 18 years older than
him…RCMP Corporal Sylvain L'Heureux said police seized a computer
and documents from Mr. Namouh but no bomb-making material because
the plot was “nipped in the bud” (Ha & Peritz, 2007, September 15;
italics indicate title sub-heading).
The above article emphasized the fact that Namouh was Muslim, and that officials had
linked the bomb plot to al-Qaeda. Marriage immigration to Canada thus became
discursively linked to the broader threat associated with Islamist ideological opposition
to the Western world, drawing on post-September 11 fears surrounding the possibility
of terrorism against Canada. It is also interesting to note from the last quote above that
the lack of bomb-making materials in Namouh’s residence was not interpreted in the
media as possible evidence of his innocence, but, rather, as evidence of the Canadian
state’s success in preventing him from proceeding with a terrorist plan.
It is also relevant that, in the media coverage of Namouh’s case, very little was
said about his Canadian sponsor, Carole Lessard, except for the comments quoted above
and the fact that, after sponsoring Namouh’s entry to Canada, the couple divorced.
Lessard was not explicitly blamed for enabling Namouh to enter Canada, nor was their
marriage specifically articulated as fraudulent or as a marriage of convenience.
However, the fact that Namouh had failed in his numerous attempts to enter the country
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until he married Lessard, and the fact that she was 18 years older than him, served to
place doubt in the veracity of their marriage. The implication that Namouh was only
interested in gaining entry to Canada and was not interested in a genuine union with
Lessard was clear. To this end, portraying Namouh as a terrorist who likely scammed
his way into Canada through marriage served as a warning to Canadian women against
marrying and sponsoring foreign men. It also implicitly problematized marriages that
defy Canadian gender norms – that is, involving an older woman and a younger man.
Other articles further articulated that inauthentic marriage immigration is a
common strategy used by organized criminals and terrorists:
A growing number of would-be immigrants are resorting to marriages of
convenience and even divorces of convenience – some of them set up by
organized crime – to fraudulently enter Canada (Blackwell, 2004, April
7).
Numerous articles (e.g., Ivison, 2009, April 6; Jain, 2008, May 28; Keung, 2009, March
31; Spencer, 2009, April 23) discussed the concerns of the group Canadians Against
Immigration Fraud regarding spousal sponsorships and overseas marriages, citing the
group’s president Sam Benet as saying “It is very much possible for a terrorist to enter
Canada through (such) a marriage…” (Jain, 2008, May 28). Although the gender of an
individual marriage immigrant was not always articulated in these articles, the
stereotype that terrorists and organized criminals are men meant that marriage
immigrants were painted in these articles as evil, threatening, (and often Muslim) men.
Again, these articles implicitly located the ‘problem’ of inauthentic marriage
immigration within a highly threatening context, drawing on post-September 11
discourses of fear and national security to problematize marriage immigration and
international marriages.
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In a case that received widespread media attention, marriages of convenience
were also linked to the kidnapping and murder of a young girl:
Min Chen, a student from China who pleaded guilty this week to the
second-degree murder in the killing of Cecilia Zhang, claimed he
intended only to kidnap the nine-year-old girl so that he could extract a
ransom of $25,000 from her parents. Failing in his studies and knowing
his student visa would run out, he was copying a friend’s desperate ruse
and planning to pay $25,000 for a marriage of convenience to secure
permanent residency here (Jimenez, 2006, May 11).
His student visa was about to expire and Chen was worried he would be
sent back to face his disappointed parents. But what could he do? Alone
in a foreign country, he turned to committing minor, non-violent crimes
with some fellow students in similar circumstances. But it wasn’t
enough, especially if he wanted to raise $25,000 to pay for a marriage of
convenience – like his friend had done – so he could stay in Canada and
finish his studies. And so the young man decided he would kidnap a little
girl he had met six months earlier while visiting a friend who lived at the
Zhang home (Brieger, 2006, May 10).
These latter articles used an isolated and highly sensationalized case (notably, involving
an Asian male) to illustrate the ultimate danger that Canadian society faces as a result of
foreign men entering or remaining in the country through marriage.
Overall, media coverage of marriage immigration discursively established a
clear connection between these immigrants and a wide range of activities that are
looked down upon or viewed as a threat to Canadian society. From relatively minor
contraventions of social mores (i.e., exotic dancing) all the way to serious and
frightening outcomes (e.g., organized crime, terrorism, and murder), marriage
immigrants were identified as a notable threat, requiring heightened vigilance on the
part of the Canadian population and the Canadian state. Portrayals of marriage
immigrants as deviants or criminals served as a basis for problematizing international
and interethnic marriages, involving doubt in the authenticity of marriages between
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Canadians and ‘foreigners.’ These tensions and ambiguities suggest broader uncertainty
surrounding cultural and ethnic diversity in Canada in a time of globalization and largescale movement across national borders. The presence in Canada of nationals from nontraditional immigration source countries, in particular, served as the basis for fear and
concern over the dangers that such immigrants could entail for the Canadian nation.
Once again, marriage was highlighted as a particularly easy route through which
criminals and deviants could gain admission to Canada, thereby problematizing
marriage immigration as a valid component of the country’s immigration program.
These immigrants were constructed not only as non-contributing members of society,
but as outright threats to national integrity. To this end, the vilification of marriage
immigrants effectively marginalized them with respect to the nation’s imagined
community.

4.54 Sympathetic Coverage: Legitimate Unions
Not all articles analyzed were explicitly negative toward marriage immigrants.
However, an interesting finding from the analysis was the subtly contradictory nature of
much of the sympathetic coverage of marriage immigration. The use of the term
‘sympathetic’ instead of ‘positive’ is intentional here; it indicates that these articles
conveyed a sympathetic tone while simultaneously problematizing marriage
immigration. Indeed, the analysis revealed that articles in this category were never
positive about marriage immigration per se. Moreover, the sympathy put forth was
often contingent on the ‘legitimate’ Canadian status of one of the parties involved. In
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some cases, the sympathetic tone of the articles, while distinctly present, co-occurred
with underlying suggestions of marriage immigrants’ own wrongdoings.
Examples of headlines for sympathetic articles are listed in Table 4.2.
Importantly, evidence suggests that newspaper readers tend to recall select, striking
details of individual newspaper stories (van Dijk, 1994, 1988, 1986). Headlines provide
the type of succinct, dramatic details that are most likely to be recalled; they also
present the major subject of the article and set the cognitive tone of the piece (van Dijk,
1988). As such, the wording of these headlines provides insight into the discursive
impact of the articles.
Table 4.2: Examples of Sympathetic Article Headlines, by Main Theme and
Newspaper
Main theme

Headline
“Red tape tearing Toronto family apart:
Application to stay in works, but mom with
Canadian son being deported back to China”
“Christmas reunions wrapped in red tape”
“Twist in red tape at Immigration keeping
husband and bride apart”

Bureaucracy
and spousal
reunification

“Red tape swept aside, couple to reunite at
last”
“G’bye to the Rock? Feds may force
Newfoundland mayor’s wife back to Cuba”
“His prayers unanswered: 79-year-old
minister’s application to sponsor Chinese
wife ignored for two years”
“‘My love for her is real’: Chinese bride
denied entry”

Newspaper and
Reference
Toronto Star
(Javed, 2008,
December 30)
Toronto Star
(Keung, 2004, 26
December)
Globe and Mail
(Jimenez, 2006,
May 25)
Globe and Mail
(Jimenez, 2006,
June 1)
Toronto Sun
(Godfrey, 2004,
January 3).
Toronto Sun
(Godfrey, 2008,
November 21).
Toronto Sun
(Godfrey, 2009,
August 12)
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Main theme

Headline
“She was the ticket to a better life”*
“Marriage scam: Polish women forced to be
sex slaves to bogus husbands”*
“Used ‘n’ abused: Polish Alliance rallies to
help keep sex-exploited women in Canada”*

Abuse

Newspaper and
Reference
Toronto Star
(Aulakh, 2009,
January 31)
Toronto Sun
(Godfrey, 2003,
September 10)
Toronto Sun
(Godfrey, 2003,
September 20)
Globe and Mail
(Armstrong, 2003,
November 20)
Globe and Mail
(Friesen, 2005, 23
February)

“Last illegal refuge of the brokenhearted:
Thousands of women in immigration void as
marriages to sponsors break down”
“Slain woman kept marriage concealed:
What may have started as an act of kindness
ended in her death by strangulation”*
“Cataloguing coercion, abuse: Researchers
National Post
find mail-order brides often are victims of
(Bell, 2000, May
poverty, family pressure, and myths of
19)
Western affluence”
*Coded as both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ in Table 4.1 due to elements of both
problematization and sympathy.

One of the main topics associated with sympathetic coverage of marriage
immigration related to the difficulties couples face in the sponsorship process. These
articles typically addressed the plight of spouses trying to join each other or to remain
together in Canada, and commonly made reference to bureaucratic ‘red tape’ that these
couples were facing. An example of this type of coverage involves the Wu-Chen
family. Articles on the Wu-Chen case discussed a pregnant woman’s (Chen’s) struggle
to remain in Canada with her husband and ten-month-old son. The Wu-Chen’s dilemma
was presented in the Toronto Star as follows:
Instead of looking forward to the New Year, the Wu-Chen family is
dreading its arrival. In two weeks, Jin Ming Wu, a factory worker, will
put his pregnant wife, Jaun Yun Chen, and 10-month-old son on a plane
to China – with no idea of when he will see them next […]. Chen, 28,
who is three months pregnant, is being deported by the Canada Border
Services Agency. This, despite the fact that her inland spousal
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sponsorship application – which allows her to stay in the country while
her immigration application is being processed – is still being reviewed.
And even though she may be granted a stay in a matter of a few months,
she won’t be allowed to remain to find out (Javed, 2008, December 30).
Articles on the Wu-Chen case were clearly sympathetic towards the plight of this
family. However, the sympathy seemed largely built around the ‘Canadianness’ of the
woman’s husband and young child, and the fact that that she was pregnant with a
Canadian citizen’s child. Indeed, the legitimacy of the Wu-Chen’s sponsorship claim
revolved around the Wu-Chen family, and relied heavily on the presence of children as
‘proof’ that the marriage was genuine. The articles on the Wu-Chen case reiterated the
fact that Chen’s husband, Jin Ming Wu, is a Canadian citizen, and emphasized that both
her young son and unborn child are, by extension, ‘Canadian.’ This emphasis is
illustrated by the headline, “Red tape tearing Toronto family apart: Application to stay
in works, but mom with Canadian son being deported back to China” (Javed, 2008,
December 30, italics added). Emphasizing that Chen’s son is a Canadian citizen served
to promote concern that a legitimate Canadian could be taken away from his country.
Chen’s pregnancy was highlighted in a subsequent article detailing the success of the
Wu-Chen’s sponsorship claim, as indicated by the headline, “Pregnant mom won’t be
deported” (Javed, 2009, January 13). The Canadian status of her family was again noted
in this article:
The Star wrote about the red tape that has bogged down [Chen’s]
immigration application last month. Despite an inland application filed
by her Canadian husband more than a month ago, she was slated for
deportation by Canada Border Services Agency (Javed, 2009, January
13).
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Coverage of the Wu-Chen family offers an interesting counterpoint to the broader
coverage of Asian marriage immigrants, wherein culturally arranged marriages were
problematized and presented as inauthentic. In contrast, the Wu-Chen’s marriage, which
was not arranged but, rather, was based on romantic love, was presented as genuine.
This contradiction demonstrates the manner in which representations of marriage
immigrants were embedded within broader uncertainty surrounding ‘non-Canadian’
practices. The recurring emphasis on Chen’s husband’s Canadian citizenship stands in
clear contrast to the manner in which, as previously discussed, Asians sponsors were
commonly described as ‘immigrants,’ without actual clarification of their status as
Canadians citizens (born or naturalized) or former immigrants. Indeed, there was no
indication in the articles whether Chen’s husband was Canadian-born or previously
came to Canada as an immigrant. It is also worth noting that the circumstances of their
union might otherwise be seen as suspect. Chen originally came to Canada as an
international student in 2002. She subsequently filed a refugee claim, which was denied,
as were numerous appeals. In 2007 (at which time she was living in Canada without
status), she married Wu, who submitted a sponsorship claim for Chen to remain in
Canada as his spouse. What is thus interesting about the coverage of the Wu-Chen case
is the fact that, in the presence of children, their marriage was portrayed as necessarily
more valid than other instances of Asian marriage immigration. In this case, the
ethnicity of the Wu-Chen family and the possibility of an inauthentic marriage was
downplayed in the face of ‘proof’ that the Wu-Chens are a legitimate family. Overall,
the Wu-Chen story demonstrates the fluid nature of the boundaries of immigrants’
symbolic membership in the Canadian national community constructed through media
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coverage. Specifically, visible minority sponsors were inconsistently and ambiguously
presented as ‘immigrants’ and/or as ‘Canadians’ in cases where their international
marriages were deemed suspect – typically, in cases of arranged marriages. In contrast,
in the case of the Wu-Chens, whose marriage was deemed ‘legitimate’ by the media, the
‘Canadian’ status of the husband and the children were emphasized. In this way, the
media discourse revealed tensions surrounding marriages between immigrants and
‘Canadians,’ and highlighted uncertainty surrounding marriage immigrants’ status as
fraudulent schemers or as legitimate partners who deserve to be in Canada. This
contrast reveals the struggle associated with defining the boundaries of national
belonging in an era of international immigration and cultural diversity, wherein ‘nonCanadian’ practices generate uncertainty and facilitate suspicion of immigrants from
non-traditional immigration source countries.
In other articles, the social standing of the Canadian sponsor emerged as the
basis for sympathy surrounding marriage immigration. Importantly, the discourse
surrounding these ‘legitimate’ Canadians stood in direct contrast to the previously
discussed coverage of ‘immigrant’ Canadians, whose marriages were presented as
suspicious and concerning. Interestingly, most of the sympathetic articles involving
‘legitimate’ Canadians operated to gender and racialize the marriage immigrants; in
these examples, the immigrants were women whose status as legitimate partners was
discursively placed in question. In contrast, the Canadian men were portrayed not as
victims of would-be frauds, but as victims of an inept immigration system.
One example of this type of media coverage involved the case of Cec Stein.
Stein, the mayor of a town in Newfoundland, was married to a Cuban woman who was
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being directed to leave the country and reapply for spousal sponsorship from Cuba.
According to Stein, who had been the mayor of Stephenville, Newfoundland for 14
years, immigration officials were attempting to paint his relationship as a marriage of
convenience. His wife, whom he met while vacationing in Cuba, had been staying in
Canada on a visitor’s visa, which had been extended several times. She was being
ordered to go back to Cuba out of her own free will or face deportation. The article
emphasized Stein’s standing in his community (including a mention of his city’s $8
million annual budget), and portrayed his marriage as a legitimate relationship that was
being unfairly questioned by immigration officials. In the media coverage of Stein’s
case, very little attention was devoted to Stein’s wife. She was thus silenced in the
debate over her sponsorship, which was presented as a matter of negotiation between
her Canadian husband and the state (see Godfrey, 2004, January 3). The only real detail
offered about Stein’s wife pertained to their age difference – Stein was 68 years old, his
Cuban wife was 31. It is interesting that this age difference, involving an older man and
a younger woman, was not highlighted as suspicious in the same manner as the
previously discussed case involving an older women and a younger man (see section
4.53 of the present chapter). This finding reveals an added dimension of gender,
wherein an international marriage that followed expected trends (i.e., a younger woman
from a less developed country marriage a older male of higher social status) was
deemed less suspect than a marriage that defied these norms (i.e., a younger Muslim
man marrying an older Canadian woman).
Another case similarly revealed how sympathy toward marriage immigrants
pertained largely to the status of the Canadian partner. This case involved James De
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Frederico (nicknamed Jimmy D, age 71) and his wife from the Philippines, Veronica
Lopez (age 55). One article in particular, entitled “Jimmy D’s fight for love: Air Canada
retiree seeks status for wife” (Godfrey, 2009, June 24) revealed the manner in which the
sponsor’s symbolic membership in the Canadian national community rendered his
marriage to an immigrant acceptable. This article discussed the couple’s two year
struggle to obtain landed immigrant status for Lopez. The majority of the article,
however, was dedicated toward recounting Jimmy D’s contacts with elite society
members through his former job:
An Air Canada retiree who catered to former Prime Minister Pierre
Elliott Trudeau and the Queen Mother is worried he’ll die before his
common-law wife is accepted as an immigrant in Canada (Godfrey,
2009, June 24).
De Frederico has dozens of photos of himself with celebrities and sports
figures who travelled on the airline. He proudly displays photos of
himself with Muhammad Ali and George Chuvalo. He met Walter
Matthau, fried chicken king Col. Harland Sanders and John Diefenbaker
(Godfrey, 2009, June 24).
Once again, the female marriage migrant was rendered largely irrelevant in favour of
establishing her husband’s status, which served to imply that he deserved to be able to
sponsor a wife in the pursuit of love. Indeed, very little was said about Jimmy D’s wife
in this coverage. Rather, Jimmy D’s proven ‘legitimacy’ as a member of the Canadian
nation emerged as the primary basis for sympathy and for precluding a claim of
inauthentic marriage immigration.
In other cases, the status of Canadian sponsor served more directly as the basis
for racializing marriage immigrants as foreign Others. In these instances, the underlying
problematization and suspicion of international marriages was present, but was
obscured by an overarching sympathetic tone. A good example of this type of coverage
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is the Toronto Sun article entitled “His prayers unanswered: 79-year-old minister’s
application to sponsor Chinese wife ignored for two years” (Godfrey, 2008, November
21). Notably, the opening line of the article reiterated the Canadian status of the male
sponsor and the Chinese origin of his wife (the would-be immigrant):
A Scarborough minister says he’s been trying for more than two years to
sponsor his Chinese-born wife to Canada and is hoping her case will be
looked at before he dies (Godfrey, 2008, November 21).
The Chinese origin of the minister’s wife was repeated numerous times throughout the
article. In contrast, the minister was specified as a “British-born Canadian citizen.” It is
worth noting here how this characterization of the minister differs from the manner in
which Canadian residents of Asian ethnic origins were often characterized as
‘immigrants,’ as discussed earlier in this chapter, without clarification of whether they
were born in Canada or abroad.
Moreover, despite maintaining an overarching sympathetic tone, suspicion of
the Chinese wife, Li Hua Han, was evident throughout the article. For instance, it was
noted that she initially overstayed her visa and then met and married the minister, who
is 21 years her senior. In addition, the only quote from Li has her stating: “I miss my
two daughters and I want to bring them to Canada” (Godfrey, 2008, November 21). The
article also quotes the couple’s immigration consultant as saying: “‘How much longer is
this man going to live? […] If he dies there will be no one to sponsor his wife in
Canada’.” These details take on a clear discursive purpose when considered in reference
to the findings of this chapter and the wider problematization of family-class
immigration (as discussed in Chapters One and Three). Specifically, while avoiding
direct claims of fraud or suspicion, the cross-cultural nature of the minister’s marriage,
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particularly in light of the cited age difference, served to cast Li in a suspicious light, as
did her stated interest in obtaining immigration status so that her daughters will be
eligible to immigrate to Canada. However, the minister’s status as a British-born
Canadian seemed to preclude outright accusations that their relationship was
inauthentic. Nevertheless, the coverage still hinted at the challenges associated with
international marriages, and provided room for problematizing immigrants who seek to
gain admission to Canada through marriage.
Overall, these articles illustrate how sympathetic coverage of marriage
immigrants focused on the status of the sponsor (the Canadian), presented as legitimate
members of the Canadian national community and thus as deserving of love and
respect. The treatment of migrant spouses, in contrast, subtly drew upon gendered
stereotypes in ways that either conjured additional sympathy or generated suspicion. In
cases of cross-cultural marriages, women marriage immigrants were indirectly
presented as potential frauds through a sub-text of suspicion. In contrast, in the case of
the Wu-Chen family, sympathy was derived from the fact that the marriage was not
cross-cultural, and the fact that the would-be immigrant could be viewed as a nurturer –
a pregnant wife and a mother of a young child. In this way, the boundaries of national
belonging were inconsistently drawn, with the positioning of marriage immigrants in
social space dependent on gendered and racialized imaginings of legitimate marital
unions.
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4.55 Sympathetic Coverage: Sponsorship and Domestic Abuse
Approximately 15% of the articles categorized as sympathetic dealt in some way with
the victimization of women marriage immigrants. These articles recounted experiences
of physical and sexual abuse, and even murder. Many of these articles were highly
contradictory in tone, containing distinct elements of sympathy, yet simultaneously
portraying marriage immigration as inherently problematic. Once again, this
problematization commonly revolved around the ethnic/cultural ‘difference’ of
marriage immigrants.
One example of this type of article involved the story of Amandeep Kaur
Dhillon. Amandeep, a 22-year old woman who immigrated to Canada from India
through an arranged marriage, and was allegedly murdered by her father-in-law
(Aulakh, 2009, December 26; 2009, January 31; 2009, January 11; O’Toole, 2009,
January 7):
Amandeep’s family has been left grieving with few answers. The slaying
has also shaken the South Asian community and again raised concerns
about the lack of social support for immigrant women, particularly
young brides who leave their home and family behind, to live with
another family they hardly know. Some endure a life of isolation and
extreme hardship, with the hope that their family – which has invested
heavily in dowry money – will one day join them in Canada (Aulakh,
2009, January 31).
The executive director of the Punjabi Community Health Centre in
Brampton says hundreds of young Punjabi brides arrive in Canada every
year. Many have arranged marriages. “They don’t know anyone, don’t
have any support system and battle pressures most people can’t even
imagine exist,” he said. […] Some women are so isolated that they are
not allowed to have communication even with their parents. […] In some
cases women, bruised and beaten, have been locked up in their homes,
not allowed to make or receive any calls (Aulakh, 2009, January 31).
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Despite clearly presenting Amandeep’s story as a tragedy and documenting the hardship
her death has caused her family, the media coverage effectively portrayed arranged
marriages as potentially dangerous for South Asian women. In this way, Amandeep’s
death was directly attributed to her ‘non-Canadian’ culture, with Amandeep emerging
as a victim of an unreasonable cultural system. Amandeep’s victimization, and the
broader victimization of South Asian female marriage immigrants in general, thus
served as a means of problematizing arranged marriages and South Asian cultural
practices. By attributing blame for Amandeep’s murder to her culturally arranged
marriage, the South Asian community in Canada was constructed as not truly
‘Canadian,’ thereby effectively marginalized with respect to the Canadian national
community.
Other articles similarly retained a highly sympathetic tone while highlighting the
potential for domestic abuse associated with marriage immigration. For instance, a
series of articles discussed a group of Polish women who came to Canada as visitors,
overstayed their visas, and subsequently paid Canadian men to marry them and sponsor
their continued residence in the country:
Eva Nowak is 21, attractive, and will do just about anything to stay in
Canada, even if it means marrying a man she’s only known for five
weeks. Her hubby, Tony, 27, was found working in Kitchener by a
marriage broker who knew Nowak and three of her girlfriends were
searching for husbands to sponsor them so they could remain in Canada.
The women, all illegally in Canada from Poland, will pay their Canadian
citizen husbands up to $15,000 each for the marriage and sponsorship.
Though they won’t live together, community leaders say the women are
used as sex slaves by the men (Godfrey, 2003, September 20).
Hundreds of Polish women living in the country illegally are being
fleeced for up to $15,000 each by Canadian men in a phony marriage
scheme that often ends up in their being deported, says the country’s
largest Polish group [the Polish Alliance]. Alliance spokesman Ted
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Lojko said many of the women end up being sexually assaulted by men
they pay to marry so they can be sponsored here (Godfrey, 2003,
September 10).
In this case, marriage immigration was presented as problematic from several different
angles. First, the possibility that illegal migrants could remain in the country through
paid marriages of convenience served to present spousal sponsorship as a problematic
immigration program, and instilled doubt surrounding the veracity of marriages
between Canadians and immigrants. Second, the Polish women, although portrayed as
victims, were also presented as willing participants in their victimization and thus as
sharing in the blame for their own situation. Indeed, this point was highlighted in the
articles:
Federal immigration officials say there’s little they can do to help Polish
women who are here illegally. “Appropriate action will be taken against
those who are in violation of the immigration act,” spokesman Rejean
Cantlon says. “We will take action when it comes to our attention”
(Godfrey, 2003, September 20).
In this instance, the women’s abuse of the immigration system, and not the abuse they
experienced at the hands of their sponsors, was presented as the foremost issue of
concern. In other words, marriage immigrants were still identified as the problem
requiring attention, regardless of their circumstances or the hardships they were facing.
Finally, these articles simultaneously represented the women’s Canadian male partners
as abusers of women, and as possible abusers of the Canadian immigration system
(through their involvement in marriages of convenience). Indeed, these articles
represent the most obvious instance in which Canadians were described in the media
coverage in clearly negative terms. These portrayals of Canadian men served to
highlight core values of Canadian society that help define the boundaries of national
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belonging. In this instance, partner violence, sexual abuse, and willing participation in
defrauding the immigration system render even ‘Canadians’ less desirable members of
the Canadian nation. To this end, general sympathy toward marriage immigrants facing
abuse co-occurred with the problematization of both these immigrants and their
Canadian counterparts. As such, although the insider/outsider status of the involved
parties was not entirely clear-cut, marriages between Canadians and immigrants were
nevertheless cast in a concerning light.

4.6 Conclusion
In considering this chapter’s findings, it is important to contemplate both what the
media discourse accomplishes, as well as what it obscures. It is also important to locate
this coverage within current controversies surrounding the Canadian immigration
system. In the media coverage of marriage immigration, a very specific picture of these
immigrants was painted – they are frauds, criminals, and deviants. They victimize
Canadians and take advantage of the Canadian social system. They skirt Canadian
immigration regulations to the end of hindering the entry of deserving and contributing
immigrants (i.e., economic immigrants). Indeed, marriage immigrants were
symbolically devalued, and were constructed as necessarily less valuable than economic
immigrants. The possible contributions of marriage immigrants to Canadian society as
wives, mothers, and workers never entered the scope of the media coverage. In this
way, the broader assumptions that marriage immigrants (and family-class immigrants in
general) are unskilled and do not contribute to the economic well-being of the nation
was upheld. Bureaucratic classifications were reified, with marriage immigrants being
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located in their roles as spouses without acknowledgement of the fact that they can be
productive members of Canadian society, economically or otherwise. The media
coverage thus produced a highly biased image of marriage immigrants. These
representations served as the basis for articulating tangible doubt over the possibility of
genuine marriages between immigrants and Canadians, and implied that marriage
immigrants are not deserving members of the Canadian nation. Moreover, migratory
pressures associated with globalization and international inequalities were also largely
left of the picture. In this way, the broader context of international migration was
ignored, and national self-interest in protecting Canadian social space took centre stage.
It is also relevant that the media discourse was overwhelmingly one-sided, often
emerging out of the voices of Canadians alleging to be victims of marriage fraud. As a
consequence, claims of marriage fraud were presented as a fact rather than as one
partner’s perspective on a failed personal relationship. This coverage also largely denied
the possibility that Canadian sponsors may have failed to live up to their obligations
toward sponsored partners, and that sponsors’ claims of being defrauded may not be
accurate. The fact that Canadian ‘insiders’ were constructed as victims of immigrants in
cases of relationship failure demonstrates the symbolic exclusion that persons defined
as immigrants tend to face. This conclusion is further supported by the finding that
sponsorship breakdown was typically discussed in terms of its impact on Canadian
sponsors or Canadian taxpayers, but never in terms of its potential detrimental impact
on immigrants. All of these absences acted to silence marriage immigrants, including
those who have successfully formed families in Canada, as well as those who may have
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been unsuccessful in their pursuit of this goal but, in reality, are not immigration or
marriage frauds.
In addition, the media discourse on marriage immigrants contributed to the
broader problematization of family-class immigrants beyond just spouses. Insofar as
marriage immigrants were constructed as frauds, deviants, and criminals, then familyclass immigration, in general, was problematized. Concern over family-class
immigration also emerged through the media’s portrayal of inauthentic marriage
migration as a stepping stone for further family-class sponsorship. Tied into this
representation was the suggestion that these migrants might take advantage of Canadian
social programs upon their arrival. In this regard, negative media portrayals of marriage
immigrants were not isolated from other dominant discourses, but reflected and upheld
broader negative views of family-class immigration (as discussed in Chapters One and
Three). As such, family-class immigrants beyond just spouses were marginalized to
Canada’s imagined community through media discourse surrounding marriage
immigration.
Overall, the media’s coverage of marriage immigration reveals tensions relating
to ethnic/cultural diversity and the state’s ability to protect Canadian borders in the
contemporary era of international immigration. By constructing international marriage
migration as inherently problematic and inauthentic, the media discourse served as a
cautionary tale surrounding international marriages, implicitly discouraging ‘insiders’ in
the Canadian nation from marrying ‘outsiders.’ In doing so, marriage immigration
served as the basis for marginalizing immigrants from non-European origins (most
notably, Asia), and for questioning marriages that defy Canadian norms. By portraying
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marriage immigration as an easy route for undeserved immigrants to gain access to the
country, the media discourse can also be interpreted as legitimizing extensive scrutiny
of spousal sponsorship and for justifying current efforts to impose further restrictions on
marriage immigration (discussed at the beginning of this chapter). In examining
sponsorship applications, Canadian immigration officers already hold the right to verify
personal documents (such as phone records), conduct site visits, demand invasive proof
of the veracity of spousal relationships, and ultimately deny the legitimacy of a union.
This process holds the default assumption that international marriages are questionable
and that immigrants arriving in Canada through marriage are disingenuous in their
intentions. Indeed, as addressed in the analysis, the nature of the spousal sponsorship
agreement is indicative of the skepticism surrounding international marriages and their
associated migrations. In this context, the possibility that marriage immigration may
become even more rigidly controlled by the Canadian state bears dangerous
implications for migrants’ rights and the rights of Canadian sponsors.
Admittedly, a direct link between the media discourse discussed in this chapter
and the current policy agenda cannot be empirically established here. Nevertheless, it is
significant that the predominant focus of media coverage on marriage immigration over
the past decade pertained to marriage fraud and marriages of convenience, and that
these concerns are presently at the heart of Canadian family-class immigration reform.
At the very least, the media discourse provides a climate conducive to suspicion of
marriage immigrants, international marriages, culturally arranged marriages, and
family-class sponsorship, while obscuring the possibility that marriage immigrants
might be ‘good,’ contributing, valuable members of Canadian society. In this way, these
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immigrants were clearly positioned on the margins of Canada’s national community, at
best. Indeed, in the imagining of the Canadian national community that emerged from
media discourse on marriage immigrants, this group simply did not belong. As
explained in one Toronto Sun article on marriage immigration, “There are some true
love stories out there…but they’re few and far between” (Godfrey, 2003, September
20).
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CHAPTER FIVE: IMMIGRATION POLICY DISCOURSE
“Liberal principles are the very language and conceptual
framework through which intolerance and exclusion are
enabled, reinforced, defined and defended” (Mackey, cited in
Henry et al., 2000: 25).
5.0 Introduction
Chapter Four of this thesis documented controversies and tensions surrounding
marriage immigrants in Canada, and revealed gendered and racialized portrayals of this
group in the Canadian news media. The present chapter steps back to consider the
broader immigrant population in a different discursive setting – the policy arena.
Since Canada’s first Immigration Act in 1869, immigration policy has
represented a source of public and political contention in Canada. Politicians, experts,
and diverse interest groups commonly dispute the costs and benefits of immigration to
the Canadian nation, and grapple with how immigration policy should be structured so
as to maximize the benefits of the immigration program. These debates arouse deepseated passions on both sides, involving diverging views about the impact of
immigration on Canada’s national economy and the implications of immigration for
Canadian society. Importantly, controversies surrounding immigration are often
intertwined with the question of ‘race.’ Population diversity is widely attributed to the
increase in immigration from non-European source countries, such that opposition to
large-scale immigration is often interpreted by both immigrant advocates and scholars
as evidence of racial intolerance (see Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Li, 2007, 2003c, 2001;
Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007; Thobani, 2001a, 2001b). This matter is particularly
relevant in light of the inherent incompatibility between discrimination and the liberal
democratic values that purportedly define the Canadian nation.
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A useful illustration of the complexity of the immigration policy ‘question’ and
its intersection with the ‘race question’ is provided by two recent events in Ontario,
Canada. The first incident relates to the 2010 mayoral race in Toronto, Ontario. During
a televised debate in August 2010, when answering a question about Tamil migrants,
mayoral front-runner Rob Ford noted that, in a “perfect world,” Toronto would not
become home to any more immigrants, further stating that: “We can’t even deal with
the 2.5 million people in this city. I think it’s more important to take care of the people
here now before we start bringing in more people” (Alcoba, 2010, August 18).
Immediately after the debate, Ford was put on the defensive about his comments, and
faced widespread claims of racism and intolerance. His opponents demanded that he
withdraw from the race in light of his ‘racist’ statements. Yet, media reports confirmed
that Ford’s position on immigration policy was not unique:
Almost half of people who say they’d vote for Rob Ford also have
qualms about welcoming new Canadians to Toronto. A Nanos poll done
for The Globe, CTV and CP24 found 48.8 per cent of Ford supporters
either disagree or somewhat disagree with the statement “Toronto would
benefit from welcoming more new Canadians to the city.” By
comparison, 32 per cent of the broader Torontonian population felt the
same way (“Almost half of Ford supporters…,” Globe and Mail, 2010,
September 21).
Media outlets jumped on Ford’s comments, keeping the connection between
immigrants, racism, and immigration policy directly in the public eye for months to
come (e.g., Balkissoon, 2010, August 17; Doolittle, 2010, August 18; Lilley, 2010,
September 28; Wente, 2010, October 7).
Just over a month after Ford’s comments, an unrelated occurrence in Ottawa –
the launch of the Centre for Immigration Policy Reform on Parliament Hill on
September 28, 2010 – highlighted many of the same issues sparked by the Ford
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controversy. The organization, headed by Martin Collacott (former ambassador to Sri
Lanka, Syria, Lebanon, and Cambodia), James Bissett (former director-general of the
Canadian Immigration Services), and Derek Burney (former ambassador to the U.S.),
emerged out of concern that Canada admits too many immigrants. In introducing the
Centre, the co-founders claimed that current immigration levels entail excessive
government expenditures, higher houses costs, pollution, and crowding in large urban
centres. 31 According to Burney, “the [immigration] system is broken…there’s too much
abuse, too much fraud, and no rhyme or reason about what we’re doing. It’s just a
numbers game” (Wente, 2010, October 7). In establishing the Centre, Burney and his
co-founders further argued that honest debate over immigration in Canada is precluded
by politicians’ concern about losing the ‘immigrant vote,’ alongside broader social fears
of appearing racist: “Canadian society, [Burney] said, needs to stop treating
immigration as an untouchable ‘third rail’ that can’t be debated without prompting
allegations of bigotry” (http://www.cireport.ca/2010/09/centre-for-immigration-policyreform.html). Indeed, opponents of the Centre were quick to contend that the founders’
anti-immigration sentiments were evidence of their racial intolerance:
[The founders of the Centre for Immigration Policy Reform] think our
immigration policies could be better. The NDP immediately attacked
them for being “un-Canadian.” One immigration lawyer called the group
a bunch of grumpy old white men who’d be hard to take seriously “were
it not for their ability to fan the flames of intolerance” (Wente, 2010,
October 7).
These examples highlight the two interrelated issues that lie at the heart of this chapter.
The first pertains to state legitimacy in the face of controversies surrounding

31

See http://www.cireport.ca/2010/09/centre-for-immigration-policy-reform.html; see also
http://www.immigrationreform.ca/
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immigration policy, while the second concerns the questions of ‘race’ and racism
relating to contemporary immigration in Canada. Indeed, as the above examples
demonstrate, immigration policy is mired in controversies that are often directly linked
to the questions of ‘race’ and racism, and that simultaneously bring the activities of the
immigration department into question. It is in this social and political milieu that the
present chapter is located. The chapter draws together two conceptual frameworks – one
on state legitimacy and another on “democratic racism” (Henry et al., 2000) – to offer a
critical qualitative analysis of Canadian immigration policy discourse.
Importantly, much of the existing literature on recent Canadian immigration
policy comments on the underlying racist (as well as sexist) biases of immigration
policy, and claims that these biases are obscured by neo-liberal discourses of skill and
the rhetoric of multiculturalism (see, for instance, Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Li, 2003b,
2003c, 2001; Oxman-Martinez et al., 2001; Thobani, 2007, 2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999).
This work often quotes specific policy statements as evidence of racism and/or
racialization. However, it is the contention here that the existing literature does not offer
a comprehensive assessment of immigration policy discourse that is sufficiently located
within the specific social and political contexts within which the discourse is
articulated. In other words, policy discourse is typically addressed as evidence of
discriminatory policy, and thus as indicative of structural ‘racism,’ but is not itself
addressed as a social phenomenon that serves a distinct purpose. Moreover, policy
discourse is typically not examined through a comprehensive analysis that examines
both the content of the discourse and the social purpose that it serves. The present
chapter offers such an analysis, and simultaneously advances a conceptual critique of
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Henry et al.’s (2000) framework of ‘democratic racism.’ Democratic racism is
commonly used to describe the ‘new’ racism of contemporary liberal societies,
involving the use of discourse to obscure underlying racist attitudes and practices. The
ideas associated with this framework are commonly used in the immigration literature.
Yet, the sociological utility of the democratic racism framework has not itself been
critically evaluated through a comprehensive application. Also, given the above
discussion surrounding the politics of immigration policy in Canada, the present chapter
views a theoretical affinity between democratic racism and state legitimacy that
deserves focused attention.
The chapter begins by outlining the conceptual framework for the upcoming
analysis, addressing notions of legitimacy and democratic racism. The chapter then
proceeds to review existing research on immigration policy discourse in Canada and
beyond. Next, the chapter provides a critical analysis of Canadian immigration policy
discourse, organized in terms of Henry et al.’s (2000) democratic racism framework,
and interpreted in reference to the state’s quest for legitimacy. Materials for this
analysis consist of CIC reports published over the past 16 years (discussed in Section
5.4 of this chapter). Based on this analysis, the present chapter advances two
interrelated arguments. First, it is argued that the Canadian state department responsible
for immigration (Citizenship and Immigration Canada – CIC) deploys discourses
associated with democratic racism (labeled ‘discourses of dominance’) as part of a
concerted, ongoing effort to demonstrate the legitimacy of its activities. Thus, in a
social and political context of controversies surrounding immigration, the state engages
in self-legitimating communications in which it attempts to appeal to a wide variety of
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interest groups and stakeholders (including, for instance, Canadian citizens and
permanent residents, potential migrants and newcomers to Canada, NGOs, corporate
Canada, other governments around the world, various international players, etc.). The
discourses of dominance commonly associated with democratic racism are a key means
by which this legitimacy is sought. However, the analysis also illustrates that these
discourses are not strictly discourses about ‘race’ that can be interpreted in terms of
‘racism.’ To this end, the second main argument advanced in the present chapter
pertains to the sociological usefulness of democratic racism as a conceptual framework.
In documenting the manner in which so-called discourses of dominance serve the state’s
quest for legitimacy, the chapter contends that democratic racism is a limited conceptual
tool that risks reifying race and racism. The chapter demonstrates that the framework of
democratic racism is not entirely without merit, but is arguably too broadly
conceptualized, and is problematic for its tendency to equate racialization with ‘racism.’
Moreover, it is argued that the democratic racism framework is limited by its tendency
to reduce discrimination to ‘race,’ thereby precluding a consideration of other potential
dimensions of discrimination (such as gender and social class) and ignoring the manner
in which various dimensions of discrimination intersect. By applying discourses
associated with the democratic racism framework to an examination of immigration
policy discourse, the present chapter is able to highlight the dimensions of this
framework that are sociologically useful, while simultaneously illustrating the
framework’s limitations.
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5.1 The Contemporary State and the Quest for Legitimacy
Legitimacy, which “pertains to how power may be used in ways that citizens
consciously accept” (Gilley, 2006: 499), is a critical component of effective
governance. A state is perceived as more legitimate to the extent that relevant people
and groups view the state as having the rightful will to execute political power and
direct policy activities (Gilley, 2006). In pre-modern societies, the legitimacy of
authority derived from metaphysical sources such as holiness, providence, or divine
rights. However, the growing rationality of modern societies brought with it a rejection
of divine authority in favour of the authority of reason, the latter of which involves
rational legitimacy. In this context, governance is largely legitimized through
communicative processes that employ principles of reasoning and rational deliberation
(that is, rational discourse) (Habermas, 1984; Weber, 1968). Under the authority of
reason, state legitimacy can only be generated through normative discourses, wherein
the arguments advanced and the decisions made will, in principle, receive a maximum
degree of consent and a minimal degree of dissent (Steffek, 2003). In other words, state
legitimacy in contemporary contexts depends on discourses that render state activities
an obvious, rational choice to as many stakeholders as possible.
The notion of rational legitimacy has been most extensively elaborated upon by
Jürgen Habermas in his theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984). For
Habermas, legitimate governance emerges from rational exchanges of arguments and
eventual arrival at agreed-upon conclusions. Logically, in a contemporary country such
as Canada, it is not possible for all possible stakeholders to engage in such processes of
deliberation. In this context, legitimacy depends not on an actual consensus, but on a
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rational, normative conclusion that can be articulated as a reasonable justification,
adhering to valid and established norms (see Habermas, 1984). Rational legitimacy is
thus achieved by advancing arguments that are generalizable and impersonal – in other
words, given a particular social context, reasonable people who are familiar with the
existing social conditions could be expected to support the logic underlying the state’s
perspective, even if they do not agree with the perspective per se. It is this element of
rationality upon which state legitimacy in contemporary contexts depends. Arguably, in
a contemporary liberal democracy, this legitimacy relies, at least in part, on the
articulation of state goals and activities as democratic, fair, and reasonable endeavours.
It is in this context that the theoretical affinity between the notions of state legitimacy
and democratic racism becomes apparent.

5.2 Democratic Racism
In liberal democratic contexts, the principles of equality, justice, and non-discrimination
are social norms, as well as institutionalized expectations encoded in law. Under such
conditions, overt expressions of discrimination, such as racism or sexism, are seen as
inappropriate in public discussions. This issue has primarily been addressed in terms of
‘race’ and ethnicity on the basis of what Henry et al. (2000) term democratic racism
(see also Henry & Tator, 2002, 2000). 32 Henry et al. (2000) argue that contemporary
racism does not necessarily entail references to inherent biological difference or
inferiority. In other words, terms such as ‘race’ or references to skin colour need not be
32

See also theoretical discussions of ‘new racisms’ by Barker (1981) and Rex (1983), and Sears’ (1988)
discussion of ‘symbolic racism.’ See also Simmons’ (1998) discussion of the possible racist outcomes of
‘non-racist’ immigration policies.
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mentioned for racism to be expressed. Instead, new forms of racism are elusive,
articulated in subtle ways through democratic modes of representation and
communication. Democratic racism can be understood as:
…an ideology in which two conflicting sets of values are made
congruent to each other. Commitments to democratic principles such as
justice, equality, and fairness conflict but co-exist with attitudes and
behaviours that include negative feelings about minority groups,
differential treatment, and discrimination against them (Henry et al.,
2000: 23).
According to the authors, democratic racism can be addressed in terms of discourses of
dominance, which operate upon racist myths and unexamined assumptions. In other
words, discrimination is obscured through discourses of dominance that render racism
invisible and/or acceptable. These discourses include: (1) the discourse of binary
polarization; (2) the discourse of national identity; (3) the discourse of multiculturalism;
and (4) the discourse of moral panic, among others. 33 These discourses can be
understood as follows:
(1) The discourse of binary polarization: This discourse involves the
fragmentation of social groups into racialized contingents of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (i.e., a Self
and an Other), often in implicit and subtle ways. This fragmentation most commonly
involves references to cultural differences that serve to dichotomize majority/minority
groups in normative evaluations. As discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, the process

33

The present chapter focuses on these four discourses because they were the only discourses of
dominance that emerged in the analysis of this chapter’s data, and are used to organize the results section.
The remaining discourses of dominance through which democratic racism is purportedly expressed
include: (1) the discourse of denial; (2) the discourse of colour blindness; (3) the discourse of equal
opportunity; (4) the discourse of blaming the victim; (5) the discourse of white victimization; and (6) the
discourse of liberal values. See Henry and Tator (2000) for a complete discussion of these other
discourses.
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of Othering is theorized as being central to definitions of national imagined
communities.
(2) The discourse of national identity: According to Henry et al. (2000), the
quest for national identity is at the heart of various dominant discourses in Canada.
Messages about national identity tend to democratically erase and silence the
contributions of ethno-racial minorities to the Canadian nation, often through the ‘myth’
that Canada was established by two founding nations (English and French). These
silences act as “the vehicles through which inequalities and imbalances are legitimized”
(Henry et al., 2000: 31).
(3) The discourse of multiculturalism: In this discourse, concepts of tolerance,
accommodation, harmony, and diversity are emphasized. According to Henry et al.
(2000), however, underlying these notions is an inherent element of racist Othering and
the implication that “while one must accept the idiosyncrasies of the ‘others’ … the
dominant way is superior” (Henry et al., 2000: 30).
(4) The discourse of moral panic: This discourse draws on an underlying climate
of uncertainty, fear, and threat associated with economic, political, and social
destabilization and dislocation to convey racist beliefs and concerns (see also Henry &
Tator, 2002; Husband, 1994).
For Henry et al. (2000), discourses of binary polarization, national identity,
multiculturalism, and moral panic represent some of the main ways in which racism is
expressed and obscured in contemporary democratic societies. In other words,
discursive articulations associated with these discourses obscure the reality of racism,
and themselves act as subtle or invisible expressions of racism.
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The present chapter takes issue with the fact that the democratic racism
framework identifies a broad range of expressions and actions as ‘racist,’ to the point of
locating racism where, arguably, it may or may not exist. By depending on highly
subtle, implicit, and often invisible references to race, the framework thus walks a thin
line between identifying racism and constructing racism. Notably, Henry et al.’s (2000)
framework was not specifically developed in reference to either state discourse or
immigration. However, there is a logical connection between the framework of
democratic racism, considerations of state discourse on immigration, and, drawing in
the second theoretical dimension of this chapter, the state’s quest for legitimacy. The
first point of relevance here is the fact that immigration stimulates questions about a
nation’s cultural values and identity (Simmons, 1999). Second, in liberal democratic
contexts, explicit discrimination or appearance of undemocratic principles in state
discourse could undermine the perceived legitimacy of the state. Given this context, it is
logical to infer that, insofar as discrimination is expressed or obscured in state
discourse, it would occur in a ‘democratic’ fashion. An examination of immigration
policy discourse in reference to state legitimacy thus offers a fruitful avenue for
critically evaluating the democratic racism framework.

5.3 Previous Research
The existing literature on Canadian immigration policy discourse is typically not
presented directly within frameworks of legitimacy and/or democratic racism, with only
a few exceptions (e.g., Simmons & Keohane, 1992 on legitimacy; Li, 2007 on
democratic racism). Despite the fact that legitimacy and democratic racism seem to
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underlie much of the literature on discriminatory immigration policy and practices,
these two issues are rarely at the centre of analysis, nor are the two frameworks
addressed concurrently. Moreover, the Canadian literature draws on highly selective
evidence of immigration policy discourse, focusing either on a particular policy event
(e.g., Abu-Laban, 1998a; Thobani, 2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999) or relying on a small
selection of policy documents as evidence of the racial subtext of discourse (see Li,
2007, 2001). Outside of the Canadian context, much of the literature on immigration
and democratic racism focuses closely on discursive expressions of racism without
taking a critical approach to the application of the democratic racism framework, and
without an eye to the broader purpose that this discourse serves. The present section
briefly reviews this literature in order to highlight its contributions and its gaps, both of
which inform the upcoming analysis.
With respect to state legitimacy, Simmons and Keohane (1992) offer a useful
interpretation of debates over Canadian immigration and refugee policy. Their analysis
speaks directly to the state’s pursuit of legitimacy through communication strategies.
According to Simmons and Keohane (1992) (see also Simmons, 1994), the Canadian
immigration policy landscape changed in 1989, when economic transformations
associated with globalization and the subsequent responses to these changes by various
institutional actors (including labour, capital, ethnic communities, human rights groups,
and the provinces) brought about new concerns, agendas, and points of contention with
which the Canadian state had to grapple. It was in this social context that the state
introduced refugee bills (C-55 and C-84) in an effort to better control refugee flow, and
engaged in consultations in developing the immigration plan for 1990-1995. Simmons
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and Keohane’s (1992) research approach was two-fold. First, they identified the key
players who sought to influence immigration policy and determined, of these actors,
whose interests were ultimately reflected in policy outcomes. Second, they considered
state actors’ management of communications in the policy formation process. Based on
interviews with key informants and observations of consultations on policy reform,
Simmons and Keohane (1992) argue that, in developing immigration and refugee policy
at that time, the state operated on the basis of three general interests: (1) the
perpetuation of economic security; (2) the pursuit of a rational-bureaucratic agenda;
and, overarching and dependent on these previous two endeavours, (3) the quest for
continued legitimacy. Simmons and Keohane (1992) also specifically demonstrate that
the state engaged in a concerted effort to manage the communication process associated
with policy formation so as to undercut opposition and establish the legitimacy of its
own agenda. The authors comment that:
In the period studied, the state’s awareness of potential threats to
legitimacy led to a general nervousness and anxiety among the key state
actors. Power was used to override opposition only when the support for
opposing groups was weak or could be undermined. Otherwise, the state
consulted and sought policy outcomes which would reinforce its
legitimacy, while allowing it to also achieve economic and rational
planning objectives (Simmons & Keohane, 1992: 445).
Simmons and Keohane’s (1992) work is relevant here for highlighting the centrality of
legitimacy to state communications surrounding immigration policy. Importantly,
Simmons and Keohane (1992) mention the widespread anti-immigration sentiment in
Canadian society, and the possible racist backlash against immigration and refugee
policy. However, the authors did not evaluate the content of state communications in
reference to racism per se. Rather, racism was merely acknowledged as a potential issue
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that state actors keep in mind when attempting to establish and manage immigration
policy.
In contrast, other literature on the politics of Canadian immigration policy
largely ignores the issue of state legitimacy, focusing instead on the discriminatory
nature of contemporary policy and subtle race-based expressions of anti-immigrant
sentiment in public and policy discourse. For instance, Abu-Laban (1998a, 1998b) and
Thobani (2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999) have widely addressed the restructuring of
Canada’s immigration program during the 1990s (i.e., the Immigration Policy Review –
IPR; see Chapter Three). The IPR was presented in public and political domains as a
process that would include members of the Canadian general population as key
contributors to policy change via widespread consultations across the country. The
extent to which this public consultation process can be considered democratic, however,
has been challenged by Abu-Laban (1998a, 1998b) and Thobani (2001, 2000a, 2000b,
1999), in light of the fact that the agenda for discussion was already set by a select panel
of state actors. Abu-Laban (1998a, 1998b) and Thobani (2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999)
claim that the predetermination of the discussion topics enabled the state to present its
agenda back onto the public as if it came from ‘Canadian society’ rather than state
actors (Thobani, 2000a, 2000b). Although these authors did not interpret this process
directly in terms of state legitimacy, their findings speak to the state’s need to appear
democratic, while simultaneously managing the immigration program according to its
own agenda.
Abu-Laban (1998a, 1998b) and Thobani (2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999) have
further documented the various ways in which racist (and sexist) biases in the
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immigration system were obscured and/or expressed in democratic ways during the IPR
and beyond. Abu-Laban (1998a, 1998b), for instance, specifically contends that
discourses of skill and integration 34 operate in a neo-liberal context as democratic ways
of obscuring discrimination in the Canadian immigration system. The author comments
that discourses of inclusion, equality and justice hide the fact that the Canadian
immigration system remains inherently discriminatory: “While the still unfolding liberal
policy reproduces the class, gender and race biases of post 1967/Policy Era Two it
nevertheless re-asserts these biases in the context of a productivist emphasis on the
‘economic worth’ and ‘self-sufficiency’ of immigrants” (Abu-Laban, 1998b: 205).
Thobani (2000a, 2000b) similarly argues that racist and sexist biases are a prominent
driving force behind immigration policy. For Thobani, these biases are obscured
through neutral discourses that facilitate the marginalization of immigrants arriving
from non-European sources (as well as men and women of colour, regardless of their
immigration status). For instance, according to Thobani (2000a), the ‘legitimate’
problematization of family class immigrants (the majority of whom are women, with a
large proportion from non-traditional immigration source countries) is actually a
manifestation of racism and sexism. However, by framing these biases in terms of the
burden associated with family-class immigrants, racism and sexism are obscured and
discrimination is rendered palatable to the Canadian public. Thobani (2000b) further
concludes that the prioritization of economic goals and the problematization of family-
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The term ‘integration’ is widely used in Canadian immigration discourses to refer to the optimal
outcome for newcomers in Canadian society. The precise meaning and subtext of this term, however, is
widely debated, with some critical immigration scholars contending that ‘integration’ is used as a
‘politically correct’ way of suggesting that the cultural specificities of some ethnic groups serve as
impediments to their full participation in Canadian society. See Abu-Laban (1998b) and Li (2003b) for a
discussion of this issue.
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class immigration in documents associated with the IPR acted to “… define immigrant
women as requiring increased control and management. The problems with both the
‘quality’ and ‘costs’ of immigration thus become inscribed, quite literally, on the bodies
of immigrant women” (Thobani, 2000b: 307; italics in original).
While Abu-Laban’s (1998a, 1998b) and Thobani’s (2001, 2000a, 2000b, 1999)
work implicitly draws on the notion of ‘democratic racism,’ this framework has been
most pointedly been addressed in the Canadian immigration context by Peter Li. Li
(2007, 2003c, 2001) argues that academic, media, and policy discourses all construct
immigrants in opposition to ‘real Canadians’ based on implied, immutable ‘racial’
differences (see Li, 2007, 2003c, 2001). These constructions, however, are subtle,
occurring in such a way so as not to disrupt the normative conventions of liberal
democracy. For instance, Li argues that concepts such as ‘diversity’ and ‘cultural
difference’ represent coded references to race. He further argues that academic research
facilitates these formulations by developing “pseudo-scientific constructs” (Li, 2001:
92) that allow for masked race-based evaluations without appearing undemocratic. To
this end:
The stakeholders of the immigration discourse – academics, journalists,
pollsters, policy-makers, and individual citizens – participate in the
construction of a racial subtext that ultimately transforms the racial
messages into “valid concerns” and “scientific findings,” and transforms
what would otherwise be unacceptably racially based opinions into
acceptable voices in a legitimate public debate (Li, 2001: 92).
Legitimacy, in this context, refers to the fact that ‘racial’ concerns become rearticulated
as acceptable social concerns; the extent to which this occurs in state discourse in direct
service of state legitimacy, however, is not addressed by Li. Nevertheless, in reference
to state discourse, Li (2003c) contends that the commitment to diversity and
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multiculturalism running through policy statements obscures underlying racist messages
that conformity to normative ‘Canadian’ values and standards is the desirable outcome
for immigrants. For Li, the subtext of policy discourse thus discriminates against
racialized immigrants and visible ethnic minorities by underscoring that their norms,
values, and behaviours are ‘non-Canadian,’ and act as impediments to their integration
into Canadian society.
Research outside the Canadian context has also addressed discursive forms of
discrimination and Othering in the context of immigration. This work predominantly
focuses on the specific discursive manifestations of racism in political talk and policy
discourse. In this literature, however, the focus is on how racism is expressed in
democratic ways, without a deeper appreciation of the legitimation purpose that this
discourse serves in the arena of immigration politics. For instance, in work specifically
focusing on parliamentary debates in Britain, France, and the U.S., van Dijk (2002,
1997, 1993a, 1992) has documented the widespread use of positive self-representations
and negative Other-representations in debates over immigration and ethnic relations.
According to van Dijk (2002, 1997, 1993a, 1992), political speakers in British, French,
and American parliamentary debates commonly invoke representations of national selfglorification, involving repeated references to national values of tolerance and
democracy while espousing the threats associated with immigration. The author notes
that positive representations of ‘insiders’ are consistently intertwined with negative
representations of immigrants and ethnic minorities, and discrimination is obscured
through explicit disclaimers of non-racism and articulations of commitment to
humanism and equality. Similar findings were reported by Every and Augoustinos
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(2007), who examined constructions of racism in Australian parliamentary debates on
asylum-seekers. These authors point out that invoking nationalist discourses and
making references to ‘cultural’ (rather than ‘racial’) difference conveys racist sentiment
without appearing ‘racist,’ thereby rendering the problematization of racialized Others
more socially acceptable.
Similarly, both Capdevila and Callaghan (2008) and Van der Valk (2003) have
documented the ways in which immigrants are racially discriminated against in political
discourse in ‘democratic’ ways. Capdevila and Callaghan (2008) specifically examined
a campaign speech given by the leader of the opposition party (Michael Howard) during
the 2005 British elections, while Van der Valk (2003) focused on the UDF/RPR’s
discourse in parliamentary during the 1997 election campaign in France. According to
the authors, in both national contexts, discriminatory biases were articulated without
references to ‘race’ or contravention of democratic norms. For instance, immigrants
were racialized through references to this group’s ‘cultural difference’ and the
challenges associated with their integration into host societies. Racial problematization
of immigrants emerged through nativist and nationalist discourses on the immigrant
‘problem.’ Immigrants were constructed, on the one hand, as a threat to the physical
safety of non-immigrants, and, on the other hand, as a threat to the moral integrity of the
nation. Racialized immigrants were also framed in both French and British contexts as a
potential burden to the respective nations and as an obvious source of social problems
(Capdevila & Callaghan, 2008; Van der Valk, 2003). These discursive strategies acted
to “produce, reproduce and stabilize racism whilst concurrently leaving it explicitly
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excluded, otherwise unnamed and, apparently, invisible” (Capdevila & Callaghan,
2008: 6).
The above research suggests the centrality of both ‘race’ and democracy in the
context of immigration policy, and, by extension, hints at the usefulness of Henry et
al.’s (2000) framework. At the same time, however, the role of democratic racism in
specific reference to Canadian state legitimacy remains largely unarticulated. In order to
demonstrate the inherent affinity between these two frameworks, the upcoming analysis
locates discourses of dominance associated with democratic racism (namely, binary
polarization, national identity, multiculturalism, and moral panic) within an examination
of the quest for state legitimacy in the arena of immigration policy.

5.4 Data Sources
This chapter is based on an analysis of twenty-four reports generated by CIC between
1994 and 2010. These consist of the core reports associated with the IPR of the 1990s,
each Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration published between 1995 and 2009
(with 2009 being the most recent report available), and each Report on Plans and
Priorities published between 1998 and 2010. These reports are all publically
available, 35 and have, as their intended audience, “Parliament and the people of
Canada” (CIC, 2002b: 3). These reports thus provide an overview of CIC’s official
policy discourse over the past 16 years.

35

The selection of documents that are publically available and the fact that these documents are
publically available is noteworthy here in light of Steffek’s (2003) comment that, in contemporary
contexts, public visibility is a prerequisite of legitimacy: “legitimacy can only be generated through a
public discourse” (Steffek, 2003: 264-5).
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With respect to the IPR documents, four main reports were tabled as a result of
the public consultations and the review process (Thobani, 2000). Three 36 of these
reports were analyzed in depth for the present chapter: Into the Twenty-First Century: A
Strategy for Immigration and Citizenship (CIC, 1994b), which outlines the findings of
the public consultations and describes in broad terms the expected main directions for
the immigration program in the subsequent ten years; A Broader Vision: Immigration
and Citizenship Plan 1995-2000 (CIC, 1994a), which provides more specific
elaborations of the general policy directions outlined in Into the 21st Century; and
Building on a Strong Foundation for the Twenty-First Century: New Directions for
Immigration and Refugee Policy Legislation (CIC, 1998a), which specifies the major
directions slated for the immigration program moving into the new millennium. This
latter document was the White Paper that became the basis for developing the 2002
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
Each Annual Report to Parliament describes CIC activities and initiatives during
the preceding calendar year; it outlines the selection of foreign nationals as permanent
and temporary residents during the previous year, provides an overview of the
department’s agreements and joint initiatives with provinces and territories regarding
immigration, and discusses the immigration plan for the upcoming calendar year.
A Report on Plans and Priorities is an annual expenditure plan that details
CIC’s main priorities and planned initiatives for achieving these objectives for the

36

The analysis of the fourth document associated with the IPR, Not Just Numbers (Trempe et al., 1998),
is not discussed in the present chapter’s results. This report was developed by independent consultants,
and as such, is considered in this chapter to be external to the state and thus distinct from official policy
discourse.
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upcoming year. These reports specify the department’s strategic outcomes, program
activities and planned/expected results pertaining to immigration.

5.5 Methods
The above reports were analyzed using qualitative content analysis. Documents were
initially read in chronological order without being coded such that an overall sense of
the document could be established (with respect to overall tone, focus, and substantive
topics). A second reading, again in chronological order, was performed and major
themes tentatively identified. A third reading was conducted by section (in instances
where sections were repeated in reports published in different years). For example, each
Annual Report to Parliament opens with a Message from the Minister of CIC at the
time. These Messages were read together in isolation from other sections of the reports
in order to elucidate commonalities and differences across time. The same process was
repeated for all recurring topics/sections. From here, all reports were read again and
were coded to the point of thematic saturation (i.e., until no new themes emerged after
additional readings). Once the major themes were finalized, portions of the documents
corresponding to each theme were read together in order to identify sub-themes. Once
again, coded segments for individual themes across all reports were read to the point of
thematic saturation. Finally, the codified content of each sub-theme was interpreted in
terms of the chapter’s and the thesis’s theoretical framework.
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5.6 Results
The analysis revealed discourses of national identity, multiculturalism, moral panic,
and binary polarization. The themes identified for discourses of national identity,
multiculturalism, and moral panic are listed in Table 5.1. Binary polarization was
interwoven throughout the other discourses, and thus will be addressed as applicable
throughout the discussion.
Table 5.1: Discourses and Themes Emerging from Critical Discourse Analysis of
CIC Reports
Discourse

Theme
Nation-Building

National Identity

Fairness
Economic Strength

Multiculturalism

Diversity and Tolerance
Burden and Balance

Moral Panic

Border Security: Health and Safety Threats
Illegal Migration and Human Trafficking

Importantly, these themes were not mutually exclusive, but commonly overlapped, and
were woven together in a narrative that outlined the meaning and value of immigration
in the Canadian context, defined the place of immigrants in the Canadian nation,
identified the Canadian population’s beliefs, values, goals, and desires, and explained
the role of the Canadian state in protecting and building the Canadian nation. These
portrayals functioned together to document state legitimacy by demonstrating how the
state was serving the Canadian nation through its immigration policies while
simultaneously protecting the Canadian nation from problems and dangers associated
with immigration. Through these representations, the symbolic borders of Canada’s
imagined community were defined in variable and shifting ways.
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5.61 Discourses of National Identity
Throughout the reports, state legitimacy in reference to immigration was sought by
emphasizing the important contributions of immigrants in past and present nationbuilding efforts. Canadian national identity was also defined in terms of fairness and
economic considerations in ways that served to document the legitimacy of CIC’s
policy activities.
5.611 Immigration and Nation-Building
Throughout the reports, immigrants were presented as having played a central role in
the historical development of the Canadian nation and as being vital to the maintenance
and building of a strong and prosperous Canada in the future. The reports also
articulated the nature of the Canadian population and the values on which the Canadian
nation was built in ways that linked Canadian national identity directly to immigration:
Canada’s history is replete with stories of people seeking a new life for
themselves and their families. As a country populated to a very large
extent by immigrants and their descendents, that experience is deeply
rooted in our national consciousness. Canadian values have been
influenced by the need to welcome and integrate people from many
cultures, religions, languages and national experiences (CIC, 1998a: 1).
Our country has been built and enriched by immigrants. Throughout our
history, immigrants have come to our shores seeking opportunities and a
better future for themselves and their families. Our shared immigrant
experience is central to how Canadians see themselves, and to how the
rest of the world sees Canada (CIC, 1999a: 2).
Immigration has been fundamental to the growth of Canada and to our
history of achievement. From our earliest days through to the global
transformations of recent years, hardworking people and their families
have come to Canada from all over the world. Collectively, they have
made a significant contribution to the development of our economy, our
society and our culture (CIC, 2005a: 7).
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One of the many rewards of being a welcoming land has been the
attraction of newcomers who have played a vital role in the development
of our values, our culture, our economy, and our political institutions
(CIC, 1998a: 1).
Clearly, portrayals of immigrants, Canadians, the Canadian nation, and the Canadian
state were inextricably intertwined in the context of nation-building in ways that sought
to document the inherent value of immigration. Immigrants were presented as having
played a central role in establishing the Canadian nation, with Canadian values
simultaneously presented as having been inevitably shaped by immigration. In this way,
the immigration program was legitimized as an integral part of Canadian history, and
the state was shown to be acting directly in the interests of the Canadian population by
granting entry to immigrants.
In this theme, binary polarization emerged through repeated use of pronouns
‘our’ (to represent both Canadians and the Canadian state). This implied that the needs
and values of the Canadian state and those of Canadians are one and the same, while
simultaneously creating a binary polarization between members of the Canadian
population and newcomers: immigrants (they) come to our shores to better their lives;
they have come to our land and have helped build our economy, society, and culture. In
this way, an in-group/out-group dichotomy was firmly established. Moreover, the ‘us’
and ‘them’ distinction simultaneously served to present Canada as a desirable place to
live, where newcomers are able to improve their lives. Canada was thus portrayed as an
open land, brimming with opportunity, for which the Canadian state is partly
responsible, and of which Canadians can be proud. Yet, despite the ‘us’ and ‘them’
polarization, the Canadian nation and Canadian national identity were at times
presented in inclusive terms (for instance, with the mention of “our shared immigrant
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experience”). Acknowledging that many Canadians are descendents of immigrants
served to partially break down the symbolic boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that
had previously been drawn. In doing so, the borders of the Canadian imagined
community shifted to include not only Canadians, but also ‘good’ immigrants (as cited
above, “hardworking people and their families”).
As alluded to in the above discussion, the central role of the Canadian state in
historical, present, and future nation-building through immigration was emphasized
throughout the reports, and operated to confirm the legitimacy of CIC’s activities in the
eyes of diverse stakeholders:
Canada’s Immigration program has played a vital role in shaping and
enriching our country. Canada has and will continue to benefit
economically and culturally from the immigration of individuals and
families who come here each year to seek a better future (CIC, 2004a: 1).
For almost a century and a half, immigration has been an engine for the
economic and social development of our country. Since 1967, the
employees of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) – whether they
worked in this country or in our offices abroad – have played a crucial
role in welcoming newcomers to join our work force and participate as
community leaders (CIC, 2005a: 3).
Canada has a long history of being a choice destination for immigrants,
and our immigration system is one of the best known and most
successful in the world. Every year Canada welcomes thousands of new
immigrants, international students and temporary workers who help
develop the economic and cultural fabric of our country (CIC, 2008a: 5).
The historical legacy of immigration as a nation-building strategy discursively served as
a means of demonstrating the ongoing necessity and value of immigration to Canada.
The centrality of immigration in building the Canadian nation and shaping Canadian
values thus operated in the interests of state legitimacy by documenting the symbolic
and material necessity of immigration to the Canadian nation. By extension, the manner
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in which the state structures immigration policy was legitimized by documenting the
ability of the immigration program to grant entry to deserving and contributing
newcomers.
In terms of the utility of the democratic racism framework, Henry and Tator
(2000) emphasize that the ‘myth’ that Canada was founded by French and Canadian
nations enacts democratic racism by obscuring the contribution of ‘non-Whites’ to the
Canadian nation. The present analysis uncovered very little evidence of this myth in the
discourse analyzed. In fact, as noted above, the contribution of immigrants in Canada’s
earliest nation-building years was commonly mentioned in the reports. Yet, the analysis
uncovered another ‘myth’ in the discursive construction of Canadian national identity,
involving the claim that Canada had always been open to and welcoming of immigrants
from around the world. To this end, the democratic racism that surfaced in the reports
was not one of obscuring the contributions of immigrants to Canadian nation-building,
but was one that denied the racial discrimination that was explicit in Canadian
immigration policy for nearly a century. This reflects the manner in which policy
discourse was shaped in large part to garner state legitimacy in the eyes of varied
stakeholders, including potential immigrants and Canadian nationals who might be
unaware of the nation’s discriminatory past.
5.612 Fairness
By definition, fairness is a central element of democracy, and, as such, is a widely
valued principle in liberal democratic societies. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter
Three, the emergence of a fair and objective immigrant selection system is widely
heralded as marking the official end of discrimination in Canadian immigration.
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Accordingly, the fairness of Canada’s immigration program and the democratic nature
of the Canadian state were emphasized throughout the reports in reference to various
dimensions of the immigration process:
Canadians’ belief that all human beings should be treated with fairness
and dignity must be reflected in the policies and practices of their
government. For its part, the immigration and citizenship program will
strive for excellence in providing its services both home and abroad
(CIC, 1998b: xiv).
Canada’s immigration program is based on nondiscriminatory principles
– foreign nationals are assessed according to the same criteria regardless
of race, nationality, ethnic origin, colour, religion or gender (CIC, 2005a:
16).
As part of the federal Innovation Strategy, the Government of Canada is
committed to working in partnership with the provinces and territories,
professional regulatory bodies and stakeholder groups to address the
barriers to successful economic integration. An important objective is the
development of fair and transparent processes to assess and recognize
foreign credentials before and after an immigrant’s arrival (CIC, 2003a:
26).
Throughout the reports, the Canadian state and the Canadian (non-immigrant)
population were presented as sharing in the belief in fairness and democracy relating to
immigrants of various origins. In this way, fairness was established as a feature of
Canadian identity and as the backbone of the Canadian nation. By articulating the fact
that Canada’s immigration program operates according to principles of fairness and
non-discrimination, the state’s legitimacy was pursued through appeals to both
Canadians and immigrants. The discourse offered assurance that CIC abides by the
wider values of the nation by ensuring fairness and transparency it its immigration
program, confirming that potential newcomers will not be discriminated against. This
established a subtle distinction between ‘Canadians’ and ‘immigrants’ by constructing
the latter group as ‘different’ from Canadians through the implication that
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discrimination against immigrants is possible. In some instances, emphasizing the
highly democratic nature of Canadian society involved obscuring well-documented
discrimination:
With passage of the Canadian Citizenship Act in 1947, so began the
promotion of a great national identity that has put newcomers to this
country on an equal footing with residents born here and helped shape
the strong, united, independent and free Canada of today (CIC, 2007b:
3).
Throughout the reports, Canadian immigration history was rewritten so as to obscure
the discrimination and lack of fairness that characterized much of this history.
Moreover, aligning the omission of historical racism with claims of fairness and
freedom directly served the state’s quest for legitimacy with respect to audiences that
might be unaware of the long history of discrimination in immigration, including
potential immigrants, newcomers, and Canadian nationals. In terms of contemporary
immigration practices, emphasizing the fairness of the Canadian system through
references to the Citizenship Act obscures the manner in which access to the rights and
benefits of citizenship remains regulated and racialized (for instance, through temporary
labour migration programs; see Basok, 2002; Bauder 2006; Satzewich, 1991). More
generally, claims of fairness and non-discrimination pertaining to immigrant selection
and integration operated as discourses of democratic racism that served state legitimacy
by suggesting that the immigration program is structured in accordance with the broader
liberal values of Canadian society. Claiming that immigrants are on equal footing as
Canadian-born citizens operated as an implicit denial of structural discrimination,
suggesting that, if immigrants do not succeed in Canadian society, the Canadian system
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is not at fault. In these instances, the framework of democratic racism was upheld by the
analysis.
At other times, claims of fairness coincided more directly with negative
portrayals of immigrants:
Access to Canada’s institutions is a privilege. Fairness requires that
access not be afforded to those who abuse Canada’s hospitality (CIC,
1994c: 55).
CIC’s activities … are designed to ensure that newcomers have fair but
controlled access to Canada and to reassure Canadians that CIC is
proactively managing risk (CIC, 2003b: 12).
Immigration has a role to play in addressing labour market challenges
and my 37 goal is to ensure the immigration program better responds to
our needs as a country in a way that is fair, transparent and adheres to the
rule of law, while protecting the health, safety and security of Canadians
(CIC, 2006a: 3).
In these examples, immigrants were implicitly presented as a risk to the Canadian
nation and the Canadian public, such that a binary polarization was again established
between immigrants, on the one side, and Canadians and the Canadian state, on the
other side. This type of direct pairing of negative ‘Other’ representations with
disclaimers of fairness is a defining feature of discourses of discrimination toward
immigrants in democratic contexts (see, for instance, van Dijk, 1997, 1993a, 1992). At
the same time, however, an ambiguous line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ immigrants that
could not clearly be reduced to ‘race’ was drawn, and the ability of the state to negotiate
this line in the interests of the Canadian nation, Canadian citizens, and (‘good’)
immigrants was emphasized. In this way, the legitimacy of state activities was
articulated with respect to multiple audiences. Emphasizing Canada’s non-
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‘My’ refers to Monte Solberg, Minister of CIC at the time.
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discriminatory approach to immigration informed a discourse of fair and equitable
governance directed toward Canadians, ‘good’ immigrants, and the interests of capital
and labour. At the same time, the boundaries of Canada’s imagined community were
clearly drawn to exclude newcomers who threaten the health, safety, and security of
Canadians.
5.613 Economic Strength
Although Henry et al. (2000) primarily address Canadian national identity in reference
to a particular vision of the cultural fabric of the nation, the present analysis revealed
that, in the context of immigration policy, the economic strength of the nation in a
global setting emerged as a defining feature of Canadian national identity. Supporting
the framework of immigration policy outlined by Simmons (2010, 1999; see also
Chapter Two of this thesis), the reports clearly articulated the prevailing ‘imagined
future’ of the nation as a sophisticated player in a global marketplace. In this context,
economic considerations were constructed as more than just a goal of immigration;
rather, Canada’s status as a strong economic player was entrenched in the nation’s very
identity. By extension, the contribution of immigrants to upholding the nation’s
economic identity was prominent in the reports, again ingraining (economic)
immigration as a necessary component of Canadian nation-building and establishing the
legitimacy of the immigration program. In this regard, skilled workers were highlighted
as being vital to the state’s ability to meet Canada’s needs in a knowledge-based
economy, in light of the fact that these immigrants are highly educated and represent a
flexible, skilled workforce that will ensure Canada’s global competitiveness:
Canada needs immigrants if it wants to continue to develop and grow in
the future. Specifically, Canada needs to attract highly skilled

182
workers…as an essential part of maintaining its competitive position in a
knowledge-based…world economy (CIC, 1999b: 3).
In an era of increased globalization with critical skill gaps in the labour
market and concern over demographic trends, the selection of skilled
worker immigrants who can successfully settle in Canada is vital for the
long-term economic development of the country (CIC, 2002b: 13).
Immigration can contribute to addressing both short- and long-term
labour market needs by attracting people with the right mix of skills and
talents to support economic growth today and in the future. With other
industrialized countries confronting similar challenges with respect to
sustaining population and economic growth, Canada will be operating in
an increasingly competitive worldwide market for higher skilled workers
(CIC, 2007a: 6).
Immigration has played an important role in building the strong and
vibrant economy that Canadians have come to enjoy. To remain
competitive in the global economy, Canada needs to continue to draw on
the talents and skills that immigrants bring with them (CIC, 2008b: 15).
Skilled worker immigrants were thus defined first and foremost in terms of their
ability to serve the needs of the Canadian nation; these immigrants were
depersonalized and depicted as resources that will help maintain Canada’s
position as a competitive player in a world market. Business immigrants,
investors, and temporary workers were similarly constructed in terms of their
economic contributions to the Canadian nation:
Migration is a positive force for economic and social development. CIC
continues to promote Canada as a destination of choice for talent,
innovation, investment and opportunity. Canada’s immigration policy
facilitates the entry into Canada of new immigrants and temporary
residents who are able to contribute to the labour market and economy
through the skills they bring, their business experience, or through
capital they invest (CIC, 2006b: 21).
[…] We must work with partners to consistently promote Canada as a
destination of choice, adopt policies that encourage the retention of
newcomers such as students and temporary foreign workers and select
applicants who have greater potential to succeed early upon their arrival
in Canada. Recent initiatives such as the Action Plan for Faster
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Immigration and the introduction of the Canadian Experience Class will
improve Canada’s ability to compete for skilled labour (CIC, 2009b: 15).
Intersecting images of economic immigrants and the Canadian nation clearly served as a
vehicle for presenting CIC as a responsive, responsible, and forward-thinking state
entity that acts to support the nation’s interests:
The Speech from the Throne in September 2002 highlighted the
important role that CIC plays in the Canadian economy, while the federal
Innovation Strategy stresses the need for a skilled workforce. CIC has
made it a priority to deliver results for the Canadian economy (CIC
2003b: 12).
We are maximizing this country’s social, cultural, and economic benefits
by working to respond to labour-market needs, attracting and retaining
skilled foreign workers, and ensuring that we have the policies and
programs in place to support the successful integration of newcomers to
this country (CIC 2007a: 3).
CIC contributes significantly to strengthening Canada’s social
foundations, to building a 21st century economy and to ensuring
Canada’s role in the world (CIC, 2004b: 9).
By articulating the fact that CIC grants entry to ‘good’ immigrants (that is, immigrants
who are economically valuable to the Canadian nation), the importance of immigration
in securing Canada’s national prosperity and international standing was emphasized.
Moreover, the centrality of Canada’s international economic standing to the nation’s
identity meant that articulations of CIC’s ability to select economic immigrants directly
served the state’s quest for legitimacy. Yet, representations of the Canadian nation and
the Canadian state were also intertwined with portrayals of family-class immigrants:
Canadian immigration policy and legislation have a long tradition of
supporting family reunification. The support of family sponsors assists
new immigrants in achieving self-reliance and more quickly adapting to
their new circumstances (CIC, 2002b: 13).

184
Reuniting families is an important tradition in Canada’s immigration
program, as it allows foreign nationals to be sponsored by close relatives
or family members in Canada. This component [of the immigration
program] is based on the belief that people who immigrate to Canada
will tend to establish themselves more easily if their family supports
them (CIC, 2004b: 19).
Family reunification remains a key objective of IRPA. In order to
facilitate the reunification of families, Canadian citizens and permanent
residents may sponsor close relatives to become permanent residents.
Canadian citizens or permanent residents who are 18 years of age or
older may qualify as sponsors. In order to ensure that sponsored relatives
are adequately supported and do not need to rely on social assistance,
sponsors must meet certain criteria and are responsible for financially
supporting their relatives for a period of three to 10 years, depending on
their age and relationship to the sponsor (CIC, 2008a: 18-9).
Family-class immigration thus allowed the Canadian state and the Canadian nation to be
portrayed as supportive and appreciative of the institution of the family, while offering
assurance that family-class immigrants will come to be productive members of society
through the help of their sponsors. In this way, discourse on family-class immigration
was directly framed within considerations on the nation’s economic integrity. Familyclass immigrants were presented as dependents who require the financial support of
their sponsors in order to succeed in Canadian society. In this way, family-class
immigrants were discursively constrained in their role as family members, and were not
acknowledged as productive immigrants. This group was thus portrayed as a potential
to burden the nation, who stand to interfere with the nation’s economic integrity. In this
way, a binary polarization was constructed between economic immigrants and familyclass immigrants. In the context of the state’s quest for legitimacy, the expressed
support of family reunification upheld the state’s social commitment to family values,
and served to obscure the inherent devaluing of family-class immigrants relative to
economic immigrants. This discourse protected the legitimacy of CIC’s activities from
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both sides: audiences that might protest family-class immigration on economic grounds
were appealed to through reassurances regarding the sponsorship program, while
humanists likely to reject a strictly economic immigration system as well as immigrants
seeking to have their family join them in Canada were appealed to through
acknowledgement of the importance of family reunification.
The centrality of the pursuit of state legitimacy in shaping policy discourse, and
the extent to which this pursuit shaped portrayals of both immigrants and the state, was
also evident in the reports associated with the IPR of the 1990s. Part of the IPR
involved a legislative review by an independent panel of consultants, which resulted in
the tabling of a report containing policy recommendations (Trempe et al., 1998).
Following the release of this report, public hearings were held across the country over a
period of several weeks, in which individual Canadian citizens and organizations
responded to the recommendations that the advisory group had outlined. Following
these hearings, the report Building on a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century (CIC,
1998a) was released by CIC. It was noted in the early pages of this report that the
feedback from the public hearings on Not Just Numbers revealed “concern with the
report’s perceived economic, market-oriented focus” (CIC, 1998a: 6). This statement is
meaningful here in light the impact that this public reaction seemed to have on policy
discourse in the immediate aftermath of the hearings.
Specifically, the analysis of Building on a Strong Foundation (CIC, 1998a)
revealed a clear downplaying of economic concerns and an emphasis on the importance
of the social and humanitarian considerations of immigration that was unparalleled in
all other reports. This report stood out in terms of its heightened articulation of the value
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of the family as an integral aspect of Canadian identity, and its emphasis on the
centrality of family reunification to the immigration program. The report also stressed
that “immigrants are social as well as economic beings” (CIC, 1998a: 14):
The assessment of successful establishment for independent immigrants
is based on their economic potential. Economics, however, is only part of
the story. Highly skilled immigrants make an invaluable contribution to
Canadian society. As they integrate into communities, these immigrants
become integral parts of all facets of Canadian society. They enrich the
cultural and social fabric of Canada (CIC, 1998a: 28).
As this shift suggests, the audience plays an important role in the framing of policy
discourse. The state was clearly engaged in a concerted effort to address perceived
concerns associated with the immigration program and to demonstrate that the
immigration program serves both Canadians, immigrants, and the Canadian nation more
broadly. Yet, as the current analysis suggests, the specific elements of the discourse that
are played up depends on the prevailing social atmosphere within which state
legitimacy is being sought.
Overall, Canada’s economic competitiveness and high standing in the
international economic order were presented in the reports as a source of national pride
and a defining feature of Canadian national identity. This economic discourse enabled
CIC to address the interests of both capital and labour by demonstrating how the state
prioritizes the national economy by matching the flow of immigrants to meet economic
needs. In turn, this served to demonstrate how CIC upholds the material and symbolic
standing of Canada in the international order. This discourse also allowed the state to
‘prove’ the value and worth of economic immigrants to the varied audiences of the
reports. In this way, economic immigrants were symbolically included in the state’s
imagining of Canada’s national community, constructed as valuable economic
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contributors and thus as worthy future citizens, while family-class immigrants were
ambiguously positioned with respect to the national community, yet nevertheless
presented as allowing the nation to meet specific social goals. The state’s quest for
legitimacy was thus evidenced through discursive assurance that the current
immigration program is the best possible approach for Canadians, corporate Canada,
and a large population of immigrants.
With respect to democratic racism, the analysis revealed many of the same
themes discussed by other authors pertaining to the discourse of immigrant skill and the
implicit devaluation of family-class immigrants (see Abu-Laban,1998a, 1998b;
Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007; Thobani, 2000a, 2000b). Although the current analysis did
not reveal explicit opposition to family-class immigrants, it found that family-class
immigrants were occasionally presented as potentially burdensome to the nation, and as
less valuable than economic immigrants. To this end, insofar as family-class immigrants
are interpreted as having been racialized relative to economic immigrants, then the
privileging of the latter group can be interpreted, to some extent, as an expression of
democratic racism. At the same time, however, the bureaucratic categorization of
immigrants is not clearly reducible to a single dimension such as ‘race.’ To this end, the
extent to which the discourse of skill and economic identity is evidence of ‘racism’ is
not entirely clear. This issue is discussed further later on in this chapter.

5.62 Discourse of Multiculturalism: Diversity and Tolerance
The theme of diversity revealed contradicting sub-texts that served to variably represent
both immigrants and Canadians, while consistently presenting the Canadian state as
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respectful and welcoming of all peoples, and depicting the Canadian nation as
multicultural and pluralistic:
Canada is a multicultural and diverse country that is open to the world,
with an immigration program that enjoys public support and a track
record of successfully integrating generations of newcomers (CIC,
2005a: 8).
Canada is among the most ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse
countries in the world. The Government of Canada is proud of the
contributions that all communities make to the social, civic, cultural and
economic fabric of this country, and of the efforts that all Canadians
make to welcome and encourage newcomers’ full participation in our
society (CIC, 2010b: 6).
I 38 believe the characteristic that most defines Canadians is their
welcoming nature. It has been a constant throughout our evolution as a
country. Wave after wave of newcomers, first from Europe, then from all
corners of the earth, have found themselves welcomed in Canada. They
have also found opportunity and tolerance in a country that genuinely
appreciates cultural diversity (CIC, 2007b: 3).
In these examples, both Canadians and the state were portrayed as welcoming and
tolerant. By extension, immigrants were implicitly constructed as ‘different’ than
‘Canadians.’ In this way, although diversity was presented as being valued in Canada
and respected by Canadians, a binary polarization of ‘Canadians’ and ‘diverse
immigrants’ was also evident. In this way, both immigrants and Canadians were
homogenized within their respective group boundaries. As mentioned for previous
themes, the Canadian state was coupled with Canadians in the polarization between Self
and Other (with statements such as “our society” and “our evolution as a country”).
Canadians and the Canadian state were thus both portrayed as being supportive of
‘diverse’ newcomers, and as constituting a nation that has a long history of welcoming
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In this instance, “I” refers to Diane Finley, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada at the
time.

189
immigrants from around the world. As discussed in previous sections and as illustrated
by the above examples, the theme of diversity revealed a selective re-writing of
Canadian immigration history, wherein historical discrimination was obscured.
Similarly, the contemporary racialization of immigration policies and practices and the
persistence of discrimination in Canadian society were implicitly denied through
references to the welcoming, pluralistic nature of the Canadian nation.
At other points throughout the reports, the racialization of immigrants was more
explicit:
Settlement programs and services assist immigrants in becoming
participating and contributing members of Canadian society and promote
an acceptance of immigrants by Canadians. While helping newcomers
adapt and learn about their rights, freedoms and responsibilities and the
laws that protect them from racial discrimination, settlement programs
also sensitize Canadians to different cultures and how diversity
strengthens the economy and community life (CIC, 2002a).
Immigrants’ need for the state’s assistance in order to become productive members of
Canadian society served as an implicit negative representation of newcomers and an
overt positive representation of the state. Moreover, the racialized identity of
immigrants (and their difference from Canadians) was constituted through the explicit
mention of newcomers’ legal protection from racial discrimination. Interestingly, in
contrast to the vast majority of the policy discourse (which emphasized Canadians’
tolerant and welcoming nature), the above example suggests an acknowledgement of
the broader presence of discrimination in Canadian society and the need for Canadians
to be educated about the value of diversity brought about by immigrants. Again, this
served to polarize immigrants and Canadians as racialized opposites, while
simultaneously constructing the state in a patriarchal role as guardian, protector, and
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educator of both newcomers and Canadian nationals. State legitimacy was thus
documented in reference to immigration by establishing the fact that the state protects
immigrants while simultaneously using their ‘diversity’ to broaden the horizons of
Canadians and the Canadian nation. In this context, the presence of institutionalized
discrimination in the immigration program and Canadian society was negated, and the
legitimacy of the immigration program was ‘proven.’
In other instances, references to multiculturalism seemed to acknowledge the
heterogeneity of the broader Canadian population, somewhat deconstructing the
racialized binary between Canadians and immigrants:
Multiculturalism fosters increased intercultural understanding, and
supports the goals of Canadians living in a society where they are treated
fairly and equitably, regardless of their background (CIC, 2009b: 35).
In response to our ever-increasing diversity and to ensure that our
Multiculturalism Program reflects the needs of all Canadians by
promoting integration, the Government of Canada has implemented three
policy objectives for the Program: building an integrated, sociallycohesive society; making institutions more responsive to the needs of
Canada's diverse population; and engaging in international discussions
on multiculturalism and diversity (CIC, 2010b: 5).
These examples illustrate the inconsistent manner in which immigrants and Canadians
were concurrently represented in reference to diversity and multiculturalism. In
instances where immigrants and Canadians were not polarized as distinct (racialized)
groups, Canada’s national community was constructed as inclusive of diverse
newcomers and Canadian nationals alike. Yet, diversity was still presented as a
potential challenge to social cohesion; implicitly, this contributed to a ‘folk
construction’ of immigrants (see Chapter One), in the sense that ethnic minorities
(regardless of legal immigrant status) were portrayed as ‘different.’ To this end, the line
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between immigrants and ethnic minority Canadians was inconsistently and ambiguously
drawn. Yet, in all cases, the Canadian state and the Canadian nation were consistently
framed in reference to tolerance and the value of diversity. In this way, the pursuit of
state legitimacy through multicultural discourse was evident throughout the reports, for
instance, through comments about the state’s commitment to multicultural programs,
and through repeated references to CIC’s role in ensuring the equitable treatment of all
members of Canadian society. The state’s activities pertaining to immigration were thus
presented so as to appeal to both newcomers and Canadian nationals of all backgrounds,
as well as to broader interest groups that advocate against discrimination.

5.63 Discourses of Moral Panic
5.631 Balance and Burden
As discussed in Chapter One, the ‘immigration question’ in Canada commonly revolves
around public concerns pertaining to the balance between economic and non-economic
immigration. This discourse contributes to an image of economic (particularly skilled
worker) immigrants as productive and valuable newcomers, while family-class
immigrants are comparatively devalued and constructed as a potential burden to
Canadian society. This devaluing of family-class immigrants is often interpreted in
racialized (and gendered) terms (see Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Thobani, 2007, 2000a,
2000b, 1999). In political and public contexts, the sponsorship agreement 39 is presented
as a safeguard against family-class immigrants’ reliance on public programs. These

39

As discussed in Chapter One, in order for family-class immigrants to gain admission to Canada, a
sponsor (i.e., a family member of a designated relationship) must sign an agreement in which they
commit financial responsibility for the sponsored immigrant for a pre-determined period of time,
depending on the relationship between the sponsor and the immigrant.
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points were visible throughout the CIC reports, and contributed to a binary polarization
between family-class immigrants and economic immigrants:
The [immigration program’s] changes are also aimed at rebalancing
immigration so that Canada selects a greater share of immigrants who
can contribute quickly to its economic development. This may mean a
decrease in the share of immigrants in other categories (CIC, 1994c: 29).
The lower number [of immigrants to be accepted in 1995] will allow the
immigration program to be gradually reoriented in later years to
applicants who can make an immediate contribution to the Canadian
economy by increasing the proportion of the economic component in
relation to the family (CIC, 1994a: 7).
The government is committed to ensuring that newcomers to Canada can
integrate and contribute to Canada as quickly as possible, without adding
to the burden on social programs. This means raising selection standards;
ensuring that Canadians honour their responsibilities towards sponsored
family members; and achieving an appropriate balance between the
economic and family components of immigration (CIC, 1994a: 7).
As these examples illustrate, the assumption that family-class immigrants are unlikely
to contribute to the nation was implicit, serving to marginalize this group as valuable
members of Canada’s national community. Economic immigrants, in contrast, were
portrayed as self-sufficient contributors who are worthy of inclusion in the Canadian
nation. These images were built upon an undercurrent of ‘moral panic,’ conceptualized
in terms of the potential risk associated with family-class immigrants and sponsorship
default:
The government believes strongly in the principle of family reunification
based on the responsibility of the family itself to provide the resources
for supporting its sponsored members. Compliance with sponsorship
undertakings is key to achieving integrity in the family class program.
Default occurs when a sponsored immigrant whose essential needs were
guaranteed by the sponsor for a set period received social assistance
(CIC, 1998a: 26).
In order to ensure that sponsored relatives are adequately supported and
do not need to rely on social assistance, sponsors must meet certain
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criteria and are responsible for financially supporting their relatives for a
period of three to 10 years, depending on their age and relationship to the
sponsor (CIC, 2008a: 19).
The privilege of immigrating or resettling in Canada must be balanced
with ‘reciprocal obligations,’ or responsibilities. Thus, for example, the
privilege of sponsoring the immigration of a family member must be
balanced with the responsibility to provide for that person once in
Canada (CIC, 1998a: 10).
The identity of sponsors as Canadian-born or former immigrants was typically not
articulated, and was rendered largely irrelevant in the context of potential sponsorship
default. In this context, the state was presented as ensuring that family-class immigrants
will not become a burden to Canadian taxpayers:
The government proposes to expand Citizenship and Immigration
Canada’s power to undertake collection action against defaulting
sponsors and to share the proceeds with the provinces (CIC, 1998a: 26).
In December 2004, a pilot project was launched with the Canada
Revenue Agency (CRA) and the Province of Ontario to facilitate the
collection of debts owed by defaulting sponsors. Sponsors in Ontario
who default on sponsorship commitments may now have their income
tax or GST refunds withheld to pay back the province for social
assistance costs incurred by family members they have sponsored. The
intention is to expand this pilot nationwide (CIC, 2005a: 20).
CIC continues to work with the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) and the
provinces on measures to collect debts owing from sponsors (CIC,
2006a: 15).
To preserve public support for family class immigration, it is critical that
sponsors meet their obligations to provide for the essential needs of their
sponsored relatives. Links will be established with the provinces to
ensure that defaulting sponsors are identified and compelled to carry out
their responsibilities (CIC, 1998b: 11).
Overall, intersecting representations of family-class immigrants, their sponsors and the
Canadian state served state legitimacy by documenting the role of the state in
guaranteeing that the economic security of the nation would not be compromised by
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family-class immigration. The boundaries of Canada’s national community were thus
drawn so as to marginalize family-class immigrants and defaulting sponsors. Through
these constructions, subtle discrimination against family-class immigrants was
articulated. Default on sponsorship was never expressed in terms of concern for familyclass immigrants’ well-being, but, rather, was addressed exclusively in terms of the
well-being of the nation. The Canadian state’s legitimacy, in this regard, was
documented in terms of its ability to minimize the burden imposed by family-class
immigrants, and thus to preclude the need for public ‘panic’ about family-class
immigration.
As noted earlier in this chapter, the problematization of family-class immigrants
is often taken as evidence of racial discrimination when considered in the context of
Canadian immigration history (see Abu-Laban, 1998a, 1998b; Boyd, 1997; Thobani,
2007, 2000a, 2000b, 1999; see also Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007). As discussed in
Chapter Three, the liberalization of family-class immigration in the 1950s brought about
an influx of immigrants from ‘non-traditional’ source countries. In contemporary
immigration flows, large numbers of ‘non-White’ immigrants (particularly Asian
women) arrive through the family-class stream. As such, critical scholars commonly
discuss family-class immigration in racialized and gendered, such that the attribution of
burden to family-class immigrants is often interpreted as an expression of democratic
racism (and sexism). While not disputing the possible value of this interpretation, it is
also relevant to point out that 40% of family-class immigrants are male, and that a large
proportion of skilled worker applicants are of Asian origin. In this regard, insofar as
Canadian immigration policy discourse reflects philosophies and agendas guiding
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immigration policy and programming, then the construction of family-class immigrants
as burdensome stands to affect all immigrants within that category, regardless of
gender, ethnicity, or ‘race.’ As such, it is argued here that category of admission is a
tangible factor in defining membership in Canada’s national community that is not
easily reducible to the bureaucratic category’s majority demographic composition, nor
can it be exclusively linked to the socially constructed image of a family-class
immigrant as a female dependent and an economic immigrant as an independent male.
5.632 Border Security: Health and Safety Threats
Throughout the reports, immigrants were commonly presented as real or potential
threats to the well-being of Canada as a nation and to the Canadian population:
CIC…protects the public health and safety of Canadians through the
medical examination of all immigrants and certain visitors, and protects
the security of Canadian society by identifying and removing individuals
who are not entitled to enter or to remain in Canada (CIC, 2000: 5).
From a medical perspective, CIC’s overarching goal is to ensure that the
vast majority of immigrants are healthy when they arrive in Canada, thus
minimizing risks to Canadians and preventing undue demands on
Canada’s already overburdened health and social services (CIC, 2003b:
33).
As Canada seeks to attract and welcome permanent and temporary
residents, CIC has a critical role to play, in partnership with other federal
departments, in protecting the health, safety and security of Canadians.
Globalization of markets and ease of travel increase risks, ranging from
epidemics such as SARS and influenza, to the spread of infectious
diseases such as tuberculosis, to chronic conditions that can affect the
overall health of Canadians (CIC, 2008a: 8-9).
Health thus served as a ‘legitimate’ means for problematizing immigrants, drawing on
global health trends and also appealing to concerns of national well-being. It was telling
that threats to public health were clearly attributed to immigrants, with no recognition
that Canadians within the country or those who travel outside the country can contribute
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to the spread of infectious diseases. In this context, health served as a means of
constructing a binary polarization between Canadians and immigrants. This finding is
particularly interesting in light evidence that, upon their arrival in Canada, immigrants
are, on average, healthier than the native-born Canadian population (known as the
“healthy immigrant effect”; see Ali et al., 2004; Chen et al., 1996; McDonald &
Kennedy, 2004). Moreover, the portrayal of immigrants as a health threat was framed so
as to document the legitimacy of state activities pertaining to the screening of
immigrants.
For instance, the image of immigrants as a health threat, and the manner in
which the state acts to minimize this threat, emerged through discussions of the
‘Migration Health Task Force,’ a joint initiative between CIC and Health Canada. The
Task Force was charged with the following responsibilities:
[…] to define the current public health and population health challenges
resulting from migration to Canada; to examine how well Canada’s
current migration health management system is meeting these
challenges; and to develop a series of strategic objectives and proposed
actions to modernize Canada’s system of managing migrant health (CIC,
2005b: 35).
Discussions of the Task Force clearly contributed to a binary polarization of immigrants
and Canadians on the basis of health ‘difference.’ Indeed, as reported in one document,
the Task Force was explicitly established in light of the fact that “most [immigrants]
come from countries with health backgrounds, beliefs and customs that are very
different from those in Canada” (CIC, 2005b: 35). Importantly, highlighting the fact
that health risks are largely associated with immigrants from countries with ‘different’
customs both racialized these immigrants, and operated directly in the state’s quest for
legitimacy. Racializing the immigrant ‘health risk’ legitimized the possibility of
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heightened scrutiny of immigrants from ‘non-traditional’ source countries, rendering
suspicion of racialized immigrants legitimate. More generally, portraying immigrants as
health threats served as a basis for presenting the Canadian state as the protector of the
Canadian nation and the Canadian public. By acknowledging the ‘threat’ associated
with immigrants from non-traditional source countries while emphasizing the steps
being taken by CIC to protect against these risks, the state’s ability to protect the
physical well-being of Canadian citizens was established. In this way, the potential
threat to legitimacy imposed by the health ‘threat’ of immigrants was refuted through
assurances that the state was taking every effort to protect Canadians from (racialized)
immigrants.
Aside from the health threats associated within immigration, terrorism and
organized crime also emerged as central elements of the discourse of moral panic:
In the face of growing threats to Canadian security, CIC supports a key
government-wide priority to build safer communities. In this context,
CIC identifies and denies admission to those who do not comply with the
Immigration Act (e.g., suspected terrorists or members of organized
crime groups). It also detects evolving patterns of abuse of the
citizenship, immigration and refugee programs and detains or removes
people who pose a serious risk to Canadians or who are not legally
entitled to remain in Canada (in particular, those who have committed
serious criminal offences or war crimes) (CIC, 1999b: 6-7).
Growing international migration has increased the possibility of
Canadians being exposed to outbreaks, infectious diseases, acts of
terrorism and transnational organized crime. A range of mitigating
strategies has been adopted across government and with international
partners to reduce the possibility of these threats impacting the Canadian
population (CIC, 2010b: 15).
Like the United States and many other countries, Canada has been
operating in a state of heightened security since September 11, 2001. The
critical need to intensify efforts to protect North America is widely
acknowledged. Terrorist attacks and continuing international tensions
have changed Canadians’ perceptions of our vulnerability in terms of
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public safety and security, and have raised concerns about how we select
and admit people to Canada (CIC, 2003b: 30).
As these examples illustrate, CIC’s role as guardian of the Canadian nation and
protector of the Canadian people was constituted through representations of
international immigrants as threats. Moreover, Canadians were simultaneously, albeit
implicitly, portrayed as good, law-abiding citizens who do not pose a threat to public
safety. Canadians were also, once again, homogenized with respect to their fears and
perceptions, and were constructed as sharing the same beliefs as the Canadian state.
These findings pertaining to the immigrant ‘threat’ must be interpreted within
the social context of international migration in recent years. Since the terrorist attacks
on U.S. soil in 2001, the fear of racialized ‘Others’ has become an increasingly
prominent sentiment in the Western world. Political discourse, particularly in reference
to national security, border control, and international migration, has become ever more
imbued with xenophobia and heightened suspicion toward ‘outsiders’ (Ibrahim, 2009;
Nagel, 2002). The SARS health scare of 2003 added a further dimension of fear
associated with international migration to Canada. In these contexts, the racialized
construction of immigrants as dangerous ‘Others’ is rendered acceptable through
‘legitimate’ concerns over national well-being. Calling specific attention to the 9/11
attacks in the policy reports effectively located the threat to the Canadian nation within
a stereotypical image of a male, Islamist terrorist. This served to profile the threat the
Canadian nation in a very concrete, racialized, gendered, and religious-specific way.
It is interesting to note here that representations of immigrants as health and
safety threats in the CIC reports preceded the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the SARS
outbreak, indicating that these events did not directly prompt a new vision of
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immigrants as safety and health threat. What did change, however, was the nature of
this theme in the reports of the decade 2000, where security and health risks were
framed as increasingly pressing concerns, as evidenced by an emphasis on increasing
collaboration between multiple federal departments to ensure border control, the
sophistication of the methods being used to screen immigrants, and the perceived
necessity of extensive efforts to protect Canadian society from potential threats
associated with immigration. In this regard, the intensity and focus of the state’s quest
for legitimacy changed in response to world events. Major scares such as terrorism and
health pandemics threaten to instill fear in the population about the ability of the state to
protect the national community. The current analysis revealed how, in the context of
this fear, racialized immigrants were constructed as the principal source of threat, while
Canadians were implicitly constructed as a vulnerable population in need of state
protection. Legitimacy, in this context, was established through a convincing discourse
regarding the steps being taken by the state to protect the Canadian public against ‘bad’
immigrants while simultaneously permitting the entry of ‘good’ (i.e., economic)
immigrants.
5.633 Illegal Migration and Human Trafficking
In the CIC reports, illegal migration and human trafficking were identified as inherent
features of global migration, and as prominent concerns for the Canadian state and other
stakeholders:
Migrant smuggling, including trafficking in women and children, is an
increasing concern for the international community…CIC recognizes
that human security and migration issues cannot be addressed in isolation
and that they require effective cooperation and exchange of information.
CIC works closely with domestic and international partners to promote
and protect Canadian interests relating to migration, refugee and
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citizenship issues in international and multilateral forums. The
Department has an enviable worldwide reputation in combating the
illegal traffic in people (CIC, 1999b: 6).
Activities devoted to preventing illegal migrants from reaching Canada
are key to any effective enforcement program in terms of cost to the
taxpayer, program integrity and public safety (CIC, 2000: 21).
[CIC] contributes to the management of international migration and
travel by combating illegal migration, including trafficking in people,
while facilitating the movement of legitimate travelers (CIC, 1998b: 17).
The discourse on illegal migration and human trafficking operated to create a distinction
between ‘legitimate’ migrants, victim migrants, and fraudulent migrants. It is also
relevant to note here the explicit gendered portrayal of women and children as
vulnerable victims in need of state protection. As noted for other themes, however, the
portrayals of migrants were, in large part, secondary to positive portrayals of the
Canadian state. Indeed, the state’s quest for legitimacy was clearly visible in references
to CIC’s efforts to establish an effective program that both ensures Canadians’ safety
and assists victims of trafficking. In this way, the state was presented so as to appeal to
Canadians concerned with the threat and costs of illegal migration, while ensuring the
state’s commitment to protecting vulnerable migrants. This discourse thus sought to
establish the Canadian state as a humanitarian entity in the eyes of a wide variety of
national and international stakeholders.
At the same time, however, despite emphasizing migrants’ potential
vulnerability, the discourse on human trafficking was not unequivocal in its portrayal
of immigrants as victims:
In May 2006, the Minister announced that the federal government has
adopted new measures to help victims of human trafficking in Canada.
Trafficking in persons violates the basic human rights of its victims. […]
To assist victims of human trafficking, temporary resident permits can be
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issued for up to 120 days. The permit will enable victims to recover from
the impact of this crime. Victims who receive temporary resident permits
will also be exempted from the processing fee, and will be eligible for
health-care benefits under the new Interim Federal Health program. The
new measures have been carefully designed so that only bona fide
victims of human trafficking will benefit from them (CIC, 2006a: 24-25;
italics added).
As part of the Department’s commitment to protecting victims of human
trafficking, guidelines were released in May 2006 which encourage
immigration officers to issue possible victims a short-term temporary
resident permit (TRP). A longer-term TRP can be issued when it is
established that the person is a victim of trafficking. The initial permit is
fee-exempt. The permit gives access to health care and counselling via
the Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP) (CIC, 2007a: 26).
Would-be victims of human trafficking were commonly presented as potential abusers
of the Temporary Resident Permit system, and thus were placed under a shadow of
suspicion. In doing so, vulnerable victim migrants were at once distinguished from, as
well as conflated with, fraudulent migrants. Again, the state’s quest for legitimacy in the
context of this theme reflects the broader social context of contemporary international
migration, wherein human trafficking and smuggling are generating increasing demand
for political action (see Laczko & Gramegna, 2003). In the present analysis, addressing
potentially fraudulent victims of human trafficking tied into the state’s quest for
legitimacy by documenting the state’s ability to distinguish between ‘bona fide’ and
fraudulent trafficking victims. By portraying immigrants in these two polarized roles,
CIC’s concern for genuine victims and willingness to assist vulnerable migrants was
articulated, while the department’s ability to protect the Canadian nation from
fraudulent, criminal immigrants was emphasized. In this way, representations of both
the state and victims of trafficking (genuine and fraudulent) served to establish CIC’s
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activities as securing a safe and peaceful world for Canadians, ‘good’ immigrants, and
vulnerable victims.
In terms of democratic racism, illegal migration and human trafficking serve as
a site for articulating doubt about populations of newcomers that tend to be widely
constructed in racialized terms. On the one hand, conceptualizing asylum seekers as
would-be frauds obscures the racialized persecution that often prompts forced
migration. Moreover, as Richmond (2001) points out, the requirements for obtaining
asylum in Canada are such that immigrants from particular regions, such as central and
southern African countries, face tangible difficulties in qualifying for selection as a
Convention refugee. Efforts to stem illegal residence of asylum-seekers in Canada
similarly racialize refugee protection; as Richmond (2001) explains, “the list of
countries whose nationals now require a visitor’s or transit visa includes virtually all
Third World countries known to have generated reactive migration flows in recent
years” (p.18). To this end, granting the potential abuse of the refugee system provides
ground for preserving racialized patterns of refuge in Canada, embedded in the
distinction between ‘illegal/fraudulent’ asylum-seekers and ‘bona fide’ victims.

5.7 Conclusion
The present chapter sought to demonstrate that immigration policy discourse in the
Canadian context is best understood in reference to the state’s quest for legitimacy in
the face of immigration controversies and the effort to appeal to diverse stakeholders. In
the current analysis, this quest for legitimacy involved a distinct imagining of the
Canadian nation that variably defined and represented different groups of immigrants,
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while simultaneously representing the Canadian population and the Canadian state in
largely positive, shared terms of national self-glorification.
Underlying this analysis was the objective of evaluating the notion of
democratic racism. More specifically, the chapter sought to address whether, in the
context of immigration policy discourse, the deployment of discourses of dominance
associated with democratic racism can actually be interpreted as racism. This chapter
thus speaks to a socially and sociologically relevant topic of contention. From a social
perspective, it is critical to assess what constitutes racism such that anti-racist initiatives
can appropriately address new and subtle expressions of discrimination. However, as
illustrated by the Canadian examples discussed at the beginning of this chapter (i.e.,
about Rob Ford and the Centre for Immigration Policy Reform), uncovering and
challenging racist talk is difficult when racism is elusive, or even “invisible or
unwittingly practiced” (Henry & Tator, 2000: 287). From a sociological perspective,
this issue bears on the conceptual challenges of defining ‘racism’ and determining the
extent to which racialization, accomplished through expressions of ‘difference’ or
‘diversity,’ can be interpreted as racism. As demonstrated in this chapter, it is
theoretically necessary, from a sociological perspective, to evaluate the social context
within which racialization occurs in order to more fully comprehend the place of ‘race’
in contemporary democratic societies, wherein racial (and other) discrimination is
prohibited by law and evokes widespread social disapproval. Given the intersections
between racialization, ‘racism,’ and contemporary immigration trends in Canada,
immigration policy discourse offers a conceptually fruitful avenue for pursuing these
issues.

204
Overall, the present chapter demonstrated that discourses of dominance
commonly interpreted as ‘democratic racism’ are not exclusively discourses of racism.
Rather, in the Canadian immigration policy context, these discourses involved elements
of both inclusivity and exclusivity, wherein immigrants were inconsistently and
ambiguously constructed in both positive and negative lights, depending on the
immediate context in which the state’s legitimacy was being pursued (that is, the social
issue and/or the audience being addressed). At times, ‘immigrants,’ as a broad group,
were at times depicted as outsiders who stood in binary opposition to Canadians and the
Canadian state, and at other times portrayed as insiders that contribute to the Canadian
nation. On other occasions, the primary polarization was between family-class
immigrants and economic immigrants, in which case the former were marginalized
while the latter were positioned as insiders to the Canadian nation. In some instances, an
ill-defined distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ immigrants was evident while, in other
instances, ‘immigrant’ or Canadian status was unclear, resulting in, for instance, a
marginalization of defaulting family-class sponsors, or a ‘folk’ construction of visible
minorities as immigrants.
In all of these instances, interpretations of democratic racism would be hinged
on the assumption that immigrants were conceptualized exclusively in terms of ‘race.’
Yet, in cases where this type of ‘Othering’ occurred in the discourse analyzed, it often
was not clearly reducible to ‘race,’ nor could it necessarily be interpreted as racist per
se. In the case of family-class immigrants, for instance, the framework of democratic
racism would suggest that the widespread problematization of this group is evidence of
racism. Yet, the extent to which this is the case is not entirely clear, given the complex
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intersections between bureaucratic category of admission, gender, ‘race,’ social class,
and even age. In this regard, the present analysis provided an empirical confirmation of
Satzewich’s (1998) suggestion that democratic racism is perhaps too broadly
conceptualized, in light of its assumption that all expressions of racialization are
necessarily racist. In Satzewich’s (1998b) example, “it is difficult to see why critics of
employment equity and supporters of the federal government’s policy of
multiculturalism should necessarily be labeled as democratic racists” (p.38). The
present analysis upholds this conclusion by illustrating that democratic discourses of
dominance do not, in all instances, seem to revolve around ‘race,’ but, rather, are deeply
embedded in complex and multi-dimensional conceptualizations of immigrants. To this
end, the present chapter suggests that, in contexts where references to ‘race’ are obscure
to the point of being highly evasive or ‘invisible,’ the extent to which they should be
labeled ‘racist’ is questionable; labeling them as such may thus serve to construct
(rather than simply identify) racism.
Overall, the present chapter uncovered both the usefulness and the limitations of
the democratic racism framework. In support of this framework, the discourses of
dominance uncovered in the analysis served to erase internal divisions, conflicts, and
inequalities within Canadian society, and acted to obscure racial discrimination at
Canadian borders in both historical and contemporary contexts. At the same time,
however, the constraints of the framework, including its focus on race in isolation from
other highly pertinent dimensions of discrimination (e.g., gender), and the tendency to
locate democratic racism in discourses that are at times ‘invisible’ in their allusion to
‘race,’ is somewhat problematic. To this end, the present chapter highlights the ongoing
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challenge associated with the concepts of ‘race’ and ‘racism’ in sociological research,
particularly in the context of Canadian immigration. The upcoming chapter indirectly
addresses this issue by calling attention to the statistical measurement of immigrants in
Canada.

207
CHAPTER SIX: STATISTICAL MEASUREMENT AS DISCOURSE
“Statistics are to bodies and social types what maps are
to territories: they flatten and enclose” (Appadurai, 1993:
333-4).
6.0 Introduction
In 20 years, nearly half (46%) of Canadians over the age of 15 will be
born somewhere else in the world, or have at least one foreign-born
parent, according to new Statistics Canada diversity projections released
this morning (Vallis, 2010, March 9).
A new report from Statistics Canada reveals that…in 1991, only 12 per
cent of established male immigrants with a university degree were in
jobs that required little education, such as taxi or truck driving. In 2006,
that number had risen to 21 per cent. The trend among established
degree-holding female immigrants was similar (Weeks, 2009, December
23).
Newcomer Numbers: 44%: Proportion of GTA residents born in another
country. 43%: Proportion of newcomers to Canada since 1985 who have
settled in the Toronto area. 100-plus: Languages and dialects spoken in
Toronto. 252,000: New immigrants to Canada in 2009. 23,000: Refugees
arrived in 2009. Source: Statistics Canada (Doolittle, 2010, August 18).
These excerpts from media reports on immigration demonstrate that official data
occupy a distinct presence in Canadian immigration discourses. Politicians, the media,
and various experts commonly present ‘newcomer numbers’ to debate the merits and
costs of immigration to the Canadian nation. Through these discourses, immigration
data enter the public consciousness and inform Canadians about the ‘face’ of their
nation. Statistics from official sources hold weight in public and political debates and
planning. They can provide the basis for legitimizing policy continuation or,
alternatively, policy change. They can also be used by advocacy groups to lobby for
funding or programming. In short – there is power in numbers.
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In principle, the objectivity of official measures used to produce statistical
knowledge ensures accurate understandings of population groups, suitable program
development, and appropriate distribution of public resources. However, official data
collection occurs within social, political and normative contexts that shape the impetus
for data collection, the nature of the data collected, the measures used to collect data,
and the fashion in which data are interpreted and used (see Bélanger et al., 2010; Boyd
& Norris, 2001; Curtis, 2002; 1994; Kertzer & Arel, 2002a; King-O’Riain, 2007;
Nobles, 2002, 2000; Rallu et al., 2006). Existing work has documented the manner in
which immigration and ethnic diversity in Canada have generated political and social
demands for particular data (e.g., on visible minorities) (Boyd et al., 2000;
Goldscheider, 2002). Yet, the manner in which official measurement constructs
‘immigrants,’ as types of people with particular social locations in the Canadian
imagined community, has not been addressed, despite the theoretical and practical
relevance of such an analysis.
To this end, the present chapter reports results of a critical discourse analysis of
the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC) questionnaire and analytical
reports. An examination of the LSIC stands to elucidate in detail the bureaucratic
construction of immigrants in Canada. The LSIC is the only official survey in Canada
that provides a focused examination of recent immigrants in Canada; as such, it is likely
to contribute widely to the manner in which immigrants in Canada are statistically
constructed and understood in a wide variety of contexts. Moreover, the content of the
LSIC questionnaire can be viewed as evidence of the issues that have been identified as
being most relevant to study from the standpoint of officials and experts. Examining the
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questions asked, the manner in which they were asked, and the questions not asked
allows for a consideration of the ideological influences shaping data collection. An
analysis of LSIC materials can thus be revealing of the Canadian state’s imagining of
Canada’s national community by highlighting the manner in which recent newcomers
are socially constructed by official measurement.
The chapter argues that the LSIC reflects concerns and tensions surrounding the
presence of immigrants from non-traditional source countries in Canada. The
questionnaire constructs these immigrants’ identities in accordance with the broader
public and political discourses on immigration in Canada. The chapter illustrates that
the LSIC contributes to the social construction of recent immigrants’ identities by
measuring them first, as ethnic beings, and second, as their bureaucratic categories of
admission. These identities are clearly located within an individualistic, ‘genderneutral’ human capital framework that mirrors Canadian immigration policy and policy
discourse. The LSIC thus informs the construction of Canada’s imagined community
along the lines of ethnicity and mode of entry to the end of upholding prevailing
dominant understandings of immigrants in broader academic, policy, and public
environments.
This chapter’s analysis is informed by two major bodies of scholarly work. The
first pertains to census-taking and the political project of official data collection. The
second body of work relates to critical examinations of migrant typologies. These
literatures are, to a large degree, distinct; indeed, critiques of migrant typologies are
often not articulated in reference to the issue of measurement. However, as the
upcoming discussion illustrates, measurement and typological constructions of
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immigrants are actually quite intertwined. The present chapter articulates this
connection and draws together these literatures by locating them within the theoretical
context of imagined communities and imagined futures.

6.1 Population Measurement
Much of the existing work on the ‘political project’ of measuring population groups has
focused on censuses. Numerous authors have argued that censuses played a central role
in historical nation-building (Alonso & Starr, 1987; Anderson, 2006; Appadurai, 1993;
Boyd et al., 2000; Clark, 1998; Curtis, 2002, 1995, 1994; Dunae, 1998; Nobles, 2000;
Urla, 1993). In this literature, census-taking is interpreted as having been directly
involved in defining national communities by allowing states to meticulously “count the
objects of [their] feverish imagining” (Anderson, 2006: 169). Both Curtis (2002) and
Anderson (2006) view censuses as a means by which states historically solidified their
own existence, enabling them to define both their catchment area and their constituents.
According to Curtis, the census also enabled the Canadian modern state to “translate
visions of social relations in Canada into authoritative numerical accounts” (Curtis,
2002: 17). In a vastly different context – namely, colonial states in Southeast Asia –
Anderson (2006) similarly comments on the role of the census in states’ social
imagining. Anderson points out that precolonial population measurement involved
enumeration of specific segments of populations in the form of tax-rolls and levy-lists.
This served to document population members who were eligible for taxation and
military conscription. However, under colonialism, states developed increasingly
sophisticated means of enumerating entire populations under their domain, including
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previously ignored population members such as women and children. Given the nature
of colonial rule in Southeast Asia, ethnic-racial classification was central to colonial
states’ efforts to numerically capture populations. As Anderson (2006) explains:
The new demographic topography put down deep social and institutional
roots as the colonial state multiplied its size and functions. Guided by its
imagined map it organized the new educational, juridical, public-health,
police, and immigration bureaucracies it was building on the principle of
ethno-racial hierarchies… (p.169).
In this context, population measurement was directly implicated in the state’s efforts to
build a nation’s infrastructure, yet was also central to the bureaucratic construction of
imagined communities along ethno-racial lines.
Other work has more pointedly addressed the central issue of measuring race
and ethnicity in official contexts. It is relevant to note that, while this work has not
typically been directly focused on immigration, it indirectly speaks to immigration, in
the sense that interest in data on race and ethnicity historically arose with the merging
of ‘different’ population groups. Boyd et al. (2000), for instance, demonstrate that early
census-taking in North America was infused with motivations relating to nationbuilding. In this context, documenting racial hierarchies was tied into efforts to define
the boundaries of states’ domination. In the early 20th century, for example, Canadian
Censuses included explicit questions about ‘race’ and ‘racial origin,’ and also provided
enumerators with express instructions on how to categorize respondents accordingly
(Boyd et al., 2000). For instance, measurement was structured such that offspring of
ethnically mixed marriages (that is, between ‘whites’ and ‘other races’) were
documented as ‘non-white.’ This classification subsequently excluded them from
official privileges associated with ‘whiteness’ (Boyd et al., 2000). Official data were

212
thus implicated in historically constructing Canada’s national community in both
material and symbolic terms by reifying boundaries that “…derived from and
reaffirmed prevailing ideologies in which white was superior and dominant in relation
to other non-white groups” (Boyd et al., 2000: 40).
Boyd et al. (2000) further demonstrate that variations in the official
measurement of race over time in Canada reflect changing conceptualizations of race
and race relations. For instance, the declining acceptability of ‘racial’ questions in the
mid-20th century led to shifts in the manner in which race was operationalized in official
surveys. In 1951, the notion of ‘ethnic origin’ replaced official survey questions on
‘race’ in Canada (Boyd, 1999). Issues surrounding race and race relations shaped not
only the manner in which questions were asked, but also the demand for certain data.
For example, in the later decades of the 20th century in Canada, concerns over racism
and equality brought about unique data needs that influenced both the impetus for data
collection as well as the nature of data collected in official surveys. Canada’s
multiculturalism policy in 1971, the enactment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in
1982, and the implementation of the Employment Equity Act in 1986 all represented
specific political projects that required data in order to implement and evaluate their
mandate. These social concerns and administrative needs led to modifications of
population measurement. Demands for data on visible minorities, for instance, led to the
inclusion of a visible minority question on the Canadian Census for the first time in
1996. Again, these changes illustrate that questions asked and response options
provided on official surveys are shaped by broader social and political understandings
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of social groups and their membership in society, as well as broader political pressures
for particular data.
Research on official surveys other than censuses has also documented the
manner in which ideological assumptions shape measurement of population groups. For
instance, in a critical examination of national surveys on foreign spouses in Taiwan and
South Korea, Bélanger et al. (2010) contend that ideological influences and prevailing
stereotypes influenced the production of statistics on migrants by shaping the
assumptions underlying questionnaire construction. Bélanger et al. argue that the
surveys demonstrate three ideologies: (1) a desire to ‘erase’ differences and assimilate
migrant women into Taiwanese or Korean society; (2) the location of these women in
patriarchal families; and (3) a nationalistic attitude that positioned foreign spouses as
inferior ‘others.’ These ideologies meant that immigrant women were first and foremost
constructed as foreigners married to Taiwanese or Korean men. The questionnaire also
implicitly and paternalistically constructed foreign brides as a potentially vulnerable
group of women in need of help. Bélanger et al. (2010) further conclude that these
official measures aimed to some extent at controlling immigrant spouses, in the sense
that the surveys implied an interest in assimilation, yet may also reinforce exclusion and
stereotypes by painting immigrant spouses in specific lights.
As the above literature demonstrates, official data collection is inherently
political, and occurs within broader social and ideological contexts that define the
phenomena that are relevant to measure, how these phenomena are understood, and, by
extension, how they are approached in survey construction and data collection. The
above review, however, also hints at the inherent categorization entailed in the
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measurement of population groups. Generation of statistics from both census and noncensus instruments necessarily entails grouping of cases. It follows that, in data analysis
and interpretation, individuals are located within particular groups – for instance,
according to gender, ‘race’/ethnicity, occupation, immigration status, etc. By
constructing statistical boundaries around categories, individuals are, in essence, located
within a series of typologies that, taken together, circumscribe the reality of their lives.
In the context of official measurement, individuals’ location within a typology also
stands to render them an object of public policy (see Schneider & Ingram, 1993),
thereby directly affecting their positioning to the state and to other groups in society. In
this regard, official measurement is implicated in defining group boundaries (often to
exclusionary ends), shaping access to resources and rights, influencing identity
formation, and affecting broader views about different social groups (Abramson, 2002;
Alonso & Starr, 1987; Blum, 2002; Curtis, 2002, 1994; Kertzer & Arel, 2002b). To this
end, it is relevant to address existing work criticizing the tendency to locate immigrants
in mutually exclusive categories, in light of the fact that measurement both depends on
conceptualizations of such categorizations, and is also implicated in upholding these
categorizations.

6.2 Constructing Immigrants: Problematic Dichotomies
One of the main categorizations of immigrants that has been addressed in the literature
speaks directly to the gendered construction of women immigrants – namely, the ‘wife’
or ‘worker’ dichotomy. This dichotomy, which is pervasive in both research and policy
contexts, has been problematized by Piper (2003) and Piper and Roces (2003). As Piper
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(2003) explains in reference to South East and East Asian women migrants, “scholars
concerned with women’s migratory patterns typically discuss women as either migrants
for marriage or as overseas contract workers … (i.e. the woman as worker or as
‘bride’)” (Piper, 2003: 458). As a result of a mutually exclusive conceptualization of
women migrants as either economic migrants or family migrants, these women’s
multiple roles as workers, spouses, parents, and, more broadly, society members and
potential future citizens, are obscured. Indeed, the tendency to study women as either
‘workers’ or ‘wives’ misrepresents complex migratory pathways wherein these
analytical categories are, in reality, blurred, variable, and fluid (see Piper & Roces,
2003).
Another migrant categorization that has been problematized involves the
distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ status. Goldring et al. (2009) point out that
binary conceptualizations of migrant legality do not reflect the reality of migrants’
various legal statuses. As an alternative, the authors introduce the concept of
precariousness to capture a continuum of migrant legality, and to document the
connections between precarious status and citizenship. Goldring et al. (2009) illustrate
the value of a non-dichotomous approach by documenting the numerous possible
pathways toward precariousness. The authors demonstrate that, in Canada, migrant
precariousness is legally produced through temporary foreign worker programs or loss
of status. Temporary foreign workers are, by definition, conferred precarious status by
the state in light of their limited access to social programs and their pre-determined
restriction from future citizenship. Moreover, their legal status is directly tied to their
relationship with an employer; if this relationship is terminated, the migrant risks loss of
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legal status. Permanent residents are also not exempt from precariousness. Legal
residents can lose their status under certain circumstances, such as if they are convicted
of a criminal offense, or if they fail to remain in Canada for the duration required to
meet residency requirements. Refugee claims made from within the country entail a
lengthy determination process. Throughout this process, claimants can find themselves
in various states of precariousness that can either lead to permanent status or formal
designation of non-status. Overall, as Goldring et al.’s (2009) work demonstrates,
immigrants can occupy a range of social locations that fall along a continuum of
legality. These varying gradations of immigrant status confirm the inaccuracy of a
simplistic, binary conceptualization of migrant legality.
Although not expressly articulated in the above work, it can be argued that
official measurement is intimately implicated in upholding distinctions between ‘wives’
and ‘workers,’ and between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ migrants. Immigrants typically enter
their destination country under a certain ‘immigrant’ designation (e.g., temporary
foreign worker, economic-class permanent resident, family-class permanent resident,
etc.). Insofar as official data are collected according to these bureaucratic categories and
are subsequently used in scholarly research, then immigrants stand to be continually
reconstructed within the boundaries of the categories for which data were collected.
Thus, taking as an example the ‘foreign brides’ surveys discussed by Bélanger et al.
(2010), by virtue of the fact that these women entered their country of destination with
the designation of ‘foreign bride,’ the subsequent collection and analytical use of data
on this group maintains this categorization. In this example, women’s categorization as
‘wives’ (as opposed to workers, even if they are, in fact, employed) was also linked to
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ethnic measurement, leading to their dual construction as wives and foreigners. In
reference to Goldring et al.’s (2009) work, the authors illustrate the inaccuracies
associated with dichotomous conceptualizations of migrant legality, as discussed above.
Yet, they also note:
There are no efforts to collect large-scale systematic data about people
with confusing or no migratory status…Estimates of the number of
people without an authorized migratory status in Canada range from
200,000 to 500,000. This range reflects the problem of defining the
population in question and the absence of systematic empirical analyses
of ‘the numbers’ by academics, government, or NGOs (Goldring et al.,
2009: 242).
As this statement indicates, collection of official data is typically limited to immigrants
with official legal status. By extension, statistical analyses conducted by state
departments, academics, or other experts on the basis of these data will maintain the
legal/illegal distinction. This conclusion speaks to the link between official data
collection and subsequent considerations of migrants.
These two examples shed light on the manner in which official measurement
contributes to the social construction of immigrants, both in an immediate sense (i.e., in
terms of conceptualization and operationalization) and in a broader sense (in terms of
the manner in which these categorizations are deployed through use of the resulting
data). Insofar as data – and the associated representations of immigrants – enter into the
public and political sphere, they become implicated in the construction of imagined
communities and the positioning of immigrants within the national imagination. To this
end, the present chapter explores the intertwining of official measurement and migrant
categorization in the construction of Canada’s imagined community. The chapter
specifically examines the LSIC questionnaire and data reports to evaluate the
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representations of immigrants that are embedded in official measurement, and to
consider how these representations are circumscribed in categorical terms relating to
gender, ‘race’/ethnicity, and bureaucratic category of admission. In this way, the
chapter addresses how the social construction of immigrants through official
measurement contributes to the broader construction of Canada’s imagined community.

6.3 Data Sources
The upcoming analysis addresses both the LSIC questionnaire and Statistics Canada
analytical reports of the LSIC results. These two sources of data provide important
insight into the contemporary bureaucratic construction of immigrants in Canada
through statistical knowledge.

6.31 LSIC Questionnaire
The LSIC is dedicated to understanding Canada’s recent immigrant population, and, as
previously noted, is the only official Canadian survey having recent immigrants as its
target population. Conducted jointly by Statistics Canada and Citizenship and
Immigration Canada, the LSIC was developed in the interest of generating information
on immigrant adaptation, settlement, and integration. Although other official data
sources (including the Census) contain questions about immigration status, these
measures typically address basic demographic considerations (e.g., country of birth,
citizenship, landed immigrant status, year immigrated to Canada), and do not consider
the immigrant settlement experience. As such, the LSIC was conducted in order to fill
existing knowledge gaps on recent immigrants in Canada (Ruddick et al., 2005). The
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survey was officially implemented in order to provide detailed information on the
settlement process to “federal and provincial governments, immigrant settlement
assistance agencies, non-governmental organizations, and researchers” (Grondin, 2007:
46).
The LSIC is presented by Statistics Canada as “a comprehensive survey
designed to study how newly arrived immigrants adjust over time to living in Canada
[that will] provide a clear understanding of how the settlement process unfolds for new
arrivals” (Chui, 2003: 5). The survey was designed through a process of consultation
with federal departments and a committee of external researchers with expertise in
immigration. Wherever possible, questions were drawn from existing Statistics Canada
surveys in order to allow comparability between different population groups. A pilot
questionnaire was developed, and focus group testing was conducted. The pilot
questionnaire was implemented in the first wave of the survey. Based on these results
and in consultation with experts and federal departments, existing content was modified
and new content was added. It should be noted that the survey consisted of
predominantly closed-ended questions (although some questions allowed respondents to
select ‘other’ and specify an answer that was not included as a response option). The
present chapter specifically addresses the LSIC Wave 3 questionnaire. 40 A summary of
this questionnaire is provided in Appendix C.

40

As a longitudinal survey, the LSIC was performed in three waves, with the questionnaires from the
second two being modified slightly from the previous wave. All three questionnaire versions were
analyzed in advance of writing this chapter. Although there were changes across the different versions of
the questionnaire that may affect statistical comparability of longitudinal data, these changes were not
substantial from a sociological perspective. As such, the chapter discusses only the Wave 3 questionnaire.
This version is the most recent of all three, and presumably reflects the ‘best’ version of the questionnaire
from an official standpoint, having incorporated revisions of earlier waves. A summary of the changes
can be found in the LSIC Microdata User Guide, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/imdbbmdi/document/4422_D1_T1_V3-eng.pdf.
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6.32 LSIC Reports
Examining the Statistics Canada analytical reports associated with the LSIC adds
another level of understanding to the construction of immigrants through statistical
knowledge. The reports document statistical ‘realities’ about immigrants that are
commonly cited in broader discourses, as revealed in the opening pages of this chapter.
The reports examined in this chapter were typically authored by one or more analyst
employed at Statistics Canada, at times in collaboration with consultants from
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (see Appendix D). Although it might be tempting
to interpret the content of these reports as reflecting the interests and opinions of these
authors alone, the reports were developed within a state context, and, as such, likely
reflect a particular organizational logic (see Acker, 1990; Clegg & Dunkerley, 1980
regarding the notion of organizational logic). More important than this point, however,
is the fact that these reports were published under the auspices of the Canadian state.
The content of the reports thus enters the public domain as official, privileged
knowledge about immigrants (see van Dijk, 1993a, 1989, regarding the power of
discourse emerging from official sources; see also Chapter Two of this thesis).

6.4 Methods
The LSIC questionnaire and analytical reports were obtained from Statistics Canada’s
official website. In order to select relevant publications for analysis, substantive reports
on immigration were searched, including ones geared toward a general audience and
ones intended for scientific and policy-oriented audiences (e.g., research papers,
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technical papers). Publications were verified for use of LSIC data, and documents that
were exclusively based on the LSIC results were included in the present analysis.
The LSIC Wave 3 questionnaire and the selected analytical reports were content
analyzed. Major themes were identified and analyzed as a form of discourse, and were
interpreted within the conceptual framework of this thesis. Particular consideration was
given to the manner in which the questionnaire and statistical reports reflected and
informed categorical conceptualizations of immigrants, and the implications of these
categorizations for the symbolic positioning of immigrants relative to Canada’s
imagined community.

6.5 Results
6.51 Immigrant Identity: Ethnicity
The analysis revealed that ethnicity, particularly in reference to social networks,
occupied a central place in the LSIC. Indeed, the questionnaire contained numerous
questions about immigrants’ co-ethnic affiliations. Respondents were asked to quantify
how many of their connections in various social contexts involved individuals who
belonged to the same ‘ethnic or cultural group’ as them (with response options being
‘all of them,’ ‘most of them,’ ‘about half of them,’ ‘few of them,’ or ‘none of them’).
This question was asked in reference to: (1) new friends; (2) neighbours; (3) members
of community groups or organizations in which the respondent was involved; (4)
children’s school friends; (5) co-workers; (6) business partners; (7) employees; (8)
clients; and (9) business suppliers. If respondents reported obtaining employment
through a friend, they were asked whether this friend was from the same ethnic/cultural
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group as them. In some instances, they were asked to clarify how many of the
individuals in the groups listed above were also recent immigrants to Canada (with the
same response options as previously noted). In addition, respondents were asked about
the importance of their ethnic/cultural group membership as follows:
(1) How important is it to you that the people providing health care are of the same
ethnic or cultural group as you? [response options: very important; important;
not very important; not important at all]
(2) When you think of others in Canada from the same ethnic or cultural group as
yourself, how close would you say that you feel to them? [response options:
very close; close; not very close; not close at all]
(3) How important is it for you to maintain ties with others in Canada from the same
ethnic or cultural group as yourself? [response options: very important;
important; not very important; not important at all]
(4) How important is it for you to establish and maintain ties with others in Canada
who are not from the same ethnic or cultural group as yourself? [response
options: very important; important; not very important; not important at all]
(5) How important is it for you to carry on the values and traditions of your ethnic
or cultural group or your homeland? [response options: very important;
important; not very important; not important at all]
(6) How important is it for you that [selected child’s name] knows and carries on
the values and traditions of your ethnic or cultural group or your homeland?
[response options: very important; important; not very important; not important
at all]
(7) Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is not strong at all and 5 is very strong, how
strong is your sense of belonging to your ethnic or cultural group?
(8) Is [selected child’s name] currently studying the language or traditions of your
ethnic or cultural group or homeland at school or in special classes? [response
options: yes; no]
(9) Would you like to have [selected child’s name] study the language or traditions
of your ethnic or cultural group, or of your homeland? [response options: yes;
no]
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These questions define immigrants as ethnic beings, and identify ethnicity as a key
principle according to which immigrants structure their lives. It is notable that, in
question 3 above, respondents were asked about the importance of maintaining ties with
people in Canada who are of the same ethnic group as them, yet, in question 4, they
were asked about establishing and maintaining ties with people who are not from the
same ethnic group as them. The implication here is that immigrants’ initial ties in
Canada are expected to be with people of the same ethnicity.
As questions 8 and 9 above suggest, language also emerged in the LSIC
questionnaire as a means of constructing immigrants as ethnic beings. Indeed, many of
the previously outlined questions were directly repeated to address language (see Table
6.1).
Table 6.1: Examples of LSIC Language Questions
What language do you speak most often at home?
In what language [is/was] [selected child’s name] mainly taught at school?
In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with your business partner(s)?
In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with your employee(s)?
In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with your clients?
In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with your suppliers?
In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with the people you [work/worked] with?
In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with the clients of the company you
[are/were] working for?
In what language or languages [do/did] you speak with the suppliers [of the company you
are/were working for]?
How important is it to you that the people providing health care speak your language?
Does [selected child’s name] understand and speak the language of your homeland?
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How important is it for you that [selected child’s name] continues to understand and speak
the language of your homeland?
How important is it for you that [selected child’s name] learns to understand and speak the
language of your homeland?
How important is it to you that [selected child’s name] speaks English well? [repeated for
French]

These questions are indicative of interest in determining the degree of co-ethnic
affiliations, particularly in the context of economic exchanges (i.e., in a business
context), as well as retention of ethnic/cultural practices. In this regard, the LSIC
seemed geared toward collecting information about ethnic enclaves. As Li (2003c)
notes, ethnic enclaves are often constructed in political and public discourses as
potentially detrimental to the integration process, and as being at odds with mainstream
Canadian society. In this context, it is assumed that, insofar as ethnic enclaves “restrict
their members and shield them from alternative norms, values, and behaviours, they can
discourage immigrants from full participation in society and perpetuate segregation”
(Employment and Immigration Canada; cited in Li, 2003c: 8). Alternatively, although
evidence indicates that ethnic enclaves can have a detrimental impact on the economic
well-being of immigrants (Warman, 2007), they have also been interpreted as a resource
that promotes social cohesion (Qadeer & Kumar, 2006). Either way, the extensive
questions on ethnic affiliations serve to represent immigrants as ethnic beings, thereby
defining ethnicity as a foremost factor in immigrants’ lives.
Building on this point, the LSIC contained extensive questions about
immigrants’ competence in English and French and their intentions to improve their
language skills (see selected examples, Table 6.2).
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Table 6.2 Examples of LSIC Questions on English and French Language Skills 41
How well can you speak English? [also asked for French]
How easy is it for you to tell someone in English what your address is? [also asked for
French]
How easy is it for you to tell someone in English what you did before immigrating to
Canada? [also asked for French]
How easy is it for you to understand a message in English over the phone? [also asked for
French]
How easy is it for you to tell a doctor who speaks only English what the problem is? [also
asked for French]
How easy is it for you to ask someone who speaks only English to re-arrange a meeting
with you? [also asked for French]
How well can you write in English? [also asked for French]
How well can you read in English? [also asked for French]
Since your last interview, do you think that your English has improved? This includes
reading, speaking and/or writing English. [also asked for French]
Have you taken any steps to improve your English, other than English language training?
[also asked for French]
What steps have you taken to improve your English? [also asked for French]
How important it is for you to learn or improve your English? [also asked for French]
Since your last interview, have you tried to find information about English or French
language training?

What is most interesting about these questions is that they effectively reduced
communication to language skill. In this regard, language proficiency of immigrants

41

It should be noted that skip patterns are embedded in the LSIC. For instance, in reference to language
skills, if a respondent indicated that English was their native language and that they speak English most
often at home, they were not asked about English language training or their ability to use English in
different situations.
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who speak English or French stood as cultural competence, while integration was
equated with linguistic competence in basic exchanges.
The LSIC questionnaire also included a small number of questions about
discrimination, which further revealed heightened interest in the ethnic identity of the
LSIC population:
Now I would like to end this section by asking you a few questions about
discrimination. Discrimination may happen when people are perceived
as being different from others. Since your last interview, have you
experienced discrimination or been treated unfairly by others because of
your ethnicity, culture, race or skin colour, language or accent, or
religion? (Statistics Canada, 2005: 28).
If participants responded that they had experienced discrimination, they were asked to
specify which of the above factors (i.e., ethnicity, culture, race or skin colour, language
or accent, or religion) was the reason for this discrimination (with the ability to mark all
that applied, yet no option to specify ‘other’), along with the frequency with which they
had experienced discrimination, and the setting within which it had occurred (e.g., on
the street; in a store, bank or restaurant; at work; when looking for a place to live, etc.).
What is notable here is that the response options for experiences of discrimination were
exclusively constructed around the presumption of ‘racial’/ethnic difference. The
questions also reveal the primacy that was attributed to ethnic identity over other
dimensions of social existence; most notable, in this regard, was the absence of gender.
Gender was not an option in questions on discrimination, nor could respondents specify
another response option. Again, these findings both reflect assumptions about who
‘immigrants’ are, in the eyes of the state, and contribute to the broader construction of
immigrants as ‘ethnic’ foreigners in Canada.
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The construction of immigrants in terms of ethnicity and ethnic affiliations was
also visible in the LSIC reports:
One reason for the high proportion of co-ethnic friendships may be
because immigrants are more likely to carry on the traditions and values
of their ethnic or cultural group or their homeland with friends who are
of the same background (Ruddick et al., 2005: 85).
Most immigrants reported that their new friends were from the same
ethnic or cultural background. This may ease the integration process of
new immigrants while helping to maintain ethnic or cultural ties with
their homeland, which was also important to new immigrants. However,
meeting friends who are not co-ethnic may facilitate a better
understanding of local norms and establish local networks (Ruddick et
al., 2005: 89).
These statements dichotomize ‘Canadian’ values and traditions from ‘ethnic’ values and
traditions, positioning immigrants and non-immigrant ethnic groups in Canada on the
borders of the Canadian national community by suggesting that their ethnic status is at
odds with their ability to understand Canadian norms, and that their ethnic networks
segregate them from the Canadian population.
The implication that immigrant integration can be hindered by ethnic group
membership was visible elsewhere in the reports:
Examining new friends by ethnicity reveals variations in the extent to
which newcomers make friends within their own ethnic group. The
majority of East/Southeast and South Asians reported that all or most of
their new friends are co-ethnic (90% and 77%, respectively), followed by
58% of Eastern Europeans. This difference in social network
composition may affect the type and quantity of resources flowing
through newcomers’ social networks, and help explain differences in the
integration process by ethnicity (Ruddick et al., 2005: 85).
In Ruddick et al.’s (2005) interpretation of the statistics, networks composed of larger
numbers of ‘ethnic’ are presented as being less rich in the resources that will aid
newcomers’ integration into Canadian society. In other words, ‘ethnic’ friends were
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presented as maintaining the ‘foreignness’ of newcomers, and as hindering immigrants’
ability to become more like ‘Canadians.’ The implication here was that different groups
are inherently more equipped for success in Canadian society, based solely on their
‘ethnic’ status.
Concerns over ethnicity also surfaced implicitly in the LSIC questionnaire in the
form of questions about family sponsorship. These questions also revealed evidence of
the broader problematization of family-class immigrants in Canada (discussed in
previous chapters). Respondents were specifically asked the following questions
pertaining to their sponsorship experience and intentions:
(1) Do you currently live with your sponsor?
(2) In the past 12 months, how often have you seen or talked to your sponsor?
(3) Was your immigration sponsored by your current spouse/common-law partner?
(4) In the past 12 months, what kind of help has your sponsor given you? [response
options: financial; information; legal help; child care; basic needs; general
support; transportation; language help; find/look for work; emotional support;
other; no help from sponsor]
(5) Are you currently sponsoring or do you intend to sponsor anyone/anyone else to
come to Canada?
(6) Who are you currently sponsoring/do you intend to sponsor to come to Canada?

Respondents who had indicated in a previous LSIC interview that they had intended on
sponsoring a family member were also asked the following questions, as applicable:
(1) Did you sponsor or are you currently sponsoring your spouse/common-law partner
to come to Canada?
(2) Since your last interview, has your spouse/common-law partner immigrated to
Canada?
(3) Did you sponsor or are you currently sponsoring your children to come to
Canada?
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(4) Since your last interview, have your children immigrated to Canada?
(5) Did you sponsor or are you currently sponsoring your parents to come to Canada?
(6) Since your last interview, have your parents immigrated to Canada?
(7) Did you sponsor or are you currently sponsoring your grandparents to come to
Canada?
(8) Since your last interview, have your grandparents immigrated to Canada?

Interest in measuring sponsorship experiences and intentions is not politically neutral,
but can be linked to concerns over sponsorship default and the influx of ‘unskilled’
immigrants. Moreover, although the above questions regarding sponsorship do not
make any reference to ethnicity, concerns over the extended familialism of certain
ethnic groups have been historically entrenched in Canadian immigration discourse
(Daniel, 2005; Li, 2003c; Satzewich, 1993; Satzewich & Liodakis, 2007). As discussed
in Chapter Three, controversy surrounding the liberalization of family-class sponsorship
rights in the 1950s has often been interpreted as evidence of a discriminatory bias
against certain ethnic groups’ ‘unreasonable’ commitment to family. As Li (2003c)
notes: “Immigration discourse periodically dwells on the extended familialism of other
cultures as a challenge to managing the ‘unchosen’ family-class immigration” (p.7). In
this context, LSIC questions about sponsorship are arguably built around broader
concerns relating to the sponsorship of immigrants from non-traditional source
countries.

6.52 Immigrant Identity: Mode of Entry
The analysis revealed that, in the LSIC reports, immigrants’ mode of entry into Canada
was the primary way in which their lives were circumscribed. In other words, the
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avenue through which immigrants gained entry into Canada, either as an economic
immigrant, an accompanying spouse of an economic immigrant, a family-class
immigrant, or a refugee served as the primary basis according to which immigrants
were categorized through the presentation of statistics.
The construction of immigrant identity in terms of bureaucratic admission
category was accomplished in several ways. The first relates to the fact that the LSIC
explicitly gathered data on mode of entry (and, notably, is the only official data source
for which this information is available). As noted in one report: “the LSIC…contains
information regarding newcomers’ immigration category, an important variable for
understanding the issues and motivations of immigrants to Canada” (Grondin, 2007:
45). The manner in which information about immigrants’ mode of entry was presented
in the reports further informed the social construction of immigrants in two main ways:
first, by virtue of the descriptions themselves, and, second, through the subsequent
organization of data according to these categories.
Each report began by clearly defining the objectives of Canada’s immigration
program and the different types of immigrants corresponding to these goals. These
portions of the reports all articulated some version of the fact that Canadian
immigration policy is constructed around three broad goals: to foster a strong and viable
economy, to reunite families, and to honour the country’s commitment to humanitarian
efforts. These three objectives were then linked to their corresponding immigrant type
and the manner in which these immigrants are selected (namely, based on skills and
experience for skilled worker principal applicants in the economic class; other
economic criteria for business and investment immigrants; family relationships for
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spouses and dependents accompanying economic immigrants as well as for family-class
immigrants; or status as a refugee). These categories were typically described as
follows:
Skilled worker principal applicants are selected based on a number of
criteria including their education, language ability and employment
skills. These immigrants are deemed to be more likely to succeed in the
labour force and contribute to the Canadian economy (Chui & Tran,
2005: 3).
Immigrants admitted under the economic category are persons who have
actively sought to settle in Canada and have presumably prepared
themselves for the transition – some may have been recruited. They are
selected as individuals but may be accompanied by a spouse and
dependent(s) (Ruddick et al., 2005: 10).
In the economic class, spouses and dependent children are admitted
along with the principal applicants, without being individually skillstested (Grondin, 2007: 48).
The family reunification category is made up of individuals who are
joining family members already in Canada. Immigrants are sponsored by
a relative in Canada who is a Canadian citizen or permanent resident and
who has taken responsibility of providing support for their settlement
[…]. There are no selection criteria for immigrants admitted under this
category (Ruddick et al., 2005: 12).
The refugee category is made up of Convention refugees and other
refugee-like persons who are deemed to require protection or relief.
These persons may not have wanted to leave their country of origin, and
may not have had the opportunity to prepare for moving to Canada
(Ruddick et al., 2005: 12).
The sex distribution of these categories was typically also presented at this point in the
reports: in the LSIC sample, 77% of principal applicants in the economic class were
men, 75% of spouses of economic class immigrants were women, 63% of family-class
immigrants were women, and 51% of refugees were women). These categories were
subsequently used throughout the reports as the primary means of organizing and
presenting data. In this regard, it is notable that, when results were reported for the
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different immigrant groups, they were typically not disaggregated by sex for each
immigrant type. In the absence of this information for individual results, the sex
distribution of immigrant categories reported at the outset of the reports operated as a
way of discursively gendering the subsequent statistics.
In terms of the descriptions of specific groups of immigrants, economic
immigrants (and, most directly, skilled workers) were portrayed as active and skilled
individuals who are suitable for inclusion in the Canadian nation. They were presented
as having actively readied themselves for immigration to Canada, and as being likely to
contribute to the economy (particularly compared to other immigrant types); as noted in
Ruddick et al.’s (2005) statement above, some of these immigrants may have even been
recruited by the Canadian government or employers for their abilities and their expected
contribution to the nation. This representation portrays economic immigrants as
desirable and contributing future citizens of Canada, and as necessarily more likely to
succeed in Canadian society compared to other types of immigrants. Having already
presented skilled workers as predominantly males (77%), this group was subsequently
statistically constructed as male, such that ‘successful’ immigrants were presented as
being men.
The manner in which skilled economic immigrants were described in the reports
contrasts sharply with the manner in which skilled worker spouses (and dependents) and
family-class immigrants were presented. Descriptions of spouses (and dependents) of
skilled worker principal applicants emphasized the fact that these newcomers were
‘self-selected’ as opposed to having been selected by ‘Canada.’ While the reports
emphasized the fact that principal applicants are selected for their skills and therefore
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their ability to contribute to Canada, it is made equally clear that spouses of these
applicants are granted entry as ‘followers.’ The dependent status of these spouses was
portrayed through the organization of statistics for this group throughout the remainder
of the reports. In all cases where statistics were presented for spouses of skilled worker
principal applicants, the data were reported together for ‘spouses and dependents’ of
skilled worker principal applicants (with results for principal applicants reported as a
separate category). This automatic categorization of economic-class spouses with their
dependent children is seen here as a very meaningful component of the construction of
immigrant women through official measurement. Having already statistically identified
principal applicants as male and their spouses and dependents as female, presenting
statistics according to these divisions established gendered representations of male
breadwinners on the one hand, and ‘women and children’ on the other. Although all of
these immigrants (principal applicants, spouses, and dependents) technically fall within
the economic class, they were never measured or interpreted on equal ground. More
specifically, statistics were never presented separately for spouses and dependents, nor
were results ever presented together for principal applicants and their spouses. Also
meaningful is the grouping together of spouses and dependents of skilled workers as a
single, distinct category; this infantilized women and constructed them as passive
dependents, more on parallel ground with children than with their skilled worker
spouse. The grouping of spouses and dependents together thus contributed to the
construction of spouses as unskilled women that are dependent on their (principal
applicant) husbands/partners.
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Furthermore, while it is true that spouses of economic-class principal applicants
are not granted entry based on skills testing of their own abilities, they are often highly
educated, and their skill-level is taken into account in the evaluation of principal
applicants. Under the point system, principal applicants are awarded points for their
spouse’s education level (under the Adaptability factor). 42 It other words, spouses’
formal education contributes directly to the selection of skilled worker principal
applicants and professionals. This fact, however, is not mentioned in a single LSIC
report analyzed here. The exclusion of this information ties into the social construction
of skilled workers’ spouses as passive (female) dependents by denying their role in the
success of their partner’s application.
Descriptions of family-class immigrants also stood in clear contrast to the
portrayal of economic immigrants as active, contributing newcomers. As described
above, family-class immigrants were presented as passive, unskilled immigrants who
were self-selected (i.e., not selected by ‘Canada’) and who were being taken care of by
their family in Canada. Nowhere in the reports was it mentioned that only specific types
of relatives are eligible for entry under the family-class (see Chapters One and Three),
nor was it noted that these immigrants must pass health and security screening prior to
being granted entry to the country, thereby inaccurately representing family-class
immigration as largely uncontrolled and unregulated. Moreover, the presence of family
members is widely acknowledged as playing an important role in immigrant settlement
(Boyd, 1991, 1989; Creese et al., 2008; Omidvar & Richmond, 2003; Satzewich, 1993;

42

See http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/factor-adaptability.asp.
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Stewart, 2006; VanderPlaat et al., 2009; Walton-Roberts, 2004b, 2003), a point that will
be discussed later in this chapter.
It is also relevant to note that the reports typically discussed data in a
comparative fashion across immigrant types. This structure of data presentation reified
these labels as a meaningful way of identifying immigrants, and naturalized these
groupings as the most legitimate way of evaluating newcomer success. Having already
described the features of these groups in terms of their mode of entry in the immigration
program, the reiteration of these categories throughout the reports and the use of these
categories to organize statistical knowledge served to construct immigrant types as
having concrete group boundaries. These categorizations thus homogenized immigrants
within the groups, erasing internal differences of immigrants within these categories. In
this way, immigration mode of entry was presumed to speak directly to immigrants’
situations and personal characteristics. Overall, statistical categorization within these
groups reduced immigrants’ lives to the objectives of the immigration program, and
oversimplified the complexity of immigration pathways and the multi-dimensionality of
immigrants’ motivations and experiences.
It should also be noted that statistics were not always presented for all groups of
immigrants. The reports typically presented statistics for family-class immigrants;
refugees; skilled worker principal applicants; skilled worker spouses and dependents;
and ‘other’ economic immigrants (i.e., business and investor immigrants; live-incaregivers; provincial and territorial nominees). Disaggregated statistics were not
presented for ‘other’ economic immigrants in light of the fact that this group, together,
represented only 10% of principal applicants in the economic component of the LSIC
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sample (i.e., skilled workers represented 90% of economic-class principal applicants)
(Ruddick, 2005). Although this decision was based on methodological constraints of
statistical analysis, it nevertheless served to render the settlement experiences of certain
immigrants invisible.
Overall, by organizing statistical data according to mode of entry
categorizations, these groupings were reified and transformed into identifiable and
veritable social types; in this way, intra-group variations in experiences were
homogenized through statistical aggregation, and immigrants’ experiences were
constructed as being exclusively a function of their mode of entry category. More
broadly, the categorization of data according to mode of entry is likely to be reiterated
in subsequent references to LSIC data (e.g., in the media, or in research reports). In this
way, the bureaucratic categorization of immigrants is likely to carry beyond the pages
of the Statistics Canada reports, thereby contributing to broader representations of
immigrants according to their mode of entry.

6.53 Immigrants and Economic Considerations: An Individualistic Focus
The analysis also revealed that the LSIC and its accompanying reports had an
individualistic, human capital focus, with an emphasis on individual immigrants as the
unit of analysis, and heightened attention to the economic dimensions of immigrants’
lives. This finding suggests that the LSIC was influenced by broader neo-liberal
discourses on immigrant self-sufficiency, and by the immigration program’s human
capital focus.
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In terms of human capital, education and language skills represented
approximately 16% (79 questions) and 14% (69 questions) of all LSIC questions,
respectively. Examples of questions about education and training included:
(1) What is the highest level of formal education you attained outside Canada?
(2) What was your major field of study or specialization for your highest level of
education attained outside Canada?
(3) What was the language of instruction of your highest level of education
attained outside of Canada?
(4) Since your last interview, have you taken any education or training in Canada,
excluding language instruction?
(5) Since your last interview, have you taken or are you presently taking any
other/any English language training? [also asked for French]
(6) Do you plan to take (other) English language training in the future? [also
asked for French]
(7) Do you think you will start taking this English language training…? [response
options: within the next month; within the next 6 months; within the next year;
within the next two years; in two years or more. Also asked for French.]
(8) Since your last interview, have you had any problems or difficulties in getting
English or French language training?
(9) Including all courses or training you have taken, what is the highest level of
formal education you attained in Canada?
(10) Since your arrival, have you obtained a license or certification to practice
[your] profession or trade or to use the professional or trade title in your
province?
Considerations of economic integration, in the form of questions about employment and
income, represented an additional 21% and 13% of the 495 substantive LSIC questions,
respectively (see Table 6.3 for examples of questions).
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Table 6.3 Examples of LSIC Employment and Income Questions
When did you start working for [employer name]?
How did you find this job?
What kind of work do you do in this job?
Since your last interview, have you worked for any other job or business?
Is/was this job related to any education or training you were taking or are currently taking?
In [your] job, would you say your qualifications and skills are being…? [response options:
adequately used; underused]
How many hours per week do/did you usually work in this job/business?
In this job, what is your wage or salary before taxes or other deductions?
Since your last interview, have you been out of work for seven or more consecutive days?
At any time since your last interview, did you look for work?
Since your last interview, have you had any problems or difficulties in finding a job in
Canada?
Is your common-law partner/spouse working?
How much have you/you and your family received from all jobs within Canada? This is
before taxes and deductions. Include commissions, tips, and bonuses.
How much have you/you and your family received from all jobs outside Canada? This is
before taxes and deductions. Include commissions, tips, and bonuses.
Could you give me an estimate of your total personal income before taxes and deductions
from all sources inside and outside Canada in the last 12 months?
In the past 12 months, what was your main source of personal income?
How would you describe your present financial situation? Would you say that you…
[response options: have more than enough money to meet your basic needs; have just enough
money for your basic needs; do not have enough money to meet your basic needs]

Overall, of the 495 questions of substantive content (that is, excluding demographic
questions and interview ‘entry’ and ‘exit’ questions – see Appendix C), approximately
64% of the survey addressed topics that are directly linked to considerations of human
capital and/or economic integration (that is, education, employment, and language
skills).
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Not surprisingly, the LSIC’s emphasis on human capital and economic
integration was mirrored in the LSIC statistical reports. Of the seven analytical reports
considered here, three (Chui & Tran, 2005; Grondin, 2007; Tran & Chui, 2006) were
fully concerned with the labour market involvement of immigrants. The remaining
reports considered other topics, but nevertheless still dedicated much of their analyses
to matters of employment and economic integration. Table 6.4 offers a summary of the
topics included in each report.

Table 6.4 Summary of LSIC Reports
Report

Main Topics
- what immigrants like and dislike about
Canada
- reasons for immigrating and for staying
- quality of life and material well-being
after arrival

Immigrants’ Perspectives on their First Four
Years in Canada: Highlights from three waves
of the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to
Canada (Schellenberg & Maheux, 2007)

- quality of life and material well-being
after being in Canada four years
- challenges in the labour market
- types of obstacles immigrants
experiences when seeking employment
- barriers to employment
- accessing language training
- finding housing
- accessing health care
- assessments of life in Canada
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Report

Main Topics
- ability to speak English/French
- perceived importance of improving
ability to speak English/French
- language training
- means used to improve language skills

Knowledge of Official Languages Among New
Immigrants: How Important is it in the Labour
Market? (Grondin, 2007)

- employment rates
- job changes
- link between knowledge of
English/French and type of job held
(included analysis of proportions of
immigrants with: a high-skill job, a job in
intended field, a job similar to job held
before immigrating, a job related to
training, average hourly wage)
- reasons for choosing Canada
- choosing where to live
- adapting to a new linguistic environment
- health status
- use of health services
- problems accessing health care
- education
- training
- credential assessment

Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada:
A Portrait of Early Settlement Experiences
(Ruddick et al., 2005)

- employment (including employment
rates; labour market characteristics by age,
gender, official language knowledge, and
country of origin; labour force status and
hours worked; occupational
classifications; number of jobs held; job
satisfaction; reasons for leaving a job or
not working; problems finding
employment)
- financial status (including analysis of
savings; personal income levels;
employment earnings; loans obtained)
- settlement (including examination of
ethnic/cultural ties; satisfaction with life in
Canada; sponsorship intentions)
- challenges to integration (including
analysis of housing; accessing health care;
accessing education; accessing training;
finding employment)
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Report

Main Topics
- choice of destination
- housing

Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada:
Process, Progress and Prospects (Chui, 2003)

- health status and use of health services
- education
- training
- labour market entry
- employment rates within first two years
after arrival
- employment rates compared to Canadian
average

Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada:
Progress and Challenges of New Immigrants
in the Workforce (Chui & Tran, 2005)

- number of jobs held
- employment in intended occupations
- lack of Canadian work experience and
barriers to employment
- reasons for not working
- job satisfaction

Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada:
A Regional Perspective of the Labour Market
Experiences (Tran & Chui, 2006)

- labour market experiences (variables
included employment rates, employment
in intended occupations, problems
entering labour market, reasons for not
working, number of jobs held) for 11
regions in Canada (Atlantic Canada,
Québec, Montréal, Ontario, Toronto,
Ottawa-Gatineau, Manitoba and
Saskatchewan, Alberta, Calgary, British
Columbia, Vancouver)
- social capital

New Immigrants’ Assessments of their Life in
Canada (Houle & Schellenberg, 2010)

- material well-being in Canada
(considered in terms of employment,
income, and housing tenure)
- comparison of immigrants’ material
well-being in Canada compared with their
well-being country of origin

As this table suggests, the LSIC provided opportunities for an extremely detailed
consideration of immigrants’ human capital, along with the manner in which this human
capital was implicated in immigrants’ economic integration (in terms of employment,
labour market participation characteristics, and barriers to economic integration) and
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their broader material well-being in Canada. Evidently, these were not the only topics of
consideration in the reports, which also addressed topics such as health and health
service utilization, housing, satisfaction levels, and views about life in Canada.
Nevertheless, the reports are notable for their focus on individual-level variables
pertaining to economic integration and human capital. This focus is viewed as
meaningful here for three main reasons.
First, as suggested by the descriptions of the LSIC questionnaire and reports
provided throughout this chapter (see also Appendices C and D), the LSIC seems to
have been largely constructed around concerns pertaining to the integration of
immigrants from non-traditional immigration source countries. Indeed, the declining
economic performance of recent immigrants relative to previous cohorts is commonly
attributed to the shift in immigrant source countries (see Picot & Sweetman, 2005). It is
important to consider this point in reference to the previous chapters of this thesis.
Chapter Four illustrated the manner in which concerns over immigration from Asian
source countries manifested in media’s portrayals of marriage immigrants. Chapter Five
demonstrated that policy discourse was largely constructed around maintaining the
legitimacy of the state’s immigration program in the public eye. It is also important to
recall that various federal departments were involved in the development of the LSIC
questionnaire. From a public and political perspective, insofar as immigrants do not
meet the expectations laid out in the immigration program, the value of immigration to
the Canadian nation stands to be questioned; this, in turn, holds implications for public
support of state programs and policies. The LSIC and the associated analytical reports
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can thus be linked to state concerns pertaining to the success (or lack thereof) of
‘ethnic’ immigrants with respect to the objectives of the immigration program.
Second, insofar as the neo-liberal, individualistic focus of immigration policy is
reflected in the LSIC, then immigrants’ own views are, to some extent, obscured. In this
regard, it is interesting to actually consider some of the results offered by the LSIC:
LSIC respondents were also asked to identify which of the reasons cited
was the most important in their decision to stay in Canada […] Almost
80% cited one of four reasons – quality of life (32%), the desire to be
close to family and friends (20%), the future prospects for their family
(18%) and the peaceful nature of the country (9%)” (Schellenberg &
Maheux, 2007: 5).
Explicitly economic-related reasons were endorsed by comparatively lower proportions
of immigrants as their main reason for staying in Canada, with 3.1% citing job
opportunities, 0.3% citing Canada’s business climate/free market, and another 0.3%
citing salary/pay (Schellenberg & Maheux, 2007: 20). These statistics suggest that state
concerns do not necessarily mirror immigrants’ concerns. Thus, while the LSIC may
offer detailed self-report statistics on immigrants’ lives in Canada, immigrants’ own
interests and concerns were not necessarily reflected in the survey.
Third, the individualistic focus of the LSIC questionnaire and reports goes
against widespread evidence that the family unit is a central consideration throughout
all stages of the migration process, including integration. This point has been supported
by research in Canada (e.g., Boyd, 1991, 1989; Creese et al., 2008; Omidvar &
Richmond, 2003; Satzewich, 1993; Stewart, 2006; VanderPlaat et al., 2009; WaltonRoberts, 2004b, 2003) and beyond (Booth et al., 1997; Cobb-Clark, 2001; Khoo, 2003;
Khoo & Mak, 2000; Mak 1997; Ong, 1999). The individualistic focus of the LSIC also
ignores the fact that 71% of immigrants in the LSIC target population arrived with
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family members, with 42% of arriving as a family of two or more adults with children,
23% arriving as two or more adults without children, and 4% arriving as a single adult
with children. These statistics support the argument that the ‘autonomous immigrant’ is
largely a fiction (see Creese et al., 2008; Walton-Roberts, 2003). It follows that the
LSIC stands to miss out on the role of the household and various family members in
settlement and integration processes, despite the relevance of this information in both
material and theoretical contexts.
This latter point also ties into the previous discussion of migrant categorization.
Conceptual and methodological challenges associated with defining and measuring the
family as a unit of analysis contrasts sharply with the ease of measuring individual
immigrants, defined according to their mode of entry. Simplistic typologies of
individual immigrants (such as the typology provided by mode of entry) circumscribe
definable identities that can be directly addressed in statistical terms in both policy and
scholarly contexts. What these typologies miss, however, is an appreciation of the
multiplicity of roles within which immigrants are situated, and the fact that an imposed
categorization may not reflect immigrants’ views about themselves or their own lives.
In this way, despite its stated objective of understanding immigrants’ experiences, the
LSIC may, in fact, be missing out on how immigrants function as part of a family unit
within Canada.

6.6 Conclusion
The present chapter examined the LSIC questionnaire and its accompanying statistical
reports. The objective of this analysis was to demonstrate how official measurement can
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operate as a form of discourse that reflects broader social norms and interests, and that
acts to socially construct immigrants as ‘types’ of beings in the analytical imagining of
Canada’s national community. Overall, the findings suggest that immigrants’ identities
as ‘ethnic’ newcomers clearly shaped the development of the LSIC questionnaire. The
LSIC seems to have been designed not so much to examine the settlement of
immigrants per se, but to evaluate the degree to which new immigrants were
maintaining ethnic connections versus integrating into Canadian society. Overall,
immigrants’ identity as ethnic beings emerged as one of the foremost considerations
informing data collection. It follows that ethnicity stands to figure centrally in the social
imagining of the national community that results from the use of LSIC data in political,
scholarly, and public arenas.
Importantly, as numerous critical scholars have noted (Balibar & Wallerstein,
1991; Barker, 1981; Li, 2007, 2003c; 2001; Satzewich, 1998; Thobani, 2000a, 2000b;
2007; see also Chapter Five of this thesis), with the declining social acceptability of
explicitly ‘racial’ discourse, concepts such as ethnic and cultural difference have
become euphemisms for ‘race,’ particularly in the context of immigration. Linguistic
difference has also been identified as a means of circumscribing ethnic/cultural group
membership, and thus acting as a means of racialization (Arel, 2002; Gonick, 2000;
Hill, 2008; Leeman, 2004; Thobani, 2000b; Urciuoli, 1996). Applying this perspective
to the present analysis, it is possible to argue that the LSIC stands to racialize ‘ethnic’
immigrants and speakers of non-Canadian languages (i.e., English and French) by
portraying them as essentially different from Canadians, both in terms of their social
interactions and their values and traditions. Inherent in this construction of difference is
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marginalization of ‘ethnic’ immigrants with respect to Canada’s national community,
effected through subtle representations of barriers to full integration imposed by coethnic affiliations and the tendency to dichotomize ‘ethnic’ and ‘Canadian’ social
networks, norms, values and traditions. Insofar as these differences are objectified and
statistically reified by the LSIC, this survey can be interpreted as an instrument of
racialization.
Using mode of entry as the dominant way of organizing data in the LSIC reports
served to reify these categorizations, and statistically circumscribed immigrants within
their roles as workers, spouses, family members, or refugees. Although data according
to mode of entry may be important insofar as it informs settlement service planning, the
statistical focus on mode of entry also entails important implications. Indeed, these
categorizations and the presentation of selected statistical knowledge around immigrant
mode of entry are socially relevant, in part due to the perceived objectivity of mode of
entry categories and the supposed objectivity of statistical information. Statistical
knowledge stands to inform how groups of immigrants are perceived, evaluated, judged,
and treated in the eyes of policy-makers and society members. Furthermore,
categorization can be linked to identity formation, influencing how individuals come to
view the organization of society and their respective place, as a member of a particular
category, among other categories of peoples (Kertzer & Arel, 2002a). Newcomers
legally entering a foreign country literally become their category of entry. These
immigrants become further constituted as discursive formations through official
measurement, wherein they are statistically and thus politically and socially constructed
according to the dimensions that were selected for official measurement.
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It is also important to address the silences surrounding gender within the LSIC
and its associated reports. As discussed, the highly gendered nature of immigration at
all stages – from the decision to migrate, the migration journey, and settlement and
integration (see Boyd, 2006; Boyd & Greico, 2003; Pedraza, 1991) – was not
acknowledged in the LSIC. The structural dimensions of gender inequality and the
different challenges that men and women from different regions of the world are likely
to experience in Canadian society was completely absent in the questionnaire. In cases
where differences between men and women were addressed in the LSIC reports, gender
was reduced to sex, involving simple sex-disaggregation of statistics. Although this type
of consideration is an important starting point, it offers only a superficial understanding
of the differences between women and men immigrants, and downplays the centrality of
gender as a dominant organizing feature of social life.
In terms of other silences, as discussed in the results section, while the LSIC did
collect some information on social networks, it was largely silent on the issue of
household strategies or considerations of the family unit in the context of settlement and
adaptation. In this regard, the LSIC clearly reflects the neo-liberal focus of current
immigration policy. Creese et al.’s (2008) comments on the implications of a human
capital focus and the associated silence surrounding the family is particularly relevant
here:
The focus of immigration policy on human capital, an individualistic
concept, cannot adequately recognize the binding of a particular
immigrant within complex household relationships and resources…This
lack fails to fully acknowledge the complex but undeniable links
between economic and social life that carve out conditions under which
immigrants and refugees come to participate in the labour force, make
friends, raise children and ultimately become ‘Canadian’ in quite specific
ways (Creese et al., 2008: 272).
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Moreover, as discussed in the present chapter, focusing on human capital measures that
pertain most directly to the individual immigrant ties into simplistic typological
categorizations. It follows that the intersection between immigrants’ different social
roles within a family unit is dually obscured – first, through individual-level human
capital variables, and, second, through their location within a ‘mode of entry’ typology.
The human capital focus and neglect of the immigrant family speaks to the extent to
which family reunification is a subordinate objective of the immigration program.
More generally, the measurement of immigrants pertains directly to theoretical
understandings of Canada’s imagined community. As discussed in the early pages of
this chapter, the existing literature interprets censuses in terms of a state’s interest in
enumerating and defining the population under its control. In historical contexts,
census-taking represented a means of both material and symbolic nation-building. In
contrast, special surveys, such as the LSIC, are reflective of a perceived need to
understand and address particular social issues, yet similarly act to characterize the
population of interest in reference to national goals and concerns. Moreover, as
suggested by the opening quotes of the present chapter (see also van Dijk, 1995),
politicians and the media regularly use official data reports to support or refute
arguments relating to immigration policy. The knowledge gathered and presented in
official reports thus enters into the immigration debate, and stands to influence policy
agendas and public opinion. It follows that representations of immigrants surfacing in
public and political immigration discourses are influenced in part by the measures and
constructs underlying data collection. In this way, the categorization and measurement
of immigrants is tied into the discursive construction of Canada’s national imagined

249
community. Recognizing these interconnections is central both to critical scholarship
and to efforts aimed at understanding immigrants’ lives in Canadian society.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION
“Discourses have enormous power not only to represent social
groups but also to identify, regulate, and even construct social
groups – to establish who is ‘we’ and who is ‘other’ in the
imagined community of the nation-state” (Henry & Tator, 2002:
27).

7.0 Introduction
The overarching goal of this thesis was to examine the social construction of the
Canadian imagined community in direct relation to immigration discourse. In order to
accomplish this goal, three analyses of immigration discourses were conducted: one
pertaining to media, a second pertaining to CIC policy activities, and a third pertaining
to official statistical measurement. By taking a multi-faceted approach that addressed
various sites of discourse, the thesis uncovered subtleties, continuities, and
contradictions associated with constructing Canada’s imagined community in the global
era of contemporary immigration. In order to tie these results together, the present
chapter provides a brief summary of the findings in reference to the thesis’s research
questions. The thesis’ limitations and future research directions are subsequently
addressed. The chapter concludes with some final thoughts on immigration discourse in
Canada.

7.1 Summary and Discussion
The overarching research question guiding this thesis was: In an era of globalization
and widespread international immigration, how is the Canadian national community
imagined and discursively constructed in reference to immigration? In order to
elaborate on this query, the following specific research questions were articulated:
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(1) How do specific immigration discourses (media, policy, and measurement)
represent immigrants?
(2) How are family-class and economic immigrants differentially characterized and
represented in discourses?
(3) How are immigrants racialized and gendered in these representations?
(4) How might these various representations be put in service of the Canadian state?
(5) How do these representations operate to define the boundaries of Canada’s
national imagined community?
The present section briefly summarizes the thesis’s findings in relation to each of these
questions.
(1) How do specific immigration discourses (media, policy, and measurement)
represent immigrants?
Across discourses, the thesis revealed that discursive representations of immigrants
were about far more than just immigrants – rather, representations of immigrants also
served as a basis for socially constructing Canadians and the Canadian state in the
imagining of the Canadian nation. Media discourse focused most clearly on the Asian
contingent of marriage immigration, and revealed concern over the impact of
immigration from non-European source countries and the burden of non-economic
immigrants to the Canadian nation. In this context, marriage immigrants were largely
portrayed as undeserving frauds who take advantage of Canadians and the Canadian
immigration system. Asian-Canadians were ambiguously portrayed, inconsistently
labeled as immigrants and Canadians. ‘Canadians’ were portrayed as unwitting victims
of unscrupulous immigrant frauds, or, alternatively, as victims of an unreasonable state.
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For its part, the Canadian state was variably defined in direct relation to immigrants and
Canadians. The state was at times portrayed as having been ineffective in protecting
national borders, and, in other instances, as doing its best to keep dangerous immigrants
out of the country. The state was also often portrayed as imposing undue strain on
Canadians through the sponsorship program, either in terms of financial burden, or in
terms of the ‘red tape’ associated with spousal reunification. In this way, representations
of marriage immigrants in media discourse were inextricably intertwined with
representations of Canadians and the Canadian state.
For its part, policy discourse was shown to be operating directly in the interests
of state legitimacy. In this context, immigrants were variably represented so as to
document the ability of the state to support and maintain the integrity of the Canadian
nation. Ambiguous lines were often drawn between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ immigrants, with
would-be immigrants and newcomers being inconsistently defined as contributors to the
Canadians nation, as marginal members of Canadian society, or as outsiders that need to
remain beyond Canadian borders. These various representations of immigrants directly
served as a means for constructing the Canadian population and the Canadian state, both
of which were portrayed as sharing in the goal of welcoming ‘deserving’ or ‘good’
immigrants, and as being tolerant and accepting of ‘diverse’ immigrants with ‘different’
(i.e., non-Canadian) customs and traditions. The state was further portrayed as
protecting the nation’s physical and symbolic borders from ‘bad’ or ‘burdensome’
immigrants.
Of all three discourses, measurement discourse was the most subtle, yet
nevertheless revealed how immigration serves as a site for relationally defining

253
immigrants, Canadians, and the Canadian state as the three main contingents of the
Canadian nation. In this discourse, immigration category of admission and immigrants’
ethnic identity were foremost. Dichotomies between immigrants and Canadians were
established through questions that opposed immigrants’ ‘ethnic’ practices and traditions
from ‘Canadian’ practices and traditions. Underlying measurement discourse was the
neo-liberal agenda of the Canadian state, which served to define immigrants in
individualistic, human capital terms. The state thus defined itself in neo-liberal terms by
virtue of defining the objects of its inquiry relative to this agenda.
(2) How are family-class and economic immigrants differentially characterized and
represented in reference to the Canadian nation?
This research question was addressed in two different ways: first, through a reexamination of Canadian immigration history with an eye to the specific intersection
between family-based and economic immigration; and, second, through the examination
of the three immigration discourses.
The historical examination (Chapter Three) revealed that family-based
immigration and economic immigration have intersected in different ways over time. In
early post-Confederation immigration, the family served as the ideal unit of
immigration, being the centre of both economic production and social reproduction
(although, as discussed in Chapter Three, this was not uniform, with access to familybased immigration serving as a direct means of racializing and gendering belonging in
the Canadian nation). As the economic needs of the nation evolved, so too did the
relationship between economic and family-based immigration. Increasingly, the ideal
immigrant was conceptualized as a skilled resource; accordingly, immigrant families
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became less central to national development and increasingly problematized as a drain
on the nation. The analyses of contemporary immigration discourses elaborated on these
representations.
Across all discourses, economic immigrants were clearly portrayed as valuable
members of the Canadian national community, and were characterized
unproblematically as contributors to the nation. In the context of media and policy
discourse, this emerged through explicit references to economic immigrants’ status as
skilled members of the Canadian nation. In measurement discourse, affirmation of
economic immigrants’ desirability was implicit, conveyed through the individualistic,
economic focus of the LSIC and the underlying neo-liberal bias of measurement
discourse.
In contrast, family-class immigrants were often represented in direct opposition
to economic immigrants, or were otherwise marginalized relative to the Canadian
national community. Media discourse on marriage immigrants, for instance, explicitly
portrayed this group of immigrants as unskilled, fraudulent, and undeserving of
belonging in the Canadian nation. Moreover, media representations informed a
dichotomous construction of ‘good’ (economic) and ‘bad’ (marriage) immigrants that
clearly operated in gendered, racialized, and bureaucratic (i.e., category of admission)
terms. The highly individualistic, economic focus of measurement discourse was most
closely geared toward examining immigrant skill, language ability, and economic status
at the individual level. In this way, the importance of the immigrant family was denied,
and, by extension, family-class immigrants were marginalized as contributors to the
Canadian nation. In policy discourse, Canada’s acceptance of family-class immigration
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served as a rhetorical means for documenting the welcoming nature of the Canadian
population and the Canadian state. However, these immigrants were still portrayed as
dependents and potential burdens on the nation.
(3) How are immigrants racialized and gendered in these representations?
Of the three discourses considered in this thesis, media discourse most vividly gendered
and racialized immigrants. In media portrayals of marriage immigrants, Asian
immigrants were clearly constructed as racialized ‘Others’ whose practices and norms
are problematic and threatening to Canadian national identity. This racialization
extended to the Asian-Canadian population, and symbolically served to document the
threat that ‘immigrants’ from non-Asian countries pose to Canadian institutions and
values. The gendering of marriage immigrants emerged through representations of
female marriage immigrants as sexualized deviants and portrayals of male marriage
immigrants as criminals and terrorists.
The other discourses were comparatively subtle, reflecting the institutional
contexts within which these discourses were produced. Policy discourse racialized
immigrants by emphasizing the diversity of newcomers and the tolerance of the
Canadian population in welcoming newcomers, thereby constructing a racialized
dichotomy between ‘immigrants’ and ‘Canadians.’ The LSIC subtly racialized recent
immigrants by emphasizing immigrants’ ethnic interactions and documenting interest in
these immigrants’ preservation of their ethnic and cultural values and traditions versus
their acceptance of Canadian values and traditions. Considerations of gender were
largely absent from both policy discourse and measurement discourse, thereby
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operating to preserve existing gender biases in immigration by failing to acknowledge
them.
(4) How might these various representations be put in service of the Canadian
state?
Media discourse operated as a cautionary tale against ‘non-traditional’ and ‘overseas’
marriages wherein Canadians were warned to find love ‘at home.’ In this way, the
problematization of marriage immigrants can be seen as acting in direct service of the
Canadian state’s scrutiny of spousal sponsorship applications, justifying intrusive
measures against both immigrants and their Canadian sponsors in the name of
protecting the nation. Policy discourse similarly acted to legitimize the sponsorship
program and state activities more generally. By constructing a dichotomy of ‘good’ and
‘bad’ immigrants, policy discourse acted as assurance that the state takes all steps
necessary to ensure the best possible outcomes for Canada, Canadians, and deserving
immigrants. Here, immigration discourse was clearly not only about immigrants, but
was used to speak directly to the Canadian state’s ability to serve all stakeholders in an
era of globalization and international immigration. On the one hand, this involved
confirming Canada’s need for ‘good’ immigrants and providing assurance that these
newcomers will succeed in Canada and contribute to the nation. It also involved
demonstrating the state’s ability to safeguard the Canadian nation against would-be
frauds, criminals, or terrorists, as well as immigrants who might be a burden to the
economy (namely, family-class immigrants). For its part, the LSIC can be seen as
facilitating categorical evaluations of immigrants in reference to immigration admission
categories. The LSIC also operated in the interests of the state by measuring aspects of
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immigrants’ lives that are directly relevant to the state’s neo-liberal agenda, while
failing to consider aspects not on this agenda and neglecting to focus on what might
matter most to immigrants in the context of settlement and integration.
(5) How do these representations operate to define the boundaries of Canada’s
national imagined community?
Across all discourses, tension existed between the principles of multiculturalism and
tolerance in Canadian society and the changes attributed to immigration from nontraditional source countries. In media discourse on marriage immigration, the
boundaries of the Canadian nation were constructed so as to racialize and marginalize
marriage immigrants and Asian-Canadians to the Canadian national community while
being inclusive of ‘deserving’ economic immigrants. In contrast, policy discourse
operated to directly locate ‘good’ immigrants (namely, economic immigrants and,
inconsistently, family-class immigrants) within the borders of the Canadian national
community in both historical and contemporary contexts. Simultaneously, the state’s
ability to safeguard the nation from ‘bad’ (fraudulent, criminal) immigrants was
paramount, and operated to marginalize immigrants who could be perceived as
threatening national integrity. For its part, official measurement operated to reify
bureaucratic categories of admission and thus to position immigrants to the Canadian
nation in specific reference to those categorizations. Moreover, the LSIC findings were
revealing of a perceived need to conceptualize and operationalize migrants within
identities that can be deployed to understand new immigrants’ ‘differences,’ and to
determine how these differences interfere with immigrant integration, defined in
individualistic and ‘Canadian-centric’ terms. As such, in the formation of the Canadian
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national community represented in measurement discourse, family-class immigrants
and, more generally, immigrant families, were subtly marginalized as a relevant site of
inquiry, while immigrants’ ethnic identities emerged as a discernable topic of concern.
Overall, the discursive representations uncovered in this thesis suggest that
Simmons’ (2010, 1999) understanding of the ‘imagined future’ guiding current
Canadian immigration policy extends beyond the policy context. Rather, a particular
vision of the Canadian nation manifests in broader discourses on immigration, directly
contributing to the social construction of immigrants, Canadians, and the Canadian state
and, by extension, the Canadian national imagined community. Across media, policy,
and measurement discourses, an overarching theme was that the purpose of immigration
is to serve the economic needs of the nation, and that the state needs to maximize the
benefits of the immigration program while minimizing the potential threats to the
Canadian nation associated with international immigration. Moreover, the multicultural
and diverse nature of the nation was widely acknowledged in different discourses
(although not unproblematically). In this way, the ‘imagined future’ guiding
immigration policy is visible in public realms in the form of dominant discourses that
construct both the value and risks associated with contemporary international
immigration. These discourses convey narratives about immigration in which
immigrants, in general, and specific groups of immigrants, in particular, are socially
constructed in relational terms alongside Canadians and the Canadian state.
It is relevant at this point to also reflect back on Benedict Anderson’s theorizing
about nations. The present thesis demonstrated that insight into Anderson’s
understanding of nations as imagined communities can be fruitfully gained by
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considering various dimensions of national immigration discourses. This contention is
based on two key points. The first pertains to the role of immigration in defining a
nation’s insiders and outsiders in both material and symbolic terms, thereby enabling
national identity to be simultaneously defined. The second pertains to the centrality of
communications in the nation-building process associated with defining a national
community.
On the first point, as demonstrated throughout this thesis, immigration brings
about social questions and controversies that shed light directly on the issue of national
identity. Immigration necessarily involves allowing certain people into and keeping
others out of a nation’s geographic and social space (although, as illustrated in this
thesis, the boundaries of these two spaces do not always coincide). In doing so, the
qualities and characteristics of a nation and its community members are simultaneously
defined. By virtue of granting newcomers entry via different categories of admission,
immigration policy establishes gradations of belonging to the Canadian nation in both
material and symbolic terms. Moreover, the Canadian stance on immigration is linked
with representations of national identity, presented to widespread audiences around the
world. In this way, immigration stands as a central site for defining the desired
characteristics of the national community. Importantly, across the discourses examined,
it was clear that immigration is a source of contention and concern. In particular,
immigration from non-traditional source countries, and that which does not directly
service the nation’s neo-liberal goals, remains an object of contention and inquiry. Yet,
the place of immigrants in Canada’s national community does not fall strictly within
dichotomous conceptualizations of ‘us’ and ‘them.’ In cases where dichotomous
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constructions emerged, they could not be neatly attributed to any single dimension (or
any straightforward combination of dimensions) such as ‘race.’ ethnicity, gender, or
mode of entry. Often, ‘immigrants’ were constructed in ambiguous terms and were
inconsistently positioned with respect to other groups of immigrants, Canadians, the
Canadian state, and, by extension, Canada’s imagined community. It is thus impossible
to speak uniformly of ‘immigrants’ as ‘Others’ who are symbolically positioned on the
margins of the Canadian national community. Indeed, this thesis suggests that the
symbolic place of immigrants in Canada’s imagined community is much more multidimensional, amorphous, and context-specific than is often implied by simplistic
‘immigrants as outsiders’ or ‘us versus them’ conceptualizations. To this end, it is
theoretically important to conceptualize the notion of imagined communities in fluid
rather than concrete, dichotomous terms.
The second main point of Anderson’s work addressed in the present thesis
pertains to the role of communications in defining a national community. In a
geographically expansive country populated by tens of millions of people, direct
communication among all community members is not feasible. As such, public
discourses disseminated through various communication media hold a critical role in
expressing ideologies, in socially constructing national identity, and in defining national
belonging. In this context, discourses on immigration constitute an important site for
defining the contours of the Canadian national community. Indeed, as demonstrated in
this thesis, discourses on immigration abound with representations of immigrants,
Canadians, and the Canadian state. Taken together, these discursive representations
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constitute an elaborate, multi-dimensional imagining of the Canadian nation that is
communicated to widespread national and international audiences.
In sum, the present thesis demonstrates that representations of immigrants and
immigration serve, in symbolic terms, as vehicles for defining the public image of the
Canadian nation. In the imagining of the Canadian nation in official contexts,
immigration serves as a means for bolstering Canada’s national and international image
as a sovereign, competitive, tolerant, and socially-just nation. The admission of large
numbers of diverse immigrants alongside discourses of tolerance and fairness conveys
to national and international communities that Canada is a desirable place to live and
work. Canada’s official multicultural status and rhetorical celebration of diversity
discursively operates as ‘evidence’ that the nation has overcome its highly
discriminatory history. The ‘Canadian-centric’ nature of the imagined future guiding
current immigration policy and the reality of structural inequality in both national and
global contexts are thus obscured by discourses of tolerance, democracy, and inclusion.
They are also obscured by discourses that ‘legitimately’ construct immigrants as threats
or social burdens. Moreover, insofar as specific groups of immigrants are represented in
discourse as frauds, criminals, or social leeches, then the ideological stage has been set
for their marginalization in the Canadian nation in both symbolic and material terms. In
the bigger picture, positive images of immigrants serve to augment Canadian national
identity, while negative images of immigrants serve as a counterpoint for articulating a
vision of the ideal Canadian citizen. The social construction of immigrants thus affords
the opportunity to simultaneously co-construct Canadians and the Canadian state, such
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that immigration operates as a key site for defining the Canadian national imagined
community.

7.2 Limitations and Future Directions
It is relevant at this point to address the thesis’ limitations, which fall into two
categories: the first pertains to data limitations, and the second relates to the highly
interpretive nature of discourse analysis. These limitations are discussed in reference to
future directions for research.
With respect to data limitations, a shortcoming of the present thesis was its
reliance on textual materials that may or may not be entirely representative of the
respective discourses under examination. The impact of this limitation was minimized
through systematic efforts to gather a comprehensive data set, and to analyze materials
to the point of thematic saturation. In the examination of media coverage of marriage
immigrants, articles from a total of four newspapers over a ten year time period were
examined. As discussed in this chapter, three of these newspapers (namely, the Globe
and Mail, the Toronto Sun, and the Toronto Star) emerged from a keyword search of a
newspaper database as the publications with the most numerous relevant articles. The
fourth newspaper (the National Post, which was not included in the primary database
used) was purposively sampled in order to obtain as national a perspective as possible.
The limitations of this approach are evident. First, the analysis addressed only a small
selection of print news media in Canada. Second, reliance on electronic search engines
means that only articles included within the electronic database would be captured by
the search. Third, the fact that two of the four newspapers are Toronto-focused might
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also suggest that the findings pertain to a local or regional perspective. These limitations
are offset in part by the fact that three of the four publications (excluding the Toronto
Sun) are the most widely circulated and nationally read newspapers in Canada. The fact
that local or regional newspapers in other areas of Canada may or may not offer the
same portrayals as the newspapers analyzed thus does not negate the widespread
dissemination of particular messages about marriage immigrants accomplished by the
publications analyzed here. Future research could explore in more detail regional
variations in portrayals of marriage immigrants in order to determine whether the
representations uncovered here are upheld or subverted in other publications. Future
research could also involve media analyses that address in more detail other categories
of migrants in Canada. As noted in Chapter Four, widespread research in Canada has
documented the racialization and criminalization of immigrants in media portrayals.
However, specific analyses have not addressed representations of immigrants in direct
reference to their category of admission. Such analyses are relevant in light of the fact
that the merits and challenges of immigration are largely debated in reference to
bureaucratic immigrant types. The present thesis provided a useful case study of the
manner in which one particular group of immigrants is constructed with respect to
Canada’s national community. However, additional media research could explore this
topic further by addressing other immigrant types and other publications.
The data limitations of Chapters Five and Six similarly relate to the selection of
materials for analysis. In Chapter Five (policy discourse), key annual reports about
CIC’s policy activities and objectives were selected in order to best capture the
Canadian state’s perspective on immigration, as it is being presented to the broader
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social world. These materials, evidently, cannot be taken as representative of any
individual state actor’s opinions or even necessarily as the template for state activity.
This concern was less relevant here because the goal was not to uncover state actors’
‘true’ opinions of immigrants and their place in the Canadian nation. Rather, the
objective was to discern how the Canadian national community is formally imagined
and plated for public consumption through official state discourse, in reference to state
legitimacy and democratic racism. The materials analyzed were suited to these
objectives. Future research could consider how the content of internal state documents
map onto, or diverge from, the images of immigrants, Canadians, the state, and the
nation that surface in publicly available reports. Such an analysis could shed additional
light on the frameworks of state legitimacy and democratic racism addressed in Chapter
Five.
Indeed, from a theoretical perspective, Chapter Five suggests that additional
critical reflection on the democratic racism framework is necessary, at least in terms of
its usage in the immigration literature (as opposed to the literature on visible minorities,
which the present thesis did not evaluate, and for which theoretical implications may be
different). In terms of the continued usage of the democratic racism framework, a more
moderate alternative may be appropriate in the context of immigration. More
specifically, it may be suitable to explore the development of a concept such as
‘democratic Othering’ or ‘democratic xenophobia.’ 43 A concept such as this could
capture the fact that distinctions of ‘us and them’ and sentiments directed at the
exclusion of immigrants may be embedded in democratic language but are not neatly
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reducible to ‘race’ (as shown in Chapter Five). Alternatively, it may be necessary to
abandon some (but not all) elements of the democratic racism framework (that is, some
of the discourses of dominance associated with this framework), or to engage in a very
careful application of the framework so as to avoid overextending claims of racism. On
this latter point, although not all discourses of dominance outlined by Henry et al.
(2000) were evaluated in Chapter Five, sociological reflection on each discourse
described by the authors suggests a highly context-specific and thoughtful application is
necessary so as to maximize the utility of the framework. Indeed, some discourses of
dominance outlined by Henry et al. (2000) are much more convincingly ‘racist’ than
others. For instance, claims of non-racism followed by an overtly negative comment
about a racialized minority (i.e., “I’m not racist, but…”) seem suitably labeled
democratic racism. On the other hand, opposition to Canada’s multicultural policy
could exist on various grounds, and may not in all cases be borne out of racist beliefs or
attitudes. To this end, although a complete abandonment of the framework is by no
means advocated here, a more modest theoretical approach may be warranted.
In terms of Chapter Six, it is necessary to acknowledge that the LSIC is far from
the only survey instrument on immigrant settlement, nor does it represent the sole
source of official knowledge on immigrants in Canada. Similarly, the reports published
in association with the LSIC do not represent all that there is to glean from the LSIC. To
this end, the social construction of Canada’s national community via the LSIC depends
in part on the manner in which the LSIC results are used in public, political, and
research contexts. Nevertheless, the LSIC is the only official and nationally
representative survey of recent immigrants in Canada, and thus the questionnaire
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provides insight into the manner in which newcomers and their lives are conceptualized
in official research contexts. Overall, future research could expand upon Chapter Six’s
analysis in two ways. First, research could investigate the manner in which the LSIC
data are utilized in other contexts (e.g., in scholarly research, or among community and
advocacy groups). Such an analysis could provide insight into the manner in which
representations of immigrants in the LSIC questionnaire do or do not feed into the wider
usage and interpretation of the data. Second, it would be useful to conduct similar
critical examinations of other instruments used in immigration research in order to
uncover the political projects within which they were designed, the ideological biases
encoded within their measures, and, by extension, their contribution to the broader
statistical construction of immigrants in reference to Canada’s imagined community.
The second main limitation of this thesis pertains to the interpretation of
materials selected for analysis. As Henry and Tator (2002) note, “discourses resonate
with very dissimilar meaning and consequences for both the producers of the text and
the diverse communities of readers” (p. 227). In other words, the present interpretation
of discursive formations does not necessarily reflect the intended purpose of the
producers, nor is it likely to be the only possible interpretation of the data. Indeed,
qualitative critical discourse analysis is often charged with being too impressionistic
and subjective (see Bryman & Burgess, 1994). Effort was taken to minimize this bias by
being as transparent as possible with the data, providing representative quotes that
directly informed the conclusions being drawn. At the same time, the present thesis also
operates on the underlying tenet that research is not an entirely neutral, unbiased
endeavour. As discussed in Chapter Two, critical discourse analysts recognize the
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interpretive nature of their projects, and accept this feature as a necessary and useful
part of a socially engaged, reflexive and reflective social science. This thesis is thus not
intended to offer the final, authoritative word on the role of immigration discourse in
constructing Canada’s national imagined community. Rather, it is intended to offer a
new piece of dialogue that can stimulate further thought on this matter.

7.3 Conclusion
Regardless of how they are represented in discourse or perceived in Canadian society,
the reality is that immigrants are part of the economic, political, and social fabric of life
in Canada; in other words, regardless of whether they are imagined as being part of
Canada’s national community, they are part of Canada’s national community. They
work, they consume, and they pay taxes. They advocate and they vote. They contribute
to their communities in tangible and intangible ways. Despite the language employed
here, they are not a ‘them’ that stand in opposition to an ‘us’; indeed, day-to-day life in
Canada does not operate along clear-cut lines of ‘Canadian’ versus ‘immigrant.’
Immigrants are integral and often indiscernible parts of Canada’s social landscape who
engage in multiple social roles that are not necessarily captured in the ‘immigrant’ label.
It follows that simplistic discursive constructions misrepresent the reality of
immigrants’ lives. Nevertheless, discursive dichotomies, even ones that are diffuse and
ambiguous, stand to fragment Canadian social space in important ways by shaping
ideologies and, hence, attitudes and behaviours.
It is also impossible to ignore the fact that recent or former newcomers to
Canada are employed in arenas of media, policy, and research. In other words,
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immigrants do not stand exclusively as objects of discourse, but are also involved in
producing discourses on immigration, including the discourses analyzed in this thesis.
Granted, it is not possible to discern the voices of immigrants versus non-immigrants as
producers of the discourse analyzed here. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge
the role of immigrants in discursive production, thereby avoiding unrealistic
dichotomies of ‘Canadians’ as producers of discourse and immigrants as powerless
subjects of discourse.
As an extension of this point, it is also relevant to point out that discourse is a
site of contestation and symbolic struggle. Alternative discourses that dispute and resist
racialized and gendered discourses of marginalization and exclusion, albeit more diffuse
than dominant discourses, do exist. In order to bolster the power of discourses of
resistance, immigrant advocates engaged in cultural politics must come armed with a
politicized understanding of cultural representations, and recognize the power of
imagery in shaping perceptions of the ‘reality’ of immigration. Simultaneously,
reflexivity on behalf of scholars, journalists, and policy-makers can contribute to a
better understanding of the implications of categorizations and characterizations in
shaping social belonging. Only in this way can the Canadian nation – as an imagined
entity – be re-imagined in more inclusive terms.
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APPENDIX A: CANADIAN IMMIGRATION LEVELS
Table A.1: Number of Immigrants Admitted to Canada, by Selected Regions of
Origin, 1946-2000
Year

19461955
19561967
19681978
19792000
Total

Total
Immigrants
Admitted
1,222,319

Immigrants
from Britain

Immigrants from Europe
(excluding Britain)

Immigrants
from Asia

358,681

705,437

26,990

1,699,320

486,266

857,858

84,411

1,675,007

292,107

447,748

352,713

3,794,009

192,340

661,617

2,039,365

8,390,655

1,329,394

2,672,660

2,503,479

Source: Adapted from Li (2003a: 32)

Figure A.1: Region of Birth of Recent Immigrants to Canada, 1971 to 2006

Note: ‘Recent immigrants’ refers to landed immigrants who arrived in Canada within five years prior to a
given census.
Source: Statistics Canada (2007: 9)
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Table A.2: Percentage of Permanent Residents Admitted in 2008, by Category of
Admission
Category of Admission

Family Class

Economic
Class

Spouses and partners
Sons and daughters
Parents and grandparents
Other
Total
Skilled workers, principal applicants
Skilled workers, spouses and
dependents
Entrepreneurs, principal applicants
Entrepreneurs, spouses and dependents
Self-employed, principal applicants
Self-employed, spouses and
dependents
Investors, principal applicants
Investors, spouses and dependents
Provincial/territorial nominees,
principal applicants
Provincial/territorial nominees,
spouses and dependents
Live-in-caregivers, principal applicants
Live-in-caregivers, spouses and
dependents
Total

% of
Category
67.5
4.91
25.3
2.30
100.0
29.0
40.4

% of all Permanent
Residents
17.9
1.3
6.7
0.6
26.5
17.5
24.4

0.33
0.83
0.17

0.2
0.5
0.1

0.17

0.1

1.82
4.98

1.1
3.0

5.63

3.4

9.45

5.7

4.14

2.5

2.99

1.8

100

60.3

Source: Adapted from CIC (2009a)

Table A.3: Percentage of Male and Female Permanent Resident Immigrants by
Source Region, 2008
Source Area
Africa and Middle East
Asia and Pacific
South and Central
America
United States
Europe and the United
Kingdom
Total

% of Male Permanent
Residents in 2008
21.7
45.6

Source: Adapted from CIC (2009a)

% of Female Permanent
Residents in 2008
19.9
49.6

10.7

10.7

4.6

4.4

17.4

15.6

100.0

100.0
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Table A.4: Percentage of Family Class and Economic Immigrants by Source
Region, 2008
Source Area
Africa and Middle East
Asia and Pacific
South and Central America
United States
Europe and the United
Kingdom
Total
Source: Adapted from CIC (2009a)

% of Family Class in
2008
14.2
52.8
11.8
7.1

% of Economic Class in
2008
20.9
49.2
7.6
3.3

14.1

18.9

100.0

100.0
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APPENDIX B: IMMIGRATION PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
The official objectives of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act with respect to
immigration are:
(a) to permit Canada to pursue the maximum social, cultural, and economic benefits
of immigration;
(b) to enrich and strengthen the social and cultural fabric of Canadian society, while
respecting the federal, bilingual and multicultural character of Canada;
(b.1) to support and assist the development of minority official language
communities in Canada;
(c) to support the development of a strong and prosperous Canadian economy, in
which the benefits of immigration are shared across all regions of Canada;
(d) to see that families are reunited in Canada;
(e) to promote the successful integration of permanent residents into Canada, while
recognizing that integration involves mutual obligations for new immigrants and
Canadian society;
(f) to support, by means of consistent standards and prompt processing, the
attainment of immigration goals established by the Government in Canada in
consultation with the provinces;
(g) to facilitate the entry of visitors, students and temporary workers for purposes
such as trade, commerce, tourism, international understanding and cultural,
educational and scientific activities;
(h) to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of
Canadian society;
(i) to promote international justice and security by fostering respect for human
rights and by denying access to Canadian territory to persons who are criminals
or security risks; and
(j) to work in cooperation with the provinces to secure better recognition of foreign
credentials of permanent residents and their more rapid integration into society.
Source: Statutes of Canada (2001)
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APPENDIX C: INFORMATION ON LSIC
The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC) targeted landed immigrants
who arrived in Canada between October 2000 and September 2001, and who were aged
15 years or older at the time of arrival. In order to meet inclusion criteria for the survey,
immigrants must have applied through a Canadian Mission Abroad (i.e. individuals
applying for permanent resident status from within Canada were not eligible; refugees
who were granted asylum from within Canada were similarly not eligible for
participation). The sampling frame for the survey was approximately 165,000 of the
250,000 persons admitted to Canada during the reference period. In total, a
representative sample of 20,322 immigrants were selected from the target population;
12,128 of these responded to the first wave of the survey (conducted six months after
their initial arrival in Canada), of which approximately 9,300 responded to the second
wave (two years after arrival) and 7,700 responded to the third wave (four years after
arrival) (Schellenberg & Maheux, 2007).

Table C.1: Overview of LSIC Questionnaire
Questionnaire
Domain

# of questions
(% of 495
questions)

Question topics
• How information (services, training, employment,
etc.) was accessed
• Contact with sponsor
• Intention to sponsor

Social
Interactions

• Help provided to other immigrants
65 (13.1%)

• Contact with family outside of Canada
• Friendships and social contacts
• Emotional connections and ability to ask for help
• Participation in groups/organization
• Experiences of discrimination
• Language spoken at home
• Facility in speaking English/French in different
situations (speaking with doctor, arranging a
meeting, taking a phone message)
• Facility in reading/writing in English/French

Language

69 (13.9%)

• English/French language training (including
course completion, reasons for non-completion,
who paid for courses)
• Other steps taken to improve English/French
• Difficulties receiving training
• Assistance sought to overcome difficulties

304

Questionnaire
Domain

# of questions
(% of 495
questions)

Question topics
• Type of residence
• Rent or own
• Mortgage/loan
• Money given to others towards their housing costs
• Monthly cost of housing

Housing

32 (6.5%)

• Quality of housing (need for repairs)
• Size of housing (number of rooms)
• Satisfaction with housing
• Difficulties finding housing
• Help sought/received/not received to find housing
• Intentions to move/purchase housing
• Formal education outside Canada (highest level
attained, country attained, language of instruction)
• Education/training in Canada (excluding language
instruction)
• Additional courses/programs taken (including
field of study, contribution to diploma/degree,
who/how paid)
• License/certification
• Credential assessment

Education

79 (16.0%)

• Plans for further education/training
• Difficulties receiving education/training in Canada
• Assistance sought/received/not received to
overcome difficulties
• Partner/spouse’s education
• Children’s schooling
• Perceived importance of children speaking
English/French
• Children’s problems in school
• Contact with children’s school(s)
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Questionnaire
Domain

# of questions
(% of 495
questions)

Question topics
• Main employment activity/duties
• Efforts to find work
• Language spoken/ethnicity pertaining to business
partner(s), employee(s), client(s), supplier(s), coworker(s)
• Job satisfaction
• Difficulties finding work in Canada

Employment

102 (20.6%)

• Assistance sought/received/not received to
overcome difficulties
• Acceptance/non-acceptance of foreign work
experience
• Volunteer work
• Partner/spouse’s employment situation
• Business ownership
• Wage/salary (self, partner/spouse)
• Quality of personal health
• Health insurance coverage
• Medical/dental services used in past 12 months
(self, children)
• Medical problems

Health

43 (8.7%)

• Stress
• Difficulties accessing/using health services in
Canada
• Assistance sought/received/not received to
overcome difficulties
• Importance of language spoken by/ethnicity and
sex of health service providers
• Importance of ties based on ethnicity/culture
• Importance of carrying on values and traditions of
ethnic/cultural group or homeland (self, children)

Values and
attitudes

22 (4.4%)

• Importance of learning/practicing values and
traditions of Canada (self, children)
• Children’s knowledge of language of homeland
• Children’s attendance at special classes/schools
for ethnic/cultural group
• Sense of belonging to family, ethnic/cultural
group, city, province, Canada, North America

306

Questionnaire
Domain

# of questions
(% of 495
questions)

Question topics
• Plans for settling in Canada

Citizenship

17 (3.4%)

• Reasons for staying or leaving Canada
• Canadian citizenship status/intentions
• Emigration plans
• Family income from sources within Canada
(sources, amount)
• Family income from outside Canada (sources and
amount)

Income

66 (13.3%)

• Personal income
• Savings
• Loans
• Remittances
• Likes and dislikes about Canada
• Difficulties in Canada

Perceptions of
Settlement

12 (2.4%)

• Perceived material well-being
• Quality of life
• Satisfaction with life (own, children, other family
members)

307
APPENDIX D: LSIC REPORTS ANALYZED IN CHAPTER SIX
Table D.1: LSIC Reports Analyzed in Chapter Six
Title (Year)

Author(s)/Contributors

Department/Division

Immigrants’ Perspectives
on their First Four Years
in Canada: Highlights
from Three Waves of the
Longitudinal Survey of
Immigrants to Canada
(2007)

Grant Schellenberg and Helene
Maheux

Social Analysis
Division, Statistics
Canada

Knowledge of Official
Languages Among New
Immigrants: How
Important Is It in the
Labour Market? (2007)

Chantal Grondin

Special Surveys
Division, Statistics
Canada

Elizabeth Ruddick, Jean Bergeron,
Mary Grant, Martha Justus, Stan
Kustec, Stephanie Potter1

1

Longitudinal Survey of
Immigrants to Canada: A
Portrait of Early
Settlement Experiences
(2005)

Cindy Bryant, Patrice Dion, JessieLynn MacDonald, Owen Phillips,
Michelle Simard, Sylvain Tremblay2

Citizenship and
Immigration Canada

2

Statistics Canada

Longitudinal Survey of
Immigrants to Canada:
Process, Progress and
Prospects (2003)

Tina Chui

Housing, Family and
Social Statistics
Division, Statistics
Canada.

Longitudinal Survey of
Immigrants to Canada:
Progress and Challenges
of New Immigrants in the
Workforce (2005)

Tina Chui and Kelly Tran

Social and Aboriginal
Statistics Division,
Statistics Canada

Longitudinal Survey of
Immigrants to Canada: A
Regional Perspective of
the Labour Market
Experiences (2006)

Kelly Tran and Tina Chui

Social and Aboriginal
Statistics Division,
Statistics Canada

New Immigrants’
Assessments of their Life
in Canada (2010)

René Houle and Grant Schellenberg

Social Analysis
Division, Statistics
Canada

Note: All reports were published by authority of the Minister responsible for Statistics Canada (Minister
of Industry)
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